2009-08-19 | AFP Al-Qa\u00efda au Maghreb islamique (Aqmi), qui a revendiqu\u00e9 l’attentat suicide du 8 ao\u00fbt contre l’ambassade de France \u00e0 Nouakchott, est une \u00ab\u00a0m\u00e9tastase\u00a0\u00bb \u00e9trang\u00e8re \u00e0 la Mauritanie, a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 mercredi Naha Mint Hamdi Ould Mouknass, sa ministre des Affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res. Le terrorisme d’Al-Qa\u00efda correspond \u00e0 un \u00ab\u00a0comportement compl\u00e8tement \u00e9tranger \u00e0 la population mauritanienne\u00a0\u00bb, c’est \u00ab\u00a0une m\u00e9tastase\u00a0\u00bb. \u00ab\u00a0Il faut savoir arr\u00eater cette m\u00e9tastase terroriste au niveau du corps mauritanien\u00a0\u00bb, a-t-elle dit dans une interview \u00e0 la cha\u00eene d’information France 24. \u00ab\u00a0Il faut poser une strat\u00e9gie douce qui se mat\u00e9rialise par la lutte contre la pauvret\u00e9 et l’ignorance, et il faut aussi lutter de mani\u00e8re efficace et un peu plus violente. C’est une m\u00e9thode dure, difficile mais certainement les jours \u00e0 venir vont nous prouver qu’elle est efficace\u00a0\u00bb, a-t-elle ajout\u00e9. La revendication de l’Aqmi est accompagn\u00e9e, selon le centre am\u00e9ricain de surveillance de sites islamistes (SITE), par une photographie du kamikaze, identifi\u00e9 comme Abu Obeida Musa al-Basri, et qui habitait le quartier Basra dans la capitale mauritanienne. La photographie montre un homme portant l’habit traditionnel mauritanien. L’auteur de l’attaque a p\u00e9ri dans l’explosion de la charge qu’il transportait et qui n’a que l\u00e9g\u00e8rement bless\u00e9 deux gendarmes fran\u00e7ais et une Mauritanienne. L’Aqim affirme, selon le SITE, que l’attaque \u00e9tait une riposte aux agressions des \u00ab\u00a0Crois\u00e9s\u00a0\u00bb, notamment la France, et des dirigeants mauritaniens contre l’islam et les musulmans 2009 AFP<\/font><\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Le pr\u00e9sident syrien Bachar al-Assad en visite \u00e0 T\u00e9h\u00e9ran<\/strong><\/font><\/h3>\n<\/div>\n
(AFP) \u2013\u00a0 19 ao\u00fbt 2009 TEHERAN \u2014 Le pr\u00e9sident syrien Bachar al-Assad est arriv\u00e9 mercredi \u00e0 T\u00e9h\u00e9ran pour une visite d’un jour afin de f\u00e9liciter le pr\u00e9sident Mahmoud Ahmadinejad pour sa r\u00e9\u00e9lection, a rapport\u00e9 la t\u00e9l\u00e9vision. Le pr\u00e9sident syrien s’entretiendra avec son homologue iranien et d’autres responsables et il \u00ab\u00a0f\u00e9licitera M. Ahmadinejad pour sa r\u00e9\u00e9lection\u00a0\u00bb, selon la t\u00e9l\u00e9vision. Cette visite intervient alors que la France a remerci\u00e9 le pr\u00e9sident syrien pour avoir selon elle contribu\u00e9 \u00e0 la lib\u00e9ration sous caution de l’universitaire fran\u00e7aise Clotilde Reiss et de l’employ\u00e9e iranienne de l’ambassade de France Nazak Afshar. Elles \u00e9taient d\u00e9tenues pour leur implication dans les manifestations qui ont suivi la r\u00e9\u00e9lection contest\u00e9e de M. Ahmadinejad le 12 juin. Mlle Reiss est h\u00e9berg\u00e9e \u00e0 l’ambassade de France en attendant un verdict de la justice iranienne mais Paris demande la fin des poursuites \u00e0 son encontre et \u00e0 ce qu’elle soit autoris\u00e9e \u00e0 rentrer en France. La Syrie est le meilleur alli\u00e9 de l’Iran au Proche-Orient.<\/font><\/div>\n
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France: profanation avec sigles nazis d’un lieu de culte musulman<\/font><\/h3>\n
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AFP \/ 19 ao\u00fbt 2009 15h47 TOUL (France) – Un lieu de culte musulman a \u00e9t\u00e9 profan\u00e9 \u00e0 Toul, dans le nord-est de la France, avec des graffitis racistes, des croix gamm\u00e9es et une t\u00eate de cochon accroch\u00e9e \u00e0 la porte, a-t-on appris mercredi de source proche de l’enqu\u00eate. Le b\u00e2timent a \u00e9t\u00e9 enti\u00e8rement recouvert de graffitis, a constat\u00e9 un riverain. Une t\u00eate de porc \u00e9tait accroch\u00e9e sur la poign\u00e9e de la porte ainsi que des pieds de cochons sur les volets de ce lieu de culte, g\u00e9r\u00e9 par l’association socio-culturelle des Maghr\u00e9bins de cette ville proche de Nancy. Croix gamm\u00e9es, sigles SS et formules x\u00e9nophobes recouvraient trois fa\u00e7ades du b\u00e2timent situ\u00e9 dans un quartier p\u00e9riph\u00e9rique de Toul. Le procureur Raymond Morey, qui s’est rendu sur place, a indiqu\u00e9 avoir d\u00e9cid\u00e9 de confier l’enqu\u00eate \u00e0 la police judiciaire de Nancy en raison de \u00ab\u00a0la gravit\u00e9 de ces faits\u00a0\u00bb. Le lieu de culte, qui comprend une salle de pri\u00e8re et des salles de cours, a \u00e9t\u00e9 ouvert il y a une vingtaine d’ann\u00e9es. \u00ab\u00a0On n’a jamais eu de probl\u00e8me jusqu’alors\u00a0\u00bb, a soulign\u00e9 Ichou Amzil, tr\u00e9sorier de l’association socio-culturelle. Nadine Morano, secr\u00e9taire d’Etat charg\u00e9e de la Famille et de la Solidarit\u00e9 et \u00e9lue r\u00e9gionale, a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 avoir \u00ab\u00a0appris avec consternation\u00a0\u00bb les d\u00e9gradations commises. Elle a ajout\u00e9 dans un communiqu\u00e9 avoir \u00ab\u00a0condamn\u00e9 tr\u00e8s fermement ces violences inacceptables\u00a0\u00bb et \u00ab\u00a0souhaite que toute la lumi\u00e8re soit faite sur cette affaire afin que les responsables soient jug\u00e9s et sanctionn\u00e9s\u00a0\u00bb. De son c\u00f4t\u00e9, le Conseil fran\u00e7ais du culte musulman (CFCM) a \u00ab\u00a0fait part de sa vive indignation face \u00e0 cette nouvelle agression raciste et x\u00e9nophobe\u00a0\u00bb, et appel\u00e9 \u00ab\u00a0les autorit\u00e9s publiques \u00e0 tout mettre en oeuvre\u00a0\u00bb pour arr\u00eater les auteurs de ces tags\u00a0\u00bb.<\/div>\n
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Un maire du nord de l’Italie interdit le port du \u00ab\u00a0burkini\u00a0\u00bb<\/font><\/h3>\n
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AFP, le 19 ao\u00fbt 2009 \u00e0 13h34 ROME, 19 ao\u00fbt 2009 (AFP) – Un maire du nord de l’Italie, membre de la Ligue du Nord, le mouvement anti-immigr\u00e9s, a interdit le port du \u00ab\u00a0burkini\u00a0\u00bb, maillot de bain islamique, sous peine d’une amende de 500 euros, indique mercredi l’agence Ansa. Gianluca Buonanno, maire de Varallo Sesia, pr\u00e8s de Vercelli, dans le Pi\u00e9mont, a interdit l’usage du burkini compos\u00e9 d’un voile, d’une tunique et d’un pantalon large \u00ab\u00a0dans les piscines et le long des cours d’eau\u00a0\u00bb de sa commune, selon la m\u00eame source. \u00ab\u00a0La vue d’une +femme masqu\u00e9e+ pourrait troubler les plus petits enfants, sans parler des probl\u00e8mes d’hygi\u00e8ne\u00a0\u00bb, a-t-il dit, selon Ansa. \u00ab\u00a0Nous ne devons pas \u00eatre obligatoirement toujours tol\u00e9rants. Imaginons le bain d’une femme occidentale en bikini dans un pays musulman. Les cons\u00e9quences pourraient \u00eatre la d\u00e9capitation, la prison ou l’expulsion. Nous nous limitons \u00e0 interdire l’utilisation du burkini et si cette d\u00e9cision g\u00eane quelqu’un, cette personne pourra toujours prendre un bain dans sa baignoire\u00a0\u00bb, a conclu le maire. La Ligue du Nord est un parti r\u00e9gionaliste et anti-immigr\u00e9s dirig\u00e9 par Umberto Bossi et dont les membres sont coutumiers de propos et initiatives visant les musulmans. En d\u00e9cembre 2008, la Ligue du Nord a d\u00e9pos\u00e9 une motion \u00e0 la Chambre des d\u00e9put\u00e9s visant \u00e0 interdire la construction et la cr\u00e9ation de lieux de culte et de centres culturels musulmans en Italie, jusqu’\u00e0 ce qu’une loi encadrant leur \u00e9dification soit approuv\u00e9e par le Parlement AFP <\/div>\n
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Pakistan – Holbrooke re\u00e7oit des dirigeants de partis islamistes<\/strong><\/font><\/h3>\n
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Reuters, le 19 ao\u00fbt 2009 \u00e0 08h40 ISLAMABAD, 19 ao\u00fbt (Reuters) – L’\u00e9missaire am\u00e9ricain Richard Holbrooke, en visite au Pakistan, a rencontr\u00e9 des responsables de partis islamistes officiels, esp\u00e9rant am\u00e9liorer l’image de Washington aupr\u00e8s de militants farouchement anti-am\u00e9ricains qui ont contribu\u00e9 \u00e0 l’essor du mouvement taliban. La pr\u00e9c\u00e9dente administration am\u00e9ricaine, sous la pr\u00e9sidence de George Bush, avait largement ignor\u00e9 ces formations islamistes, notamment le Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) et le Jamiat-e-ulema-e-Islam, ce dernier n’ayant pas m\u00e9nag\u00e9 son soutien aux taliban dans les ann\u00e9es 1990 en Afghanistan. \u00ab\u00a0Il s’agit d’\u00e9largir la base de nos relations au Pakistan au-del\u00e0 du cercle relativement restreint des contacts traditionnellement entretenus par Washington\u00a0\u00bb, a expliqu\u00e9 mercredi Vali Nasr, l’un des conseillers de Richard Holbrooke, \u00e9missaire des Etats-Unis au Pakistan et en Afghanistan. L’un des responsables du JI, Liaqat Baloch, a salu\u00e9 le \u00ab\u00a0changement de ton\u00a0\u00bb des autorit\u00e9s am\u00e9ricaines, sous l’impulsion du pr\u00e9sident Barack Obama, envers le monde musulman. Mais il s’est plaint de ne constater \u00ab\u00a0aucun changement concret\u00a0\u00bb sur le terrain au Pakistan et en Afghanistan, o\u00f9 les op\u00e9rations militaires contre les combattants islamistes se sont intensifi\u00e9es ces derniers mois. Richard Holbrooke a invit\u00e9 des membres du Jamaat-e-Islami, que certains responsables am\u00e9ricains comparent aux Fr\u00e8res musulmans d’Egypte, \u00e0 visiter l’ambassade des Etats-Unis \u00e0 Islamabad, afin de balayer les rumeurs r\u00e9currentes sur la pr\u00e9sence de milliers de \u00ab\u00a0marines\u00a0\u00bb dans cette enceinte fortifi\u00e9e. Holbrooke a affirm\u00e9 \u00e0 ses interlocuteurs que les Occidentaux n’avaient nullement l’intention de faire la guerre \u00e0 l’islam. Fazl-ur-Rehman, dirigeant du Jamiat-e-ulema-e-Islam, a \u00e9galement \u00e9t\u00e9 re\u00e7u par l’\u00e9missaire am\u00e9ricain et son \u00e9quipe. Apr\u00e8s le 11-Septembre, Rehman avait affirm\u00e9 qu’Al Qa\u00efda n’\u00e9tait pas responsable des attentats de New York et Washington et il avait mis en garde les Am\u00e9ricains contre une invasion de l’Afghanistan. Ces derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es, ses relations avec les taliban se sont tendues et il s’est prononc\u00e9 pour l’ouverture de n\u00e9gociations entre le gouvernement de Kaboul et les insurg\u00e9s islamistes. Le pr\u00e9sident pakistanais Asif Ali Zardari a estim\u00e9 que les rencontres entre Holbrooke et les partis islamistes marquaient le d\u00e9but d’une \u00ab\u00a0nouvelle \u00e8re en faveur de la paix et de la r\u00e9conciliation\u00a0\u00bb. \u00ab\u00a0Nous devons aider Obama. C’est une bouff\u00e9e d’air frais pour le monde entier\u00a0\u00bb, a-t-il dit aux journalistes accompagnant Richard HolbrookeREUTERS<\/div>\n
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Kaboul demande aux m\u00e9dias de ne pas parler des violences le jour des \u00e9lections, les journalistes afghans refusent<\/font><\/p>\n
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19 ao\u00fbt 2009 Rahim Faiez et Heidi Vogt Les journalistes afghans ont rejet\u00e9 mercredi la demande du minist\u00e8re afghan des Affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res qui souhaitait qu’ils ne diffusent aucune information sur des attentats ou des violences lors des \u00e9lections pr\u00e9sidentielle et provinciales de jeudi. Alors que les talibans ont revendiqu\u00e9 deux attentats-suicide \u00e0 Kaboul ces derniers jours et menac\u00e9 d’attaquer les bureaux de vote, le minist\u00e8re des Affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res avait publi\u00e9 mardi un communiqu\u00e9 demandant aux m\u00e9dias d’\u00e9viter de diffuser toute information sur des violences le jour des \u00e9lections, entre 6h du matin et 20h, pour \u00ab\u00a0assurer la large participation du peuple afghan\u00a0\u00bb au scrutin. Les m\u00e9dias locaux ont aussit\u00f4t d\u00e9nonc\u00e9 une atteinte \u00e0 la libert\u00e9 de la presse, cens\u00e9e \u00eatre r\u00e9tablie depuis la chute du r\u00e9gime fondamentaliste des talibans en 2001. \u00ab\u00a0Nous n’ob\u00e9irons pas \u00e0 cet ordre. Nous allons continuer notre couverture normale de l’actualit\u00e9\u00a0\u00bb, a expliqu\u00e9 Rahimullah Samander, chef de l’Association ind\u00e9pendante des journalistes d’Afghanistan. Il a rapport\u00e9 qu’un porte-parole de la pr\u00e9sidence l’avait appel\u00e9 mardi soir lui demandant d’informer les membres de l’association qu’ils ne devaient pas mentionner les violences le jour de l’\u00e9lection, ce qu’il a refus\u00e9. Quand des rumeurs de violence ou d’attentats circulent, \u00ab\u00a0la premi\u00e8re chose que font les gens, c’est d’allumer leur radio ou leur t\u00e9l\u00e9vision ou d’aller sur Internet pour lire les informations\u00a0\u00bb. \u00ab\u00a0Si les gens ne peuvent pas trouver l’information, ce sera difficile pour eux de participer \u00e0 l’\u00e9lection. S’il y a, par exemple, un attentat sur autoroute menant \u00e0 un bureau de vote, il faut que les gens soient inform\u00e9s. Cela pourrait \u00eatre dangereux pour eux d’utiliser cette autoroute\u00a0\u00bb. Fahim Dashti, r\u00e9dacteur en chef de l’hebdomadaire en langue anglaise \u00ab\u00a0Kabul Weekly\u00a0\u00bb, a d\u00e9nonc\u00e9 une \u00ab\u00a0violation de la loi sur les m\u00e9dias\u00a0\u00bb et de la constitution afghane qui prot\u00e8ge la libert\u00e9 d’expression. \u00ab\u00a0Si un \u00e9norme attentat se produit, bien s\u00fbr nous sommes oblig\u00e9s de le couvrir\u00a0\u00bb. La porte-parole de l’ambassade am\u00e9ricaine \u00e0 Kaboul Fleur Cowan a pr\u00e9cis\u00e9 que les Etats-Unis, tout en reconnaissant les droits souverains du gouvernement afghan, pensait qu’une couverture libre par les m\u00e9dias est \u00ab\u00a0directement li\u00e9e \u00e0 la cr\u00e9dibilit\u00e9 des \u00e9lections\u00a0\u00bb. Mais l’appel du gouvernement afghan risque d’enhardir les forces de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 qui se sont montr\u00e9es de plus en plus agressives ces derniers jours envers les journalistes qui tentent de couvrir les attentats. Mercredi, des journalistes se pr\u00e9cipitaient vers le site de l’attaque d’une banque \u00e0 Kaboul ont \u00e9t\u00e9 battus par des policiers qui ont frapp\u00e9 des photographes \u00e0 coup de crosse et les ont menac\u00e9s en pointant leurs fusils en direction de leur visage, selon un journaliste de l’Associated Press sur place. Au moins un appareil photo a \u00e9t\u00e9 cass\u00e9 dans la m\u00eal\u00e9e, au cours de laquelle la police s’en est aussi pris \u00e0 des civils. Un homme a re\u00e7u des coups de matraque, selon les journalistes d’AP. AP<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Muslim students reflect on Ramadan celebration<\/font><\/h3>\n
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Associated Press, le 19 ao\u00fbt 2009 \u00e0 02h20 By MEGAN K. SCOTT, Associated Press Writer NEW YORK (AP) _ Muslim Students Reflect on Ramadan Celebration Fasting with a purpose; College students celebrate Ramadan in food-obsessed culture By MEGAN K. SCOTT Associated Press Writer The Associated Press NEW YORK In a Muslim country, celebrating Ramadan is relatively simple: Most people are fasting from sunrise to sunset. But in the U.S., most people are eating, and enticing food commercials, an overabundance of restaurants and watching others eat can make celebrating the holiday more challenging. How do Muslims deal with the cravings, the puzzling looks and the \u00ab\u00a0Are you on a diet?\u00a0\u00bb questions? The Associated Press interviewed several college students about Ramadan, which begins around Aug. 21, according to Muslim scholars, and runs for 30 days. (Ramadan is set by sightings of the moon). Here are their stories, edited from their own words.<\/div>\n
NAME: Saba Shahid, 17, of Naugatuck, Conn., an incoming freshman at Quinnipiac University in Hamden, Conn.<\/strong> HER STORY: I can remember when I was younger, both me and my brother would pretend that we were fasting. We would go up to our parents and say, \u00ab\u00a0We’re not going to eat. We’re fasting too.\u00a0\u00bb Our parents never had to force us to do it. We were brought up with Muslim customs and traditions from a very young age. I’m pretty sure the first time I did it the correct way I was in fourth or fifth grade. I went to a Catholic high school and everyone was supportive. I had non-Muslim friends fast with me. Sometimes I would go to the cafeteria, and other days I would go to the library at lunchtime. There’s been days in the morning where I have been so busy I just had a glass of water. But I’m not going to lie. There are some days I can’t wait until sunset so I can eat. At the end we have Eid (Eid al-Fitr). Everyone gets all done up and stuff. We go have community prayer and then break fast together. We’ll come back home and we’ll get presents and go to neighbors’ houses. It’s kind of like our Christmas.<\/div>\n
NAME: Abdullah Shamari, 19, of Pomona, Calif., a rising sophomore at University of California, San Diego<\/strong> HIS STORY: A lot of kids are really excited to fast. I can remember when I was 6 or 7, I would fast at school and then break my fast when I came home. Now you see 6- or 7-year-olds fasting all day. Their parents tell them they don’t have to, but the kids want to. I was about 11 when I started fasting the entire day. As you grow up, you realize the significance. There’s more to it than fasting or abstaining from food. It’s more of a moral fast. You’re bettering yourself in all aspects. The first day and you haven’t fasted for a whole year, you’re going to get hungry. You’re going to have a headache. But generally no, you don’t get hungry. You know when you’re running a long race, there’s always a point where you want to quit. Once you get past that point, you keep going. It’s the same mentality. You get hungry, you know you have to keep going. In the end, you do feel good that you accomplished something, that you bettered yourself in some way, even if it was breaking a little bad habit.<\/div>\n
NAME: Aisha Azher, 18, of Ames, Iowa, an incoming freshman at Iowa State University<\/strong> HER STORY: I moved here when I was 9 from Pakistan. I started fasting when I was 12 to get the hang of it and then when I was 14, it became a must. In the beginning, you do get hungry, you do start craving, especially if you are watching television and see commercials for food. I keep myself busy. When I’m not busy I think about food. With friends, it can be awkward but they are very supportive. Sometimes they change plans so we can go to a movie instead of a restaurant. They ask about Ramadan. I tell them it’s the month of fasting and in this month we do not eat from sunrise to sunset. Then they ask why. I let them know that in Islam we are supposed to feel how the poor feel. At the same time, we are also supposed to work on one of our character flaws. I think I’m going to do procrastination this year. I worked on gossiping last year. I might break fast with pizza. The first thing I have is usually a glass of water, then some fruit. I try to lose weight \u2014 sort of. We have a community potluck on Saturdays at the mosque. There are many desserts, so whatever you have been working off over the week, the weekends you usually gain it back.<\/div>\n
NAME: Qasim Ijaz, 19, of Pittsford, N.Y., a rising junior at Monroe Community College in Rochester, N.Y.<\/strong> HIS STORY: Most of the people in Pakistan are Muslim, so mostly you don’t see anyone eating. Here everyone is eating around you. It’s very easy to cheat. I don’t ever cheat. God is everywhere. He’s watching you. The good thing is that my friends really don’t eat in front of me when I’m fasting. We try to plan something without food, such as bowling, maybe go play some pool, go for a walk or take a long drive. But if someone is eating, I try to keep busy with something else so I’m not watching him eat. The more you watch people eating, the more you want to eat. I start reading a book, or getting on the computer. I may pray. Ramadan is more than people not eating or smoking or drinking water. It’s also stopping yourself from telling a lie, from cheating. It’s stopping yourself from anything unethical. I was vice president of the Muslim club last year and got a lot of questions. \u00ab\u00a0Why are you guys fasting?\u00a0\u00bb Then people got used to it. I like when people ask questions. The best way to eliminate the misconceptions is by asking questions.<\/div>\n
NAME: Ismahan Warfa, 21, of San Diego, Calif., rising senior at University of California, San Diego<\/strong> HER STORY: Some people ask, \u00ab\u00a0Are you on a diet?\u00a0\u00bb and I’m like, \u00ab\u00a0No.\u00a0\u00bb A lot of people misconstrue Ramadan as a month where Muslims are starving themselves for no reason. People go on diets to make themselves skinny; this is fasting with a purpose. It teaches you self control. During the month, you have to try your best to control your tongue, make sure you are nice to people. You give to those who are less fortunate. I reflect back on my character and certain flaws that I wish to change so I can be a better person. I set a goal for myself to memorize a chapter from the Quran and apply the understanding to my life. Because we’re human, we always crave food. I have a weakness for chocolate. But I would feel disappointed in myself if I allowed for my cravings to control me. I’m a little sad when the month is over. You feel the blessing of it. At the same time, I feel happy because I set goals for myself for the entire year. I really love that month.<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Rotterdam cesse de collaborer avec l’islamologue controvers\u00e9 Tariq Ramadam<\/font><\/h3>\n
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AFP, le 18 ao\u00fbt 2009 \u00e0 18h54 LA HAYE, 18 ao\u00fbt 2009 (AFP) – La ville de Rotterdam et une universit\u00e9 n\u00e9erlandaise ont annonc\u00e9 mardi avoir mis fin \u00e0 leur collaboration avec l’islamologue controvers\u00e9 Tariq Ramadan parce qu’il pr\u00e9sente une \u00e9mission \u00e0 la t\u00e9l\u00e9vision Press TV, financ\u00e9e par le gouvernement \u00ab\u00a0r\u00e9pressif\u00a0\u00bb iranien. \u00ab\u00a0La commune de Rotterdam et l’Universit\u00e9 Erasmus de Rotterdam ont d\u00e9cid\u00e9 de mettre fin, de mani\u00e8re anticip\u00e9e, \u00e0 leur collaboration avec Tariq Ramadan\u00a0\u00bb, ont-elles indiqu\u00e9 dans un communiqu\u00e9 commun. \u00ab\u00a0La raison en est la collaboration de Tariq Ramadan avec la t\u00e9l\u00e9vision iranienne Press TV, qui est inconciliable avec ses deux fonctions \u00e0 Rotterdam\u00a0\u00bb, ont-elles pr\u00e9cis\u00e9. Press TV est \u00ab\u00a0financ\u00e9e par le gouvernement iranien\u00a0\u00bb, lequel a d\u00e9ploy\u00e9 une \u00ab\u00a0violence excessive envers des manifestants\u00a0\u00bb apr\u00e8s l’\u00e9lection pr\u00e9sidentielle en juin, a-t-on ajout\u00e9 de m\u00eame source. \u00ab\u00a0Cette relation indirecte avec ce r\u00e9gime r\u00e9pressif (…) n’est pas acceptable\u00a0\u00bb et \u00ab\u00a0a entach\u00e9 la cr\u00e9dibilit\u00e9 des travaux\u00a0\u00bb de M. Ramadan. Le Suisse Tariq Ramadan, petit-fils du fondateur des Fr\u00e8res musulmans \u00e9gyptiens, collaborait avec la mairie de Rotterdam depuis 2007 en mati\u00e8re d’int\u00e9gration. Il devait \u00eatre pr\u00e9sent deux jours par mois jusqu’en 2011, pour un salaire de 55.000 euros sur deux ans. Il avait vu sa collaboration r\u00e9affirm\u00e9e en avril, apr\u00e8s une enqu\u00eate sur des propos homophobes qui lui avaient \u00e9t\u00e9 attribu\u00e9s par les m\u00e9dias n\u00e9erlandais. Tariq Ramadan, qui vit actuellement en Grande-Bretagne et enseigne l’islamologie \u00e0 l’Universit\u00e9 d’Oxford, \u00e9tait \u00e9galement professeur invit\u00e9 \u00e0 l’Universit\u00e9 Erasmus. Il a indiqu\u00e9 qu’il allait attaquer la mairie en justice. \u00ab\u00a0C’est une question d’honneur et de dignit\u00e9\u00a0\u00bb, a-t-il r\u00e9agi sur la radio publique n\u00e9erlandaise. \u00ab\u00a0Ma collaboration avec Press TV \u00e9tait connue depuis un an. Il est incroyable de m’accuser aujourd’hui de soutenir le r\u00e9gime iranien\u00a0\u00bb, a-t-il ajout\u00e9. Selon lui, la d\u00e9cision rel\u00e8ve surtout du \u00ab\u00a0climat politique actuel aux Pays-Bas\u00a0\u00bb, o\u00f9 le d\u00e9put\u00e9 d’extr\u00eame droite Geert Wilders occupe r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement l’avant-sc\u00e8ne. AFP<\/div>\n\n
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Lettre ouverte \u00e0 mes d\u00e9tracteurs aux Pays Bas<\/font><\/h3>\n
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par Tariq Ramadan<\/font><\/strong> Une nouvelle pol\u00e9mique a commenc\u00e9 aux Pays-Bas. Au mois de mai-juin, on m\u2019accusait de \u00ab double discours \u00bb, d\u2019homophobie et de propos inacceptables \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9gard des femmes. Apr\u00e8s v\u00e9rification, la municipalit\u00e9 de Rotterdam a pr\u00e9cis\u00e9 que ces accusations \u00e9taient infond\u00e9es. Aujourd\u2019hui on affirme que je serais li\u00e9 au r\u00e9gime iranien et que je soutiendrais la r\u00e9pression qui a suivi les derni\u00e8res \u00e9lections. N\u2019est-il pas \u00e9tonnant que cette derni\u00e8re accusation ne soit apparue qu\u2019aux Pays-Bas ? Tout se passe comme si j\u2019\u00e9tais utilis\u00e9 (avec l\u2019islam) pour r\u00e9gler des comptes politiques dans la course aux voix alors que les \u00e9lections approches. L\u2019ombre de Geerd Wilders n\u2019est pas loin, lui qui gagne des voix en comparant le Coran au \u00ab Mein Kampf \u00bb de Hitler. Je suis devenu l\u2019\u00e9pouvantail et le pr\u00e9texte au d\u00e9foulement de passions politiques pas tr\u00e8s saines : au fond, cette pol\u00e9mique dit davantage sur l\u2019\u00e9volution inqui\u00e9tante des Pays-Bas que sur ma personne. Les attaques sur mon engagement ont \u00e9t\u00e9 tr\u00e8s violentes et il faut r\u00e9pondre clairement aux accusations. Quand j\u2019ai accept\u00e9 d\u2019animer une \u00e9mission en avril 2008, j\u2019avais pris trois mois de r\u00e9flexion en discutant avec des amis iraniens ainsi qu\u2019avec des sp\u00e9cialistes. J\u2019ai moi-m\u00eame suivi de pr\u00e8s l\u2019\u00e9volution du pays et les tensions internes. Je fus l\u2019un des premiers penseurs musulmans, en Occident, \u00e0 prendre position contre la fatwa \u00e0 l\u2019encontre de Salman Rushdie. Depuis vingt cinq ans, tout en relevant que comparativement aux pays arabes, l\u2019Iran avait avanc\u00e9 en mati\u00e8re du droit des femmes et de l\u2019ouverture d\u00e9mocratique, j\u2019ai critiqu\u00e9 le manque de libert\u00e9 d\u2019expression en Iran, l\u2019imposition du foulard, ou plus r\u00e9cemment la conf\u00e9rence sur l\u2019holocauste de 2006 (qui entretenait une dangereuse confusion entre la critique de la politique isra\u00e9lienne et l\u2019antis\u00e9mitisme). J\u2019ai bien s\u00fbr condamn\u00e9 la r\u00e9pression et les tirs sur les manifestants \u00e0 la suite des \u00e9lections. J\u2019ai toujours gard\u00e9 cette ligne critique, et constructive. Je passe du temps \u00e0 \u00e9tudier la vraie nature des dynamiques internes et je ne me laisse pas influencer par les campagnes de propagande, ni de l\u2019int\u00e9rieur du syst\u00e8me iranien, ni celle d\u2019Isra\u00ebl (qui affirme, pour s\u2019innocenter de fa\u00e7on inacceptable, que l\u2019Iran serait le principal obstacle \u00e0 la paix), ni celle des Etats-Unis ou de pays europ\u00e9ens qui d\u00e9fendent des int\u00e9r\u00eats strat\u00e9giques. Les rapports entre les forces religieuses et politiques sont tr\u00e8s complexes en Iran. Une vision binaire, qui opposerait deux camps \u2013 les conservateurs fondamentalistes aux r\u00e9formateurs d\u00e9mocrates \u2013 t\u00e9moigne d\u2019une profonde ignorance des r\u00e9alit\u00e9s du pays. En sus, les \u00e9volutions vers la transparence d\u00e9mocratique ne se feront pas par les pressions occidentales : le processus sera interne, long et douloureux. En acceptant d\u2019animer un show t\u00e9l\u00e9vis\u00e9 autour de d\u00e9bats sur l\u2019islam et la vie contemporaine, j\u2019ai fait le choix du d\u00e9bat critique. On ne m\u2019a jamais rien impos\u00e9 et j\u2019ai pu inviter des ath\u00e9es, des rabbins, des pr\u00eatres, des femmes, voil\u00e9es ou non, pour d\u00e9battre de sujets tels que la libert\u00e9, la raison, le dialogue interreligieux, le sunnisme et le chiisme, la violence, le jihad, l\u2019amour, l\u2019art, etc. Qu\u2019on regarde donc ces \u00e9missions et que l\u2019on me dise si on y trouve une seule seconde de soutien au r\u00e9gime iranien. Le programme est une opportunit\u00e9 d\u2019ouverture sur le monde et je le m\u00e8ne dans le respect de tous mes interlocuteurs. En ces temps de crise en Iran, je veux prendre une d\u00e9cision sereine et juste : je dois consid\u00e9rer les faits et d\u00e9terminer la meilleure strat\u00e9gie pour accompagner le processus interne vers la transparence et le respect des droits humains. La pol\u00e9mique et les d\u00e9bats passionn\u00e9s comme aux Pays Bas aujourd\u2019hui ne sont pas de bons conseils et je veux y voir clair avant de me d\u00e9terminer. Quand j\u2019ai accept\u00e9 l\u2019offre de PressTV Ltd \u00e0 Londres (je n\u2019ai eu aucun contact avec des autorit\u00e9s iraniennes mais avec des producteurs de t\u00e9l\u00e9vision qui offraient un service \u00e0 la chaine), je l\u2019ai fait en \u00e9tant clair sur mes conditions quant aux choix des sujets et \u00e0 mon ind\u00e9pendance dans le cadre d\u2019une \u00e9mission traitant de religion, de philosophie et de questions contemporaines. J\u2019ai tout rendu public et mes \u00e9missions sont aussi sur mon site depuis le d\u00e9but. J\u2019ai fait le choix d\u2019accompagner l\u2019\u00e9volution des mentalit\u00e9s sans jamais avoir \u00e0 soutenir le r\u00e9gime ni \u00e0 me compromettre. C\u2019est un choix que beaucoup d\u2019amis iraniens ont non seulement compris mais encourag\u00e9. Je ne fais pas ce travail pour l\u2019argent et une autre chaine de t\u00e9l\u00e9vision d\u2019informations internationales m\u2019a propos\u00e9 jusqu\u2019au triple des honoraires. J\u2019ai refus\u00e9 au nom de mes principes. Si je le voulais, en changeant de discours politique et religieux, je pourrais aujourd\u2019hui amasser des fortunes : tous ceux qui suivent mon travail le savent. Mais flatter les rois, les princes, les r\u00e9gimes et les fortunes n\u2019est pas ma philosophie de vie. Mes prises de position m\u2019ont amen\u00e9 \u00e0 payer le prix fort et je n\u2019ai jamais c\u00e9d\u00e9 : je ne peux me rendre en Egypte, en Arabie Saoudite, en Tunisie, en Lybie, en Syrie car j\u2019ai critiqu\u00e9 ces r\u00e9gimes qui \u00e9taient anti-d\u00e9mocratiques et ne respectaient pas les droits de l\u2019homme. Les Etats-Unis ont r\u00e9voqu\u00e9 mon visa \u00e0 cause de mes virulentes critiques contre les guerres en Afghanistan et en Irak et le soutien unilat\u00e9ral \u00e0 Isra\u00ebl. Ce dernier pays m\u2019a fait savoir que je n\u2019y serai jamais le bienvenu. Un conseiller de l\u2019ambassade de Chine m\u2019avait murmur\u00e9 un rien mena\u00e7ant, il y a vingt ans, que mon engagement aupr\u00e8s des Tib\u00e9tains ne passeraient pas inaper\u00e7u aupr\u00e8s les autorit\u00e9s de son pays. J\u2019ai toujours assum\u00e9 mes choix, je n\u2019ai jamais soutenu une dictature ou une injustice dans les soci\u00e9t\u00e9s majoritairement musulmanes comme dans tout autre soci\u00e9t\u00e9. Quant \u00e0 ceux qui me reprochent \u00ab le principe \u00bb de pr\u00e9senter un programme de t\u00e9l\u00e9vision dans une chaine iranienne, je r\u00e9ponds que travailler pour une chaine de t\u00e9l\u00e9vision n\u2019impose pas de soutenir un r\u00e9gime. Si l\u2019acte politique \u00e9tait si simple, il faudrait d\u2019urgence que mes d\u00e9tracteurs, si f\u00e9rus d\u2019\u00e9thique en politique, demande au gouvernement n\u00e9erlandais de mettre imm\u00e9diatement un terme aux relations politiques et \u00e9conomiques avec l\u2019Iran, l\u2019Arabie Saoudite, l\u2019Egypte, Isra\u00ebl ou la Chine. Curieusement, je n\u2019entends pas ces voix. Comme je ne les ai pas entendues quand la municipalit\u00e9 de Rotterdam m\u2019a lav\u00e9 des fausses accusations de \u00ab double discours \u00bb ou \u00ab d \u2018homophobie \u00bb ou encore quand la Cours f\u00e9d\u00e9rale am\u00e9ricaine \u00e0 inverser en ma faveur le jugement du tribunal de premi\u00e8re instance concernant la r\u00e9vocation de mon visa. Pourquoi ce silence ? Pourquoi ces accusations \u00e0 g\u00e9om\u00e9trie variable ? Parce que ces campagnes ne sont que des pr\u00e9textes destin\u00e9s \u00e0 attaquer un \u00ab intellectuel musulman visible \u00bb et ainsi de gagner des voix sur la peur et le rejet de l\u2019islam. Tous les moyens sont bons pour gagner des \u00e9lecteurs, m\u00eame les moins dignes, m\u00eame les moins honn\u00eates. Je respecte les principes, mais je ne plierai pas devant la propagande malsaine. Non pas seulement pour mon honneur mais \u00e9galement pour celui de notre humanit\u00e9 et de notre avenir. (Source : le site officiel de Tariq Ramadan, le 18 ao\u00fbt 2009) Lien : http:\/\/www.tariqramadan.com\/spip.php?article10752<\/font><\/a><\/font><\/strong><\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Democracy, Lebanese-Style<\/font><\/strong><\/div>\n
Melani Cammett<\/strong><\/font> Just as reports from Lebanon were indicating that a cabinet would be finalized within days, the notoriously fickle Druze leader Walid Jumblatt announced, on August 2, that his Progressive Socialist Party would withdraw from the governing coalition. Jumblatt criticized his coalition partners in the March 14 alliance, which had claimed victory in the June 7 parliamentary elections, for a campaign \u201cdriven by the re\u00adjection of the opposition on sectarian, tribal and political levels rather than being based on a political platform.\u201d[1] This view could apply to the campaigns of both major alliances that ran in the elections. While there were spirited appeals to prevent unwanted foreign intervention or control by representatives of other sects, the campaign period was notable for its lack of attention to issues of real substance. Six days before the elections, the Matn Salvation List, or the pro-government candidates running in the contested, predominantly Christian Matn district, held a rally where each of the seven list members delivered impassioned speeches to the enormous crowd about the need to save the country from control by the Hizballah-led opposition. The candidates warned that their opponents would bring rule by wilayat al-faqih, or the system of rule by clerics promoted by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Iran, and exhorted the crowd to recreate Lebanon as the \u201cSwitzerland of the East.\u201d Similarly, on election day, voters at a precinct in the Sunni Tariq al-Jadida neighborhood of West Beirut called out to each other, urging fellow voters to vote for the pro-government list \u201cso that Iran does not take over Lebanon.\u201d At the border with Syria, a large billboard read, \u201cThey will not come back as long as the sky is blue,\u201d in reference to the Syrian troops who were expelled following the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005. Even the opposition candidates from Michel Aoun\u2019s Free Patriotic Movement did not articulate and disseminate concrete agendas for reform beyond broad appeals for \u201cchange\u201d and \u201cfighting corruption.\u201d In conversations in Matn on election day, Aounists were hard-pressed to explain the specific elements of their party\u2019s platform that they found most appealing. In the Western media, many commentators devoured the campaign rhetoric and eagerly portrayed the elections as a de facto referendum on Lebanon\u2019s geopolitical orientation. The election, which pitted the US-backed March 14 alliance against the Iranian-backed March 8 alliance, was widely said to be a contest to determine whether Lebanese foreign policy would veer west toward the US and Europe, or east toward Iran. Indeed, the two major competing coalitions take their names from demonstrations that called for differing geopolitical orientations in the aftermath of Hariri\u2019s assassination. The March 8 alliance was formed following the March 8, 2005 demonstrations in central Beirut in which supporters of Hizballah insisted on the right of the \u201cresistance\u201d to maintain its arms, which it is said to receive from Iran via Syria. Days later, counter-protesters took to the streets, insisting that Syria withdraw its troops from Lebanon in what became known in the West as the Cedar Revolution. The March 14 alliance consists of some of those groups who find unity in their opposition to Syrian involvement in Lebanese political affairs. When the June election results came in, the governing March 14 coalition headed by Saad al-Hariri, son of the slain prime minister and leader of the predominantly Sunni Future Movement, edged out the Hizballah-led March 8 alliance by 14 seats. Western commentators billed the results as a victory for the forces of \u201cmoderation\u201d and a rejection of Iranian and Syrian influence in domestic politics. It was widely posited that President Barack Obama\u2019s address to the Arab world in Cairo on June 4 influenced the outcome in favor of the Hariri-led Future Movement. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman triumphantly reported: \u201cPresident Barack Obama defeated President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran.\u201d On the pages of the Wall Street Journal, Egyptian political activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim referred to an \u201cObama effect\u201d and opined that the results were part of a regional trend toward \u201cmoderation\u201d: \u201cThe results of the recent parliamentary elections in Lebanon and Kuwait clearly indicate that Islamist parties have lost significant ground to their moderate counterparts.\u201d Such rhetoric, however, misinterprets the import of the elections because it misreads what democracy in Lebanon means. Lebanon\u2019s electoral system is designed to ensure that some voters receive greater weight than others and its majoritarian district-level system means that even a small margin of victory grants the winner control over all seats in a district. Thus it was possible for the governing March 14 alliance to be declared the \u201cwinner\u201d of the election, despite losing the popular vote by almost 10 percent, while the Hizballah-led opposition was deemed the \u201closer\u201d despite gaining in total seats. [2] In fact, Hizballah won seats in all 11 districts where it fielded candidates and, where it prevailed. the Hizballah-led opposition won by higher margins than March 14. Regardless of who \u201cwins\u201d or \u201closes,\u201d the nature of Lebanon\u2019s political system means that the outcome of the elections will have limited consequences for actual politics and policy making. Lebanon\u2019s political system necessitates power sharing among religious groups so as to ensure government stability. Because the system functions by consensus, the opposition retains de facto veto power, bolstered by the threat of armed force. This threat was realized in May 2008, when Hizballah\u2019s militia took to the streets in response to the cabinet\u2019s decision to dismantle the group\u2019s telecommunications network. When the standoff was resolved, the opposition secured a veto in the cabinet, effectively reasserting the system of rule by consensus. Thus, an electoral loss does not necessarily translate into reduced influence in the system. The challenge of forming a cabinet after the elections demonstrates the limitations of an electoral victory. Despite March 14\u2019s success in the June elections, it has so far taken more than two months for an agreement to be reached on the composition of a cabinet, as the opposition will need to be awarded significant representation in order to avoid the stalemate that plagued the previous government for four years. Reports indicate that such a cabinet will comprise 15 seats for March 14, 10 for March 8 and five \u201cneutral\u201d seats to be appointed by the president. This would leave the opposition with significant voice, but just one vote shy of the 11 required for a veto. Such a framework would make it unlikely for March 14 to achieve its goal of disarming Hizballah. The tenuous significance of an electoral victory is further manifested by the change in fortune Jumblatt\u2019s withdrawal from March 14 brought to the so-called victors of the June elections. If the proposed cabinet composition holds, Jumblatt\u2019s defection would give March 14 little more than a third of the seats in the cabinet and only a two-seat lead over the opposition in Parliament. Despite his denunciation of March 14\u2019s sectarian discourse, Jumblatt\u2019s decision to withdraw is illustrative of the sectarian nature of Lebanese politics. Politics in Lebanon is marked by transitory alliances between sects, with politicians jockeying to improve their sect\u2019s position and protect its interests, often at the expense of national priorities. Dedicated first and foremost to his Druze constituents, Jumblatt has likely calculated that given the beginnings of a rapprochement between the US and Syria, remaining in the anti-Syria camp may not be the best long-term strategy for his community. Moreover, following the violence of May 2008, which was particularly fierce between Druze fighters and Hizballah in Mount Lebanon, Jumblatt may consider his community to be better protected if it takes a more neutral position. Distancing his party from March 14 will also serve to reconcile Druze factions in the aftermath of the May 2008 violence, which enhanced fissures between Jumblatt\u2019s loyalists and the Democratic Druze Party allied with March 8. Such sectarian maneuvers are not merely symptoms of a capricious politician weak in ideological commitment. They are characteristic of a political system that reinforces sectarian affiliation. Institutionalized Sectarianism<\/strong> Lebanon\u2019s 128-member Parliament is equally divided between Christians (all denominations) and Muslims (Sunnis, Shi\u2018a, Druze and Alawites). Each of Lebanon\u2019s 26 multi-member districts has pre-established quotas for candidates from different sects. Voters cast ballots for candidates from all sects — not just from their own sect — and the candidates with the highest number of votes win the seats allotted to their respective sects. In theory, candidates who run in districts with religiously mixed populations must appeal to voters from diverse sects. In practice, however, they rely on pre-election bargains with elites from other sects and create multi-sectarian lists, obviating the need to expend significant time or resources to actually woo members of other sects in most districts. As a result, competition is most intense among members of the same sect who run on competing lists. For example, in the largely Christian district of Jazzin in southern Lebanon, both the Shi\u2018i Amal Movement and the Christian Aounists ran Christian candidates for the district\u2019s Christian seats — a fact that exposed cracks in the opposition given that both parties were technically allies in the March 8 alliance. The district-level allocation of seats by sect based on the purported sectarian distribution of the population does not reflect the actual demographic distribution of the current population because the district-level seat allocations are based on the results of the last census, which was held in 1932. Variation in birth rates and emigration trends in different religious communities has resulted in the relative decline of Christians vis-\u00e0-vis Sunnis and, especially, Shi\u2018i Muslims. In addition, because citizens vote in their father\u2019s place of origin (or, for married women, in the husband\u2019s district of origin) rather than in their place of residence, there is a significant mismatch between where people vote and where they actually live. Similarly, other government offices are divided according to pre-established sectarian quotas, with the presidency reserved for a Maronite Christian, the office of prime minister for a Sunni Muslim and the speaker of Parliament for a Shi\u2018i, while bureaucratic and other administrative positions are also divided by sect. Thus, instead of distributing power proportionally, some groups are intentionally underrepresented while others are given a political weight that exceeds their demographic proportion. Lebanon\u2019s power-sharing system is founded on pacts among elites, who forge pre- and post-electoral compromises, thereby ensuring the stability of the overall system, with little opportunity for meaningful input on the part of the citizenry. Even Lebanon\u2019s particular mix of electoral regimes, which combines a division of power along religious lines with majoritarian electoral rules, does not achieve its intended goal of fostering cross-sectarian cooperation in society because elite-level alliances among political leaders from different sects undercut the need to forge meaningful linkages with citizens from other sects in many districts. Thus, in the 2005 elections, Hizballah, the Future Movement and other parties fielded Sh\u2018i and Sunni candidates in a joint list in Beirut despite the absence of a shared ideological agenda, thereby eliminating the potential for real cross-sectarian competition. Where other sects constitute swing voter blocs, parties generally form alliances with local elites rather than direct linkages with voters but, if necessary, the political machines of wealthier parties may provide cash or foodstuffs to local power brokers, who then distribute these resources to their followers for vote-buying purposes. For example, it is widely alleged that both Hizballah and the Future Movement engaged in such efforts in competitive districts such as Zahle in the Bekaa or the Matn in Mount Lebanon. Most importantly, because power is awarded based on religious affiliation, there is little scope for citizens to vote as citizens rather than as members of sectarian groups. All of these factors combine to distort the translation of voter preferences into electoral outcomes. Citizen Priorities<\/strong> Conversations with those outside of the wealthy, privileged elite reveal that citizens feel utterly disenfranchised and powerless to make their voices heard. In describing the Lebanese political class, people routinely exclaim, \u201cAll of them are liars.\u201d A comparison between the priorities of ordinary citizens and civil society groups and the trends in parliamentary activity corroborates these impressions. In 2006, a Lebanese non-governmental organization, Toward Citizenship, launched the Lebanese Parliamentary Monitor, which is an ongoing effort to assess the legislative initiatives of members of Parliament. According to its website, the project aims to \u201cenhance accountability and transparency by establishing a monitor to provide citizens with concrete information on their representatives\u2019 track record on key public policy issues.\u201d The findings of the project indicate a wide gap between the policy priorities of citizen groups and legislation. Polls show that the majority of Lebanese non-governmental organizations prioritize policy areas such as energy and water, social development and poverty alleviation, government reform, social security and anti-corruption measures. Low- and middle-income Lebanese — regardless of sectarian affiliation — are overwhelmingly concerned with bread-and-butter issues such as access to affordable, good quality medical care and schooling, as well as employment opportunities to provide stable and adequate lifestyle for their families.[3] But parliamentary activity has not centered on these citizen priorities: Between 2005 and 2007, over 18 initiatives submitted by MPs to Parliament related to justice (including institutional arrangements for investigating the assassinations of high-profile public figures such as Rafiq al-Hariri). Only one law proposed in this time period addressed social services. Justice-related proposals ranked first among MPs of the Future Movement, the Hariri family\u2019s political base — not surprisingly, given the organization\u2019s emphasis on an international tribunal to prosecute the perpetrators of Hariri\u2019s assassination. Meanwhile, opposition MPs tended to propose legal reforms related to parliamentary reform and anti-corruption measures, which were key the foundation of the opposition\u2019s critiques of the ruling majority. Legislation passed was even more removed from the priorities of the citizenry: Out of a total of 54 laws enacted in 2005 and 2006, the vast majority related to international pacts and agreements, while almost no laws concerned basic socio-economic issues that have more immediate effects on improving the lives of ordinary citizens. In 2005, no laws related to social services were passed and, in 2006, only one law was enacted in this issue area. As the Lebanese Parliamentary Monitor observes, \u201cNone of the top five priority public policies, as designated by civil society, appear in the top five legislated policies [sic].\u201d (While Parliament was particularly ineffective in the period 2005-2007, due to political turmoil following the assassination of Hariri, the legislature had not achieved much in less tumultuous times prior to this period.) In the June elections, at least 1.5 percent of Lebanese chose to protest the political system and the choice of candidates by casting blank ballots.[4] In the 2009 elections, the Ministry of Interior announced that it would count blank ballots separately from invalid ballots for the first time in Lebanese history. Unlike boycotting the elections, casting a blank ballot cannot be interpreted as political apathy. By making the effort to vote — which, in many polling stations was no small feat given hours of standing in long lines before reaching the ballot box — these voters chose to set aside apathy and the apparent \u201cirrationality\u201d of casting a ballot to convey their active opposition to the system. Still, absent a broader multi-pronged movement, this kind of opposition by individuals will have little impact. Lebanese Civil Society<\/strong> Lebanon is distinguished in the Arab world for its relatively democratic rule and vibrant civil society — characteristics that are largely a result of state weakness and social fragmentation. But an energetic and relatively unconstrained civil society does not necessarily translate into an effective civil society. The bulk of Lebanese civil society organizations are linked to religious organizations, family associations and political movements. The interactions of citizens with the state and civil society organizations are largely mediated by clientelist relations structured by religious sects, political parties and movements, or za\u2018ims (or individual, quasi-feudal leaders who tend to have regional power bases). Clientelist social relations are premised on exchange and, therefore, clients can derive benefits from patrons under such arrangements, but these benefits are not entitlements. Instead, they are contingent on the willingness of patrons to grant favors and on client compliance with the expectations of the patrons. As such, clientelist benefits are neither predictable nor reliable, nor are they subject to mechanisms of accountability, which would enable less privileged members of the population to organize in favor of their demands. Even in laissez-faire Lebanon, which institutes fewer public welfare programs than most developing countries, citizens view access to basic standards of living as entitlements of citizenship and, therefore, as one of the greatest failures of their state. For example, the Ministry of Health guarantees coverage of up to 85 percent of hospitalization expenses for all citizens with demonstrated financial need. A budget crisis, in part induced by abuse of this policy, limits the ability of the state to fulfill its commitment: Because the Ministry of Health is in arrears, hospitals increasingly refuse to accept patients without private insurance or confirmation of their ability to pay. Patients have even died outside of hospitals because their families could not show that they could cover hospitalization costs prior to treatment. Political factors also undercut citizen access to this entitlement: In practice, individuals require personal connections to access the right to financial assistance for hospitalization, often via a political party or religious authority. As long as citizens lack economic means, they are preoccupied with meeting the basic needs of their families, such as food, shelter and health, and therefore cannot devote precious time and resources to organize themselves in alternative forms of social organization. Under these conditions, it is virtually impossible for citizens to mobilize against clientelist social relations or to pressure elected officials to reform social policy, effectively locking low-income groups into a vicious cycle of dependence on patrons. If citizens somehow manage to join associations or engage in other forms of collective action that either directly or indirectly threaten the system, then powerful constituencies with vested interests in clientelist practices block their efforts. While wealthier individuals can afford to organize in independent, anti-sectarian associations, the majority of the population is too dependent on the intervention of elites for access to basic services or bureaucratic favors to risk jeopardizing relationships with their de facto patrons. Historical analyses suggest that economic growth and development, which enable people to amass sufficient resources to stake their own political claims, are important factors contributing to the decline of clientelism and machine politics. Yet given Lebanon\u2019s massive foreign debt, persistent economic challenges and high levels of income inequality, economic development with real benefits for the vast majority of the population seems distant at best. Civil society can be a vital arena for formulating and acting on different visions of the public good. These shared notions of the public good arise from deliberation among citizens. Since the creation of independent Lebanon in 1943, there has been no consensus on the country\u2019s national identity, with some Maronite Christians emphasizing Lebanon\u2019s alleged Phoenician heritage while others, including both Christians and Muslims, point to the country\u2019s Arab foundations. These disputes are alive and well today, as reflected in the persistent failure to publish official textbooks on national history as well as the multiple, competing historiographies taught in Lebanese private schools, which educated over 60 percent of the children enrolled in primary and secondary schools in 2006. Debates over the nature of Lebanon\u2019s national political community have also hindered the development of public welfare functions, in part because of strong \u201cpro-market\u201d pressures from the founding elites of the country and in part because of a lack of social cohesion and an associated ideology of national solidarity. The construction of a national welfare regime requires a sense of national solidarity, a point that was not lost on Fu\u2019ad Shihab, the president of Lebanon from 1958 to 1964. Shihab recognized the importance of national welfare regimes to nation building, compelling him to establish the National Social Security Fund, which he saw as a way \u201cto ground all Lebanese in a single society on which national unity is based — not as much on the basis of coexistence — but rather to make one complete people and to remain loyal to the country.[5] The Fund provides health coverage and other benefits to formal-sector employees. Although the Fund is virtually bankrupt and Lebanese complain about the de facto erosion of benefits, it remains a pillar of the Lebanese national welfare regime. With profound differences over the contours of the national political community, and a political system structured on religious lines, secular or cross-confessional forms of social organization have little if any opportunity to compete effectively. The ex ante structuring of politics around religion simply increases and entrenches the political salience of religious identity and undercuts the influence of non-religious groups in the system. In effect, elections become contests over who can best defend the interests of her sect. Virtually all of the major politicians resort to sectarian appeals — whether overt or more discreet. For example, although Aounist officials and their supporters loudly proclaim their opposition to sectarianism, the movement\u2019s candidates frequently resorted to sectarian language on the campaign trail by emphasizing the movement\u2019s qualifications for protecting Christian interests in Lebanon. For their part, pro-March 14 candidates also resorted to sectarian appeals, as the Matn Salvation List rally attests. These strategies pay off: Christians, who constituted the real swing voters in the elections, considered whether Aoun and his cohort or the pro-government Christian parties and local leaders would safeguard their position in the country, despite their dwindling numbers vis-\u00e0-vis both Sunni and Shi\u2018i Muslims. In Sidon and Beirut, where independent candidates ran for Sunni seats with non-sectarian messages, the Future Movement\u2019s implicit appeals to defend the Sunnis (not to mention vote-buying efforts) carried the day, while the Communist Party performed especially poorly in the handful of districts where it fielded candidates. Beyond Sectarianism<\/strong> Adopting a long-term perspective, some activists are challenging Lebanon\u2019s sectarian culture by working through the nongovernmental organization sector to promote a \u201cculture of rights\u201d among citizens. For example, explicitly anti-sectarian NGOs such as the Amal Association or the Mouvement Social run social programs that offer medical care, vocational training and other social services. Embedded in their activities are larger messages containing their visions for social change, inter-sectarian tolerance and the establishment of a national citizenship. The Amal Association, for example, displays attractive posters throughout its facilities promoting a \u201cculture of citizenship rights\u201d alongside public service announcements encouraging mothers to breastfeed or families to remain up to date on childhood immunizations. The organization\u2019s activities extend beyond the provision of services to community-based advocacy for human rights and inter-group reconciliation. In the religiously mixed region of Marjayoun, Amal runs a program that brings together Druze, Christian and Muslim youth to participate in dialogue and joint activities, with the goal of promoting greater tolerance and understanding in the community. Founded in 1961, the Mouvement Social, which currently focuses mainly on vocational training and income-generation programs, was founded by P\u00e8re Gregoire Haddad, who is sometimes referred to as the \u201cred priest\u201d because of his allegedly left-wing beliefs. Both of these groups make a point of establishing centers in areas that collectively encompass all of Lebanon\u2019s major sectarian groups and emphasize their non-sectarian, non-discriminatory and secular values in every public communication and activity they undertake. With their national presence and established histories, the Amal Association and Mouvement Social are among the most important non-sectarian civil society organizations in the country, and yet representatives from both organizations emphasize the uphill battle they face in Lebanon\u2019s political system. Their experiences underscore that such grassroots approaches will not yield rapid reforms. But local civil society organizations have been critical in overturning entrenched clientelism in other developing countries and are therefore likely to be essential components of a larger process of constructing substantive democracy in Lebanon — a goal that the current system cannot fulfill. Endnotes ——————————————————————————– [1] Daily Star, August 3, 2009. [2] Kamal Faghali, \u201cPreliminary Analysis of the Parliamentary General Elections in Lebanon, 2009,\u201d available online at http:\/\/elnashra.com\/elections\/articles-1-2991.html#file. [Arabic] [3] Based on author interviews in 2008 with 130 Lebanese citizens across sectarian lines. [4] Daily Star, June 11, 2009. [5] Albert Dagher, L\u2019Etat et l\u2019Economie au Liban (Beirut: CERMOC, 1995), p. 53. (Source: MIDDLE EAST REPORT ONLINE \u201cMERIP\u201d (USA), le 18 ao\u00fbt 2009) Lien : http:\/\/www.merip.org\/mero\/mero081809.html<\/font><\/strong><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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