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TUNISNEWS<\/strong><\/span> <\/font> <\/div>\n 7\u00a0\u00e8me\u00a0ann\u00e9e, N\u00b0\u00a02522 du 19.04.2007<\/span><\/font><\/strong><\/div>\n
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Descente polici\u00e8re violente chez les parents du prisonnier politique Noureddine Amdouni<\/font><\/span><\/strong><\/div>\n
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ACIJLP: For the second time, the UN General Assembly approves the statement presented by the ACIJLP on the conditions of justice Ridha KEFI: Enqu\u00eate – Al-Qa\u00efda au Maghreb: Evaluation de la menace terroriste en Tunisie<\/font> Aidan Lewis: Al-Qa\u00efda recrute chez les marginaux de l’Alg\u00e9rie Daniel Lav : L’Organisation Al-Qa\u00efda au Maghreb islamique : l’\u00e9volution de la pr\u00e9sence terroriste en Afrique du Nord<\/font> Chokri Hamrouni: Ces \u00e9lections qui vont changer la France Houcine Ghali: Le long sommeil des diplomates arabes<\/font> K. Boumiza: Tunisie : Une entreprise, autoris\u00e9e par les Fran\u00e7ais, r\u00e9alise un sondage sur les pr\u00e9sidentielles ! Le Temps : A l’\u00e9coute du Palais<\/font> Le Temps\u00a0 M. Wolfowitz, la Banque mondiale et la lutte contre la corruption<\/strong><\/font><\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n
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Descente polici\u00e8re violente chez les parents du prisonnier politique Noureddine Amdouni<\/font><\/h2>\n
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Des forces de police ont fait une descente chez les parents du prisonniers politique Noureddine Amdouni. Ses parents \u00e2g\u00e9s ont \u00e9t\u00e9 terrifi\u00e9s, insult\u00e9s, et leur maison fouill\u00e9e. La m\u00e8re de Noureddine souffrant de diab\u00e8te est sous le choc et son \u00e9tat de sant\u00e9 s’est d\u00e9grad\u00e9e. M. Ahmed et Aicha amdouni, parents de Nourreddine ne comprennent pas la raison de cette descente polici\u00e8re alors que leur fils se trouve en prison. <\/font><\/p>\n
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(Message re\u00e7u\u00a0par\u00a0mail le 19 avril 2007 \u00e0 22:08)<\/span><\/font><\/strong> \u00a0<\/div>\n
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The Arab Center for the Independence of\u00a0 Judiciary and Legal Profession\u00a0\u00a0 (ACIJLP)<\/font><\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
In Consultative Status with the ECOSOC<\/span><\/p>\n
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Cairo, April 17^{th<\/sup>\u00a0 2007<\/span><\/u><\/i><\/p>\n}
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Press release<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
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For the second time, the UN General Assembly approves the statement presented by the ACIJLP on the conditions of justice<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
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The UN General Assembly approved the statement (*) presented by the Center on the conditions of justice and human rights in five Arab countries, which are (<\/span>Republic of Tunisia, Republic of Sudan, Republic of Syria, Arab Republic of Egypt, Republic of Iraq). This statement was presented by the Center to the Fourth session on the Human Rights Council (HRC), which was held from March 12^{th<\/sup> to March 30^{th<\/sup> 2007.<\/span><\/p>\n}}
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The UN <\/span> General Assembly approved this document as one of its documents, and it published it under the title of (A\/HRC\/4\/NGO\/14). This document is regarded as the second document which is presented by an Arab non-governmental organization and approved by the UN General Assembly, after it approved the first document that the Center submitted for the first session of the HRC which was held from June 19^{th<\/sup> to June 30^{th<\/sup> 2006.<\/span><\/p>\n}}
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Worth mentioning that in his statement the Center dealt with the conditions of justice and human rights. This statement mentioned the extent of violation of the right of life, the right of a fair trail and the extent of violation of the guarantees of fair and just trails, which can be seen the existence of many citizens in custody for long times and for political reasons in most, without any charges under deteriorated conditions of health, living, prisons and detention places. In addition to that most of detainees subjected to torture and ill and inhuman treatment. In addition to that referring citizens to exceptional and military trails in still continuing.<\/span><\/p>\n
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Furthermore, the Center also dealt with the continuation of the use of exceptional laws(emergency law)in some countries, covered by the statement, for long periods reached decades, during which many violations of rights and fundamental freedoms were occurred on a large scale, like for example: the right of freedom of expression and opinion, the right of association and peaceful demonstration.<\/span><\/p>\n
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This document showed also a lot of practices that represented great violation of the right of life, and the increase of\u00a0 war crimes and wars against humanity. And it mentioned the difficult atmosphere that human rights activists are work within in some countries covered by the document. In addition to the harassments by the security forces that human rights activists subjected to, like arresting and preventing of travelling without legal reasons of warrants.<\/span><\/p>\n
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ACIJLP<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
Secretary General office.<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
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(*) Texte int\u00e9gral du DOCUMENT pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 par l\u2019ACIJLP au conseil des droits de l\u2019Homme \u00e0 Gen\u00e9ve<\/font><\/span><\/h2>\n
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HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
Fourth session<\/span><\/p>\n
Item 2 of the provisional agenda<\/span><\/p>\n
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IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 60\/251<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
OF 15 MARCH 2006 ENTITLED \u201cHUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL\u201d<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
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Written statement* submitted by the Arab Center for the Independence of Judiciary<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
and Legal Profession, a non-governmental organization in special consultative status<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
The Secretary-General has received the following written statement which is circulated in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1996\/31. [5 March 2007]<\/span><\/p>\n
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* This written statement is issued, unedited, in the language(s) received from the submitting non-governmental organization(s).<\/span><\/p>\n
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UNITED NATIONS<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
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A<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
General Assembly <\/span><\/b> Distr.<\/span><\/p>\n
GENERAL<\/span><\/p>\n
A\/HRC\/4\/NGO\/141<\/span><\/p>\n
8 March 2007<\/span><\/p>\n
ENGLISH ONLY<\/span><\/p>\n
GE.07-11685<\/span><\/p>\n
A\/HRC\/4\/NGO\/141<\/span><\/p>\n
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page 2<\/span><\/p>\n
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Conditions of human rights in some Arab countries:<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
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Sudan, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Iraq<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
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1. Sudan<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
Darfour: A humanitarian tragedy which is still continuing<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n
The conflict in Darfour has resulted in huge numbers of crimes against humanity and unlawful killings. Its effect has spread to include the forced conscription of children into the army. The Arab Center for the Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal Profession (ACIJLP) has documented the conscription of a large number of children in government civil defence camps by the armed opposition in Darfour, which has resulted in the deaths of a large number of these children in combat.<\/span><\/p>\n
ACIJLP also documented the killing of more than twelve people employed in food relief agencies in Abuja on the 17th January 2007. On the 7th December 2007 Jangaweed militia soldiers attacked villages in the north of Darfou (Kafout, Ab Sakeen, Al Hamra, Umm Sadr and Hashaba) which resulted in the death of a large number of civilians including women and children. ACIJLP strongly suspects that the Jangaweed militias receive support from the Sudanese government.<\/span><\/p>\n
Civilians have been subject to campaigns of random pillaging and killing, including an attack on the 9th February 2007 by Jangaweed militias on a market in Al Fasher, which was documented by ACIJLP. The market was pillaged and firepower used randomly, resulting in three civilian deaths.<\/span><\/p>\n
Freedom of expression and opinion <\/span><\/p>\n
The Sudanese government harassed journalists and frequently imposed security surveillance measures. These measures have reached the extent of arbitrary killing and the administrative banning of some newspapers whose circulation has been blocked.<\/span><\/p>\n
The Sudanese authorities arbitrarily detained Ahmed Sherif, editor of the daily al Watan <\/i>and Adel Sayed Ahmed, the newspaper\u2019s deputy editor. They were thrown in the Kobr\u00b4Prison in Khartoum on the 7th February 2007 without being brought before investigative authorities.<\/span><\/p>\n
Circulation of the Arabic language newspaper al Sudani <\/i>was blocked immediately after it published an article about the killing of journalist Mohamed Taha Mohamed.<\/span><\/p>\n
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2. Tunisia<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
Violations committed under the counter-terrorism law<\/span><\/i><\/b><\/p>\n
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Under the counter-terrorism law, Tunisian security forces have detained large numbers of political activists on the pretext that they are members of terrorist groups. These activists include:<\/span><\/p>\n
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– Mohamed el Sewaissy<\/span><\/p>\n
– Majdy el Dhakawany<\/span><\/p>\n
– Yassin el Jibry<\/span><\/p>\n
– Salim el Haj Saleh<\/span><\/p>\n
– Ali el Aouni el Harzy<\/span><\/p>\n
– Ibrahim el Aouni el Harzy<\/span><\/p>\n
– Saber Ben el Kelany el Hosny<\/span><\/p>\n
– Saber Ben Mokhtar el Hosny<\/span><\/p>\n
– Anis el Bouzidy<\/span><\/p>\n
– Mohamed Amin Aoun<\/span><\/p>\n
– Mahfouz el Ayyary<\/span><\/p>\n
– Gheith el Ghazawany<\/span><\/p>\n
– Maher Bezoush<\/span><\/p>\n
– Sahl el Balady<\/span><\/p>\n
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These activists were arrested on charges of belonging to a terrorist group. Large numbers of prisoners have spent more than sixteen years in prison, in inhuman living conditions.<\/span><\/p>\n
Violation of the privacy of the home and administrative surveillance of suspects Police forces have committed a large number of violations of the privacy of the homes of<\/span><\/p>\n
those wanted by courts. Security bodies breached the privacy of Qabeel el Nasry\u2019s home and terrorised his family on claims that he had violated administrative surveillance orders imposed on him. El Nasry had previously spent two years and eight months in prison, and upon his release was issued with a directive ordering him to register daily at the police station. This is a flagrant breach of the inviolability of judicial verdicts, and draws attention to the fact that many detainees released are subject to a harsh surveillance regime, and forced to report daily to their local police station.<\/span><\/p>\n
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Violation of the right to freedom of opinion and expression and the right to association The Tunisian government banned January and February editions of the French magazine <\/span> Historia Th\u00e9matique<\/span><\/i>, which was first issued in 1909. It also banned the first edition of the French-language magazine L\u2019Expression <\/i>despite having previously agreed to its being published. Al Taher Ben Hussein, director of the al Hiwar television channel and the Tunisian website Afaaq had also previously been detained.<\/span><\/p>\n
Government harassment of newspapers and journalists remains a systematic practice through the intensification of surveillance of newspapers and the imprisonment of<\/span><\/p>\n
journalists.<\/span><\/p>\n
The Tunisian judiciary prevented the Tunisian League for the Defence of Human Rights from holding its seventh national conference after government authorities cancelled the League\u2019s meetings, surrounded its headquarters, and prevented it from pursuing any of its activities. This represents a clear attack on the activity of human rights organizations in <\/span> Tunis.<\/span><\/p>\n
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3. Iraq<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
Violations of the rights of journalists<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n
Killing and kidnappings of journalists have increased in recent times. Journalist Diaa al Makotar was murdered in Baghdad by unknown groups on the 28 January 2007, while journalist Ahmed el Hady was murdered in a district of Baghdad after being tortured. A total of eight journalists were murdered by unknown groups in just one month, January, while journalist Karim Sabry el Rabei was kidnapped by an unknown armed group from his home in Wishwash, west Baghdad, on 10 January 2007. A cameraman from the Basra office of El Alam channel was unlawfully detained by British troops on 17 January 2007 while he was filming a bombing incident. There had been no judicial warrant authorising his detention, a matter which makes Iraq the most dangerous country for journalists. <\/span><\/p>\n
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Refugees<\/span><\/p>\n
The current mass emigration from Iraq is the biggest movement of people in the Middle East singe the forced emigration of Palestinians following Israel\u2019s founding in 1948. There are an estimated 1.7 million people internally displaced people inside Iraq alongside two million others who fled to neighbouring countries. Syria is hosting between 500,000 and one million Iraqi refugees, Jordan nearly 700,000 and Egypt some 80,000. There are around 40,000 Iraqi refugees in Lebanon and an unknown number in Turkey. The number of emigrants is gradually rising as people flee the increasing factional, ethnic and general violence which portends a serious intensification of the crisis.<\/span><\/p>\n
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Dujail<\/span><\/p>\n
On 26 December 2006 Saddam Hussein was executed four days after the appeal court upheld the death penalty issued against him. The death penalty was also carried out against Birzan Ibrahim el Takriti and Awad Hamad el Bandar on 15 January 2007. The appeal court sent back the case of Taha Yassin Ramadan and directed the court to make harsher the sentence handed down against him. He received the death sentence. It would seem the appeal process which ended after an extremely short period of time \u2013 no more than a few weeks \u2013 was a mere formality. The political interference which had earlier pushed judge Rizkar Amin into resigning prevented the appointment of another judge. The trial which began in October 2005 was subject to numerous violations, including a failure to ensure the physical safety of the defence attorney, witnesses and others. Three defence attorneys were killed during the course of the trial.<\/span><\/p>\n
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4. Syria<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
Political detention<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n
The Syrian government continues to detain Syrian civilians in the complete absence of the most basic rights ensuring a fair and independent trial. On Wednesday 7 February 2007 the doctor and poet Mahmoud Bin Hussein Sarem was detained. Most detainees are tried before state security and military courts which lack the necessary standards of a fair trial, and which frequently issue death sentences.<\/span><\/p>\n
A\/HRC\/4\/NGO\/141<\/span><\/p>\n
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Violations which affect human rights defenders and those who voice opinions <\/span><\/i> The chain of detentions of human rights activists and defenders continues, with the recent detention of human rights activists Kamal Hussein Sheikho by a state security body. Writer and political analyst Michel Kilo is still being detained and has spent a total of nine months in prison, while Mahmoud Eissa, the leader of the Communist party, and Anwar el Benna a human rights activist, both remain in detention.<\/span><\/p>\n
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5. Egypt<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
Torture in police stations<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n
Torture is still routine practice in police stations where arbitrary detention and a failure to bring individuals before a judge are also common. The most high-profile case is that of Emmad Mohamed Ali Mohamed, better known as Emmad el Kabeer, who was tortured and subject to degrading and inhuman treatment at the hands of policemen in the Boulaq Dakrour police station in 2005. Egyptian legislation continues to impose a light penalty for torture where it is carried out by state employees.<\/span><\/p>\n
Arbitrary detention and exceptional courts <\/span><\/i> Eighty members of the Muslim Brotherhood were arrested in nine Egyptian governorates at the beginning of February 2007, while forty civilian suspects were sent for trial before military courts at the same time using powers under the state of emergency in force in<\/span><\/p>\n
Egypt since 1981.<\/span><\/p>\n
Freedom of opinion and expression<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n
Freedom of opinion and expression remain restricted, and numerous individuals who have expressed an opinion have been imprisoned. Abdel Karim Amer was sentenced to four years imprisonment for writings posted on his blog. A book written by Doctor Mohamed Ammara was banned and an inquiry launched after claims that he was inciting unrest. An Al Jazeera television producer was banned from broadcasting films showing scenes of torture, and was sent for investigation on claims that the films contained fake scenes.<\/span><\/p>\n
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Enqu\u00eate – Al-Qa\u00efda au Maghreb <\/font>Evaluation de la menace terroriste en Tunisie<\/font><\/h2>\n
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Par : Ridha KEFI<\/font><\/strong> Alors que les attentats terroristes se multiplient en Alg\u00e9rie et au Maroc, une question s’impose : la menace d’Al-Qa\u00efda au Maghreb islamique (AQMI) est-elle aussi importante dans notre pays que chez nos voisins de l’Ouest ? R\u00e9ponse, sous forme de boutade, d’un ami am\u00e9ricain en poste \u00e0 Tunis:\u00abJe me sens plus en s\u00e9curit\u00e9 ici qu’\u00e0 Washington\u00bb… Il\u00a0 faisait allusion au carnage sur le campus de Virginia Tech, mardi dernier. \u00a0Annonc\u00e9e officiellement, le 11 septembre dernier, par Ayman Al-Zawahiri, le n\u00ba 2 d’Al-Qa\u00efda, dans une vid\u00e9o enregistr\u00e9e \u00e0 l’occasion du 5e anniversaire des attentats du 11-Septembre, l’alliance entre le Groupe salafiste pour la pr\u00e9dication et le combat alg\u00e9rien (GSPC) et l’organisation d’Oussama Ben Laden a donn\u00e9 naissance \u00e0 Al-Qa\u00efda au Maghreb islamique (AQMI), qui r\u00e9unit sous une m\u00eame banni\u00e8re les divers groupes terroristes de la r\u00e9gion. Aussit\u00f4t cr\u00e9\u00e9e, la nouvelle organisation n’a pas tard\u00e9 \u00e0 mettre ses menaces \u00e0 ex\u00e9cution, multipliant les attentats sanglants, surtout en Alg\u00e9rie et au Maroc. Et comme pour souligner sa m\u00e9tamorphose, elle a modifi\u00e9 sa strat\u00e9gie en d\u00e9laissant le maquis pour des attentats spectaculaires en milieu urbain. Elle a aussi adopt\u00e9 des m\u00e9thodes et techniques exp\u00e9riment\u00e9es sur d’autres fronts du djihad, notamment le recours aux bombes humaines et aux voitures pi\u00e9g\u00e9es et le choix de cibles civiles mais \u00e0 forte symbolique politique, comme les employ\u00e9s expatri\u00e9s des entreprises \u00e9trang\u00e8res en Alg\u00e9rie (am\u00e9ricaines et russes), le Palais du gouvernement \u00e0 Alger, les b\u00e2timents diplomatiques am\u00e9ricains \u00e0 Casablanca… Elle a \u00e9galement adopt\u00e9 les m\u00eames modes d’emploi pour fabriquer des bombes disponibles sur Internet et les m\u00eames DVD et CD contenant des sermons et vantant le martyre… Une autre \u00e9volution m\u00e9rite d’\u00eatre not\u00e9e: notre pays, qui a longtemps \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9pargn\u00e9 par le terrorisme – l’attentat kamikaze contre la synagogue de Djerba remonte au 11 mars 2002 et il a \u00e9t\u00e9 commis par un citoyen tunisien r\u00e9sidant en France -, a \u00e9t\u00e9, de nouveau, le th\u00e9\u00e2tre d’une s\u00e9rie de fusillades, du 23 d\u00e9cembre au 3 janvier, au sud de la capitale, qui se sont sold\u00e9s par la mort de 12 activistes arm\u00e9s, pour la plupart infiltr\u00e9s d’Alg\u00e9rie, et l’arrestation de 15 autres, qui ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9f\u00e9r\u00e9s devant la\u00a0 justice. Intervenus apr\u00e8s une accalmie de pr\u00e8s de cinq ans, ces \u00e9v\u00e9nements ont suscit\u00e9 une vive \u00e9motion parmi les Tunisiens et les Tunisiennes, qui se sont crus, jusque l\u00e0, \u00e0 l’abri du terrorisme islamiste, un ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne dont la port\u00e9e mondiale n’est pourtant plus \u00e0 d\u00e9montrer. Depuis le d\u00e9but de l’ann\u00e9e, des centaines d’islamistes radicaux – les autorit\u00e9s n’ont pas encore publi\u00e9 de chiffres pr\u00e9cis – ont ainsi \u00e9t\u00e9 arr\u00eat\u00e9s aux quatre coins du pays. Beaucoup d’entre eux ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9f\u00e9r\u00e9s devant les tribunaux, accus\u00e9s dans le cadre de la nouvelle loi antiterroriste et condamn\u00e9s \u00e0 de lourdes peines, allant jusqu’\u00e0 27 ans de prison ferme. \u00a0La relative efficacit\u00e9 des services tunisiens<\/strong> En revanche, et contrairement au Maroc et \u00e0 l’Alg\u00e9rie, notre pays n’a pas connu d’attaques terroristes au cours des quatorze derni\u00e8res semaines. Ceci explique-t-il cela ? Peut-on s\u00e9rieusement affirmer que le danger terroriste est \u00e9cart\u00e9 et que les \u00e9l\u00e9ments djihadistes ont tous \u00e9t\u00e9 mis hors d’\u00e9tat de nuire ? Ou bien le calme r\u00e9gnant actuellement dans nos villes et villages est-il du genre qui pr\u00e9c\u00e8de la temp\u00eate, comme le pr\u00e9tendent certains oiseaux de mauvais augure, qui aimeraient tant que \u00ab\u00e7a p\u00e8te partout\u00bb, ne fut-ce que pour donner raison \u00e0 leurs sombres pr\u00e9dictions ? Ce calme, que d’aucuns trouvent aussi improbable qu’inesp\u00e9r\u00e9, n’est-il pas, plut\u00f4t, le reflet d’une situation objective, caract\u00e9ris\u00e9e par la faible implantation des r\u00e9seaux djihadistes dans notre pays et par le puissant engagement de nos services de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 dans le d\u00e9mant\u00e8lement de ces r\u00e9seaux avant qu’ils ne passent \u00e0 l’acte ? Si tel \u00e9tait le cas, comment expliquer cette relative efficacit\u00e9 des services tunisiens, en comparaison avec leurs homologues maghr\u00e9bins, qui multiplient les coups de filets contre ces m\u00eames r\u00e9seaux, mais sans parvenir \u00e0 les mettre hors d’\u00e9tat de nuire ? Parler d’\u00abefficacit\u00e9\u00bb, \u00e0 propos d’un ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne aussi myst\u00e9rieux et complexe que la lutte antiterrorisme, n’est peut-\u00eatre pas appropri\u00e9, car la comparaison entre la Tunisie et ses voisins, si tant est qu’elle puisse \u00eatre parlante, doit prendre en consid\u00e9ration l’ampleur – et l’ant\u00e9riorit\u00e9 – de l’implantation des r\u00e9seaux djihadistes dans les pays du Maghreb, ainsi que\u00a0 les retards enregistr\u00e9s par chacun de ces pays en mati\u00e8re de d\u00e9veloppement \u00e9conomique et social, sachant que la pauvret\u00e9 et la pr\u00e9carit\u00e9 sont un terreau propice \u00e0 l’embrigadement des jeunes et \u00e0 leur recrutement pour le djihad. De ce point de vue, la Tunisie semble \u00eatre mieux lotie que ses deux voisins de l’Ouest, puisque la pauvret\u00e9 et les in\u00e9galit\u00e9s y sont relativement moins criardes. M\u00eame si des poches de pauvret\u00e9 persistent, qui requi\u00e8rent des traitements urgents, alors que le ch\u00f4mage des jeunes dipl\u00f4m\u00e9s constitue, autant qu’en Alg\u00e9rie et au Maroc, un grave probl\u00e8me dont les solutions se font attendre. On sait, par ailleurs, que l’embrigadement djihadiste suit diff\u00e9rentes voies, recourt \u00e0 d’autres arguments et fait feu de tout bois. Ainsi, par exemple, la plupart de nos jeunes se sentent fortement concern\u00e9s par le sort r\u00e9serv\u00e9 aux Arabes et aux Musulmans dans les autres r\u00e9gions du monde. Certains d’entre eux se disent pr\u00eats, sous certaines conditions et si les circonstances s’y pr\u00eatent, de r\u00e9pondre favorablement aux sir\u00e8nes de la lutte arm\u00e9e. Beaucoup ont d\u00e9j\u00e0 fait le pas. Certains ont \u00e9t\u00e9 arr\u00eat\u00e9s ou sont morts, comme ils le souhaitaient, en \u00abmartyrs\u00bb, sur les fronts du djihad mondial, en Bosnie, Afghanistan, Irak et ailleurs (voir encadr\u00e9). \u00a0Menace endog\u00e8ne ou \u00abproduit\u00bb d’importation ?<\/strong> Vu sous cet angle, le terrorisme islamiste reste une menace s\u00e9rieuse en Tunisie. Cette menace est, en tout cas, aussi s\u00e9rieuse dans notre pays qu’elle l’est dans les autres pays arabes et musulmans o\u00f9 les conditions d’\u00e9mergence des mouvements radicaux sont loin d’avoir totalement disparu. Ne minimisons donc pas cette menace, mais ne l’exag\u00e9rons pas non plus. Car le terrorisme, en Tunisie, demeure un \u00abproduit\u00bb essentiellement d’importation. Et qui trouve son ressort dans l’actualit\u00e9 internationale. L’occupation am\u00e9ricaine de l’Irak, conjugu\u00e9e \u00e0 l’injustice inflig\u00e9e au peuple palestinien, ne cesse en effet d’insuffler un nouveau dynamisme au djihad. Les djihadistes tunisiens se recrutent aussi, en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, \u00e0 l’\u00e9tranger, et particuli\u00e8rement en Europe. L’organisation polici\u00e8re Europol a affirm\u00e9, dans son dernier rapport sur le terrorisme en Europe en 2006, que le Vieux Continent reste un lieu privil\u00e9gi\u00e9 de recrutement, de financement et une cible de choix pour les terroristes islamistes. Elle affirme aussi que la majorit\u00e9 des 257 personnes arr\u00eat\u00e9es l’ann\u00e9e derni\u00e8re en Europe pour des activit\u00e9s pr\u00e9sum\u00e9es li\u00e9es au terrorisme islamiste sont originaires du Maghreb (\u00a0\u00bbLe Figaro, 12 avril 2007). C’est aussi \u00e0 l’\u00e9tranger, notamment dans l’Alg\u00e9rie voisine, o\u00f9 se trouve le noyau dur de l’AQMI, que les djihadistes tunisiens s’entra\u00eenent au maniement des armes et des explosifs. Le territoire de notre pays \u00e9tant relativement \u00e9troit et sans relief, aucun groupe n’a pu, \u00e0 ce jour, y installer un camp d’entra\u00eenement ou une base pour lancer des attaques. Pas m\u00eame le groupe de Soliman, qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9mantel\u00e9 quelques semaines apr\u00e8s son \u00e9tablissement dans les zones bois\u00e9es au sud de la capitale. Si l’on ne peut s\u00e9rieusement \u00e9carter la possibilit\u00e9 que des djihadistes tunisiens puissent projeter des attentats dans leur pays – les combattants qui reviennent d’Irak, un camp d’entra\u00eenement \u00e0 ciel ouvert, constituent toujours un danger maximal pour leur pays d’origine\u00a0 -, nous devrions aussi admettre que le champ de man\u0153uvre de ces derniers reste assez limit\u00e9, le quadrillage s\u00e9curitaire \u00e9tant relativement herm\u00e9tique, surtout \u00e0 l’approche des zones urbaines. De ce point de vue, les \u00e9v\u00e9nements de Soliman ont \u00e9t\u00e9, si l’on peut dire, \u00abtr\u00e8s b\u00e9n\u00e9fiques\u00bb, en ce sens qu’ils ont permis aux autorit\u00e9s de prendre conscience de la vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 du pays, de maintenir l’\u00e9tat d’alerte \u00e0 son niveau le plus \u00e9lev\u00e9 et de resserrer l’\u00e9tau autour des \u00e9l\u00e9ments salafistes, de mani\u00e8re \u00e0 pr\u00e9venir leur \u00e9ventuelle regroupement au sein de cellules djihadistes. En conclusion, nous pouvons dire que le terrorisme islamiste constitue une menace s\u00e9rieuse pour la Tunisie. Cette menace perdurera tant que les conditions – int\u00e9rieures et ext\u00e9rieures – d’\u00e9mergence des groupes terroristes n’auront pas disparu. On doit donc apprendre \u00e0 vivre avec. Rester vigilant, mais sans c\u00e9der \u00e0 l’alarmisme. Vaquer \u00e0 ses affaires, mais sans baisser la garde. \u00a0De la Bosnie \u00e0 l’Irak en passant par l’Afghanistan: Sur les traces des djihadistes tunisiens Des djihadistes tunisiens ont \u00e9t\u00e9 tr\u00e8s actifs au sein du r\u00e9seau Al-Qa\u00efda en Afghanistan. Ils \u00e9taient d\u00e9ploy\u00e9s dans ce pays bien avant son invasion par les troupes \u00e9tats-uniennes. L’US Army a d’ailleurs arr\u00eat\u00e9 une douzaine de Tunisiens, qui sont d\u00e9tenus, depuis plus de cinq ans, dans le camp de Guantanamo, dans l’attente d’un hypoth\u00e9tique proc\u00e8s. Voici, par ailleurs, leurs noms: Lotfi Lagha, Riyadh Ben Mohamed Taher Nasri, Abdallah Ben Mohamed Ouerghi, Adel Ben Hamida, Sa\u00eff Ben Abdallah, Ridha Ben Salah Yazidi, Hichem Ben Ali Sliti, Adel Ben Ahmed Hakimi,\u00a0 Amor Ben Abdallah, H\u00e9di Ben H\u00e9dhili Hammami, Mohamed Abderrahmane, Rafik Ben B\u00e9chir El-Hammi.\u00a0 Les deux kamikazes ayant assassin\u00e9 le Commandant Ahmed Chah Massoud, le 9 septembre 2001, soit deux jours avant les attentats du 11-Septembre, \u00e9taient, eux aussi Tunisiens. Abdessatar Dahmane et Bouari El-Ouaer s’\u00e9taient d\u00e9guis\u00e9s en journalistes arabes venus interviewer l’ex-chef de l’Alliance du Nord. En 2002, quatre Tunisiens (Abdaoui Youssef, Habib Ben Hamed Loubiri, Kamel Darraji et Mohamed Ben Abdelhedi) ont \u00e9t\u00e9 arr\u00eat\u00e9s, pr\u00e8s de Milan, et condamn\u00e9s \u00e0 des peines de prison pour avoir cr\u00e9\u00e9 une cellule de soutien au GSPC dans la p\u00e9ninsule italienne. En 2003, un autre Tunisien, Ihsan Garnaoui, a \u00e9t\u00e9 arr\u00eat\u00e9 en Allemagne o\u00f9 il \u00e9tait arriv\u00e9 quelques semaines auparavant avec pour objectif de mettre sur pied une cellule clandestine charg\u00e9e d’organiser un attentat \u00e0 Berlin. Le cerveau pr\u00e9sum\u00e9 des attentats de Madrid, le 11 mars 2004, Serhane Ben Abdelmajid Fakhet, \u00e9tait \u00e9galement de nationalit\u00e9 tunisienne. Il s’\u00e9tait immol\u00e9 \u00e0 l’explosif, le 8 avril de la m\u00eame ann\u00e9e, dans l’appartement o\u00f9 il s’\u00e9tait r\u00e9fugi\u00e9 avec quelques autres complices, dans la banlieue de Madrid. Ce jeune homme originaire de Gafsa avait pourtant b\u00e9n\u00e9fici\u00e9 d’une formation universitaire et obtenu une bourse du gouvernement espagnol pour poursuivre un doctorat en \u00e9conomie dans une des meilleures universit\u00e9s du pays. Il avait aussi trouv\u00e9 du travail dans l’immobilier, et, selon son ancien patron, il \u00e9tait l’un des meilleurs vendeurs de l’entreprise (\u00a0\u00bbEl Mundo\u00a0\u00bb, 8 avril 2004). La n\u00e9buleuse europ\u00e9enne d’Al-Qa\u00efda a compt\u00e9 d’autres activistes tunisiens. On pourrait en citer: – Nizar Naouar, le kamikaze d\u00e9c\u00e9d\u00e9 dans l’attentat de Djerba, le 11 avril 2002 ; – Nizar Trabelsi, l’ancien joueur du Club sportif sfaxien (CSS) condamn\u00e9 le 30 septembre 2003 \u00e0 dix ans de prison par le tribunal correctionnel de Bruxelles pour avoir projet\u00e9, pour le compte d’Al-Qa\u00efda, un attentat \u00e0 l’explosif contre la base militaire belge de Kleine Brogel (Nord-est de la Belgique) ; – Adel T\u00e9bourski, arr\u00eat\u00e9 en 2001 en France et condamn\u00e9, le 17 mai 2005, par le tribunal correctionnel de Paris, \u00e0 six ans d’emprisonnement, pour \u00abassociation de malfaiteurs en relation avec une entreprise terroriste\u00bb. Selon \u00a0\u00bbLe Monde\u00a0\u00bb du 19 avril 2005, ce dernier aurait \u00e9t\u00e9 l’un des inspirateurs des assassins du commandant Massoud ; – Tarek Maaroufi, co-fondateur de la Jama’a Attounissiya Al-Mouqawama (Groupe tunisien combattant-GTC), et Amor Sliti, tous deux inculp\u00e9s dans le cadre d’une fili\u00e8re de faux documents destin\u00e9e \u00e0 recruter des candidats pour les camps de formation paramilitaire d’Al-Qa\u00efda en Afghanistan, et condamn\u00e9s par la Cour d’appel de Bruxelles, le 9 juin 2004, respectivement, \u00e0 cinq et sept ans de prison, – Lassaad Sassi, ancien garde national converti au trafic de drogue en Italie, puis au djihad en Alg\u00e9rie, avant de constituer le r\u00e9seau terroriste d\u00e9mantel\u00e9, en janvier dernier, pr\u00e8s de Soliman, et de d\u00e9c\u00e9der des suites de ses blessures dans un h\u00f4pital de la capitale… Beaucoup de nos compatriotes ont rejoint \u00e9galent la r\u00e9sistance arm\u00e9e en Irak apr\u00e8s l’occupation de ce pays par les troupes de la Coalition. Selon des services occidentaux, des Tunisiens ont pris part \u00e0 l’attentat \u00e0 la voiture pi\u00e9g\u00e9e contre les locaux de l’ONU \u00e0 Bagdad o\u00f9 l’ex-secr\u00e9taire g\u00e9n\u00e9ral adjoint, Viera di Melo, a trouv\u00e9 la mort le 29 ao\u00fbt 2003. Le 4 juillet 2005, les autorit\u00e9s irakiennes ont appr\u00e9hend\u00e9 le Tunisien Imad Nassar Ahmed Amarah (transcription orientale), qui \u00e9tait charg\u00e9 de la logistique de kamikazes dans la r\u00e9gion de Mossoul. Des Tunisiens ont \u00e9galement particip\u00e9 \u00e0 l’organisation de l’attentat \u00e0 la bombe contre la grande mosqu\u00e9e chiite de Samarra, le 22 f\u00e9vrier 2006. A la mi-juin de la m\u00eame ann\u00e9e, l’un d’eux, Yousri Fakher Mohamed Ali, alias Abou Qoudama, a \u00e9t\u00e9 arr\u00eat\u00e9 au nord de Bagdad. Un mois auparavant, un autre Tunisien du nom d’Abdel-Rahman Saifuddin (transcription orientale) a \u00e9t\u00e9 appr\u00e9hend\u00e9 au Waziristan, \u00e0 la fronti\u00e8re afghane, suspect\u00e9 appartenir \u00e0 Al-Qa\u00efda et d’avoir voulu p\u00e9n\u00e9trer en Afghanistan pour rejoindre les Taliban. On pourrait aussi \u00e9voquer le cas d’autres Tunisiens qui ont lou\u00e9 leurs services au djihad en Bosnie, et dont certains, apr\u00e8s avoir \u00e9chapp\u00e9 aux massacres perp\u00e9tr\u00e9s contre les musulmans dans ce pays, sont actuellement sous le coup d’une reconduite \u00e0 la fronti\u00e8re d\u00e9cid\u00e9e par l’actuelle gouvernement bosniaque. Ou encore ces Tunisiens, candidats au djihad, qui ont \u00e9t\u00e9 arr\u00eat\u00e9s sur le chemin du djihad irakien, en Italie, Alg\u00e9rie, Syrie… et livr\u00e9s aux autorit\u00e9s tunisiennes. La plupart croupissent aujourd’hui dans des prisons tunisiennes. (Source : \u00ab Le Temps \u00bb (Quotidien \u2013 Tunis), le 19 avril 2007)<\/font><\/strong> \u00a0<\/font><\/div>\n
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Al-Qa\u00efda recrute chez les marginaux de l’Alg\u00e9rie<\/font><\/h2>\n
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par Aidan Lewis– Associated Press, le 18 avril 2007 \u00e0 16h45<\/font><\/div>\n
ALGER (AP) — Les attentats d’Alger la semaine derni\u00e8re semblent indiquer que la branche maghr\u00e9bine d’Al-Qa\u00efda, qui cherche \u00e0 faire ses preuves, a commenc\u00e9 de recruter aux marges de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 alg\u00e9rienne, pour mettre en \u0153uvre une nouvelle strat\u00e9gie \u00e0 fort pouvoir d’impact. Mais l’attitude de cette nouvelle franchise du mouvement d’Oussama ben Laden, cet \u00ab\u00a0Al-Qa\u00efda au Maghreb islamique\u00a0\u00bb, comme s’est rebaptis\u00e9 en janvier le Groupe salafiste pour la pr\u00e9dication et le combat (GSPC), est d\u00e9nonc\u00e9e par les anciens dirigeants islamistes de la d\u00e9cennie 90. Ces ann\u00e9es noires du terrorisme firent quelque 200.000 morts, apr\u00e8s l’interruption par les militaires des \u00e9lections multipartites de 1992 que les islamistes du FIS (Front islamique du salut, dissous) \u00e9taient en train de remporter. \u00ab\u00a0Je condamne et suis pr\u00eat \u00e0 travailler pour arr\u00eater cette effusion de sang\u00a0\u00bb, lance Madani Mezrag. Ancien \u00ab\u00a0\u00e9mir\u00a0\u00bb de l’Arm\u00e9e islamique du salut (AIS, bras arm\u00e9 du FIS), il signa en 1997 la tr\u00eave avec Alger avant de b\u00e9n\u00e9ficier de l’amnistie dans le cadre de la politique de r\u00e9conciliation nationale du pr\u00e9sident Abdelaziz Bouteflika. \u00ab\u00a0Pour moi, la r\u00e9bellion aujourd’hui en Alg\u00e9rie n’a pas de nom.Al-Qa\u00efda aujourd’hui, c’est un parapluie, tout le monde travaille et Al-Qa\u00efda peut signer, c’est facile\u00a0\u00bb, juge-t-il. Les attentats du 11 avril, qui ont fait 30 morts et quelque 330 bless\u00e9s, ont \u00e9t\u00e9 revendiqu\u00e9s par l’ex-GSPC. Ils ont frapp\u00e9 une Alg\u00e9rie qui n’avait plus subi d’attentats urbains depuis longtemps et croyait \u00eatre enfin en train de tourner la page d’une interminable guerre civile. Ils ont aussi \u00e9branl\u00e9 l’\u00e9quipe dirigeante et sa th\u00e8se d’une violence devenue d\u00e9sormais \u00ab\u00a0r\u00e9siduelle\u00a0\u00bb. Pour Hamida Ayachi, directeur du quotidien arabophone \u00ab\u00a0Djazair News\u00a0\u00bb qui travaille actuellement \u00e0 un livre sur le GSPC, l’actuelle direction du groupe est \u00ab\u00a0l’ancienne g\u00e9n\u00e9ration\u00a0\u00bb, le \u00ab\u00a0noyau dur\u00a0\u00bb id\u00e9ologique ayant surv\u00e9cu \u00e0 la r\u00e9pression militaire et rejet\u00e9 l’amnistie. \u00ab\u00a0Mais sur le plan du recrutement, c’est carr\u00e9ment une nouvelle g\u00e9n\u00e9ration\u00a0\u00bb, estime-t-il. C’est ce que semble indiquer le profil des auteurs pr\u00e9sum\u00e9s des attentats, des d\u00e9linquants multir\u00e9cidivistes: celui qui s’est jet\u00e9 sur le Palais du gouvernement a \u00e9t\u00e9 identifi\u00e9 comme \u00e9tant Merouane Boudina, 23 ans, membre d’un fratrie de dix enfants, originaire d’un bidonville d’Alger. Selon la presse, il a effectu\u00e9 plusieurs s\u00e9jours en prison pour trafic de drogue, avant de s’\u00e9vanouir dans la nature. Le minist\u00e8re de l’Int\u00e9rieur s’est content\u00e9 de dire que les deux autres terroristes avaient \u00e9t\u00e9 identifi\u00e9s et \u00e9taient tous deux Alg\u00e9riens. Mais selon le quotidien \u00ab\u00a0Libert\u00e9\u00a0\u00bb, l’un d’eux \u00e9tait Mouloud Benchiheb, lui aussi dealer et multir\u00e9cidiviste, vivant au centre d’Alger, recrut\u00e9 par le GSPC en prison o\u00f9 il purgeait une peine pour trafic de drogue. \u00ab\u00a0Ce sont des gens qui ont \u00e9t\u00e9 dans les prisons, qui ont \u00e9t\u00e9 marginalis\u00e9s, qui ont beaucoup de probl\u00e8mes\u00a0\u00bb, souligne Hamida Ayachi. D’apr\u00e8s lui, les attentats viennent montrer que ce GSPC nouvelle mani\u00e8re cherche \u00e0 accro\u00eetre son rayon d’action et son impact m\u00e9diatique, \u00ab\u00a0pour prouver que maintenant ils sont vraiment les vrais repr\u00e9sentant d’Al-Qa\u00efda au Maghreb\u00a0\u00bb. Si Hassan Hattab, fondateur du GSPC en 1998 \u00e9cart\u00e9 depuis, a condamn\u00e9 les attentats, la nouvelle direction \u00ab\u00a0veut internationaliser le conflit et donc cr\u00e9er plusieurs foyers de chaos\u00a0\u00bb dans la r\u00e9gion, ajoute Hamida Ayachi. Le ministre de l’Int\u00e9rieur, Noureddine Yazid Zerhouni, avait dans un premier temps estim\u00e9, selon le quotidien gouvernemental \u00ab\u00a0El Moudjahid\u00a0\u00bb, que les terroristes alg\u00e9riens \u00e9taient \u00ab\u00a0dans l’impasse\u00a0\u00bb, n’ayant \u00ab\u00a0devant eux que deux issues: se rendre ou se suicider, et ils sont en train de se suicider\u00a0\u00bb. Mais, en r\u00e9v\u00e9lant mardi la d\u00e9couverte de d\u00e9tonateurs \u00e0 distance dans une des voitures, il a remis en cause la th\u00e8se de l’attentat suicide classique: \u00ab\u00a0<\/p>\n
il est fort probable que les terroristes conducteurs des trois voitures aient saut\u00e9 avec leurs charges d’explosifs \u00e0 leur insu<\/font><\/p>\n
<\/strong>\u00ab\u00a0, a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 le ministre, des propos rapport\u00e9s par le \u00ab\u00a0Quotidien d’Oran\u00a0\u00bb. Et d’ajouter que \u00ab\u00a0l’\u00e9tude du profil\u00a0\u00bb des terroristes identifi\u00e9s \u00ab\u00a0accr\u00e9dite davantage cette th\u00e8se\u00a0\u00bb des kamikazes malgr\u00e9 eux: la direction de l’ex-GSPC aurait ainsi instrumentalis\u00e9 ses terroristes, les envoyant \u00e0 la mort sans le savoir, pour ainsi mieux terrifier la population en \u00e9voquant le spectre des m\u00e9thodes irakiennes d’Al-Qa\u00efda… C’est en tout cas la version qu’Alger veut faire passer. Associated Press<\/font><\/div>\n
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Etude publi\u00e9e par l\u2019institut MEMRI (Bas\u00e9 \u00e0 Washington et proche des milieux pro isra\u00e9liens aux USA) :<\/font><\/strong> <\/p>\n
L’Organisation Al-Qa\u00efda au Maghreb islamique : l’\u00e9volution de la pr\u00e9sence terroriste en Afrique du Nord<\/font><\/p>\n
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Par Daniel Lav (*)<\/font><\/strong> Le 24 janvier 2003, avec la b\u00e9n\u00e9diction d’Oussama Ben Laden, le Groupe salafiste pour la pr\u00e9dication et le combat (GSPC) a chang\u00e9 de nom pour devenir l’Organisation Al-Qa\u00efda au Maghreb. C’est ainsi que s’est trouv\u00e9e consolid\u00e9e une union qui avait d\u00e9j\u00e0 \u00e9t\u00e9 annonc\u00e9e plusieurs mois plus t\u00f4t. Cette union est le fruit de relations de longue date entre le GSPC et Al-Qa\u00efda, et repr\u00e9sente une nouvelle \u00e9tape dans la globalisation du djihad. Peu apr\u00e8s avoir rejoint Al-Qa\u00efda, le GSPC, dont les op\u00e9rations \u00e9taient jusqu’alors essentiellement limit\u00e9es \u00e0 l’Alg\u00e9rie et au Sahara, a entrepris de prendre pour cible les int\u00e9r\u00eats \u00e9trangers et de formuler des menaces d’attentats en Europe. Ce n’est pas la premi\u00e8re tentative d’Al-Qa\u00efda pour \u00e9tablir une branche en Afrique du Nord. En 2005, les forces de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 marocaines avaient mis la main sur une cellule d’Al-Qa\u00efda dont les dirigeants entretenaient des relations \u00e9troites avec Abou Moussab Al-Zarkaoui et d’autres chefs d’Al-Qa\u00efda. Selon les sources s\u00e9curitaires marocaines et europ\u00e9ennes, ils auraient avou\u00e9 qu’ils cherchaient \u00e0 \u00e9tablir \u00ab\u00a0l’Organisation Al-Qa\u00efda au Maghreb arabe\u00a0\u00bb – un nom presque identique \u00e0 celui ayant par la suite obtenu l’aval de Ben Laden pour le nouveau GSPC. La d\u00e9couverte de cette cellule a retard\u00e9 la concr\u00e9tisation des plans d’Al-Qa\u00efda d’une ann\u00e9e et a probablement conduit Al-Qa\u00efda \u00e0 se reposer de fa\u00e7on plus directe sur le GSPC. En plus d’avoir rejoint Al-Qa\u00efda, l’ancien GSPC ouvre \u00e0 l’englobement d’autres groupes terroristes nord africains sur la base de liens d\u00e9velopp\u00e9s par des ann\u00e9es de coop\u00e9ration. L’organisation a en outre \u00e9t\u00e9 efficace dans le recrutement de nord Africains au djihad en Irak. Avec une profonde port\u00e9e strat\u00e9gique au Sahara et en raison de sa proximit\u00e9 g\u00e9ographique avec l’Europe, la nouvelle branche d’Al-Qa\u00efda en Afrique du Nord menace de transformer le bassin m\u00e9diterran\u00e9en en front actif du djihad islamique. <\/font> <\/div>\n
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Titres du rapport<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
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I. Histoire du GSPC<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
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Al-Qa\u00efda et la naissance du GSPC<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
Trois \u00e9mirs, le durcissement du radicalisme<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
Rapprochement du GSPC et d’Al-Qa\u00efda<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
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II. Int\u00e9r\u00eats d’Al-Qa\u00efda en Afrique du Nord<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
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Premi\u00e8re tentative : le r\u00e9seau de Mohamed Raha au Maroc <\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
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III Contribution du GSPC \u00e0 Al-Qa\u00efda<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
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Le pipeline entre l’Afrique du nord et l’Irak<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
Menaces \u00e0 l’encontre de l’Europe<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
L’Afghanistan apr\u00e8s le Sahara<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
Unifier le djihad en Afrique du Nord<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
Derniers attentats<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
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Conclusion<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
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(*) Daniel Lav est charg\u00e9 de recherches au MEMRI<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
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Le rapport int\u00e9gral a \u00e9t\u00e9 publi\u00e9 le 7 mars 2007 en anglais (Enqu\u00eate et Analyse\u00a0 N\u00b0 332 de MEMRI):<\/span><\/b> http:\/\/memri.org\/bin\/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA33207<\/font><\/a><\/b><\/span><\/p>\n
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March 7, 2007<\/span><\/b> No.332<\/b> <\/span><\/p>\n
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\u2018The Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb\u2019: The Evolving Terrorist Presence in North Africa<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
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<\/span><\/b> By Daniel Lav*<\/span><\/b><\/span> <\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
On January 24, 2007, with the blessing of Osama bin Laden, the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) changed its name to The Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb. Thus was cemented a union that had been announced several months previously; this union is the fruit of longstanding relations between the GSPC and Al-Qaeda and represents a further stage in the globalization of the jihad movement. Shortly after joining Al-Qaeda, the GSPC, whose operations had for the most part been limited to Algeria and the Sahara, began to attack foreign interests and to threaten attacks in Europe.<\/span><\/i> <\/span><\/p>\n
This was not Al-Qaeda’s first attempt to establish a branch in North Africa. In 2005, the Moroccan security forces exposed and captured a cell of Al-Qaeda operatives. The cell’s leaders had close relations with Abu Mus’ab Al-Zarqawi and with other top Al-Qaeda commanders. According to Moroccan and European security sources, they confessed that they were planning to establish what was to be called \u00ab\u00a0The Al-Qaeda Organization in the Arab Maghreb\u00a0\u00bb – nearly the same name as that eventually authorized by bin Laden for the new GSPC. The discovery of this cell delayed Al-Qaeda’s expansion plans by a year, and may also have led it to rely more directly on the GSPC. <\/span><\/i><\/p>\n
Along with joining Al-Qaeda, the former GSPC is working on incorporating other North African terrorist groups into it, on the basis of ties developed over years of cooperation. The organization has also been instrumental in recruiting North Africans for the jihad in Iraq, where, according to the U.S. administration, North Africans make up approximately one-quarter of the foreign <\/span><\/i> mujahideen. With considerable strategic depth in the <\/i><\/span> Sahara and geographical proximity to Europe, Al-Qaeda’s new North African wing threatens to turn the western Mediterranean basin into a live front in the global jihad. <\/span><\/i><\/p>\n
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<\/p>\nI. The History of the GSPC<\/font><\/h2>\n
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Present at the Creation: Al-Qaeda and the Birth of the GSPC<\/font><\/h2>\n
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The ultimate origins of the GSPC are the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), [1]<\/font><\/a> a former political party that took to the battlefield in the civil war sparked by the 1991-92 elections and their aftermath. After splitting into several competing organizations, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) eventually gained dominance and, at the same time, took an extremely radical turn, adopting a virulent brand of takfir<\/i> ideology and slaughtering civilians by the thousands. In 1997, Hassan Hattab, then a regional commander in the GIA, broke off from the group and founded his own organization, at first unnamed and later dubbed the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). At the same time, religious authorities close to Al-Qaeda also began to turn their backs on the GIA. This led to infighting in the ranks of the mujahideen<\/i>, pitting Algerians loyal to the GIA against foreign \u00ab\u00a0volunteers\u00a0\u00bb in Algeria who were close to Al-Qaeda. [2]<\/font><\/a> After the break became definitive, Osama bin Laden reportedly sent messengers to convey his support for Hattab and the future GSPC, and to offer material support. [3]<\/font><\/a> The GIA withered away soon after, leaving the GSPC the only active jihad group fighting in Algeria. <\/span> <\/p>\n
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Three Emirs, Increasing Radicalism <\/span><\/p>\n
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One of the GSPC’s goals was to regain the popular support the FIS had enjoyed in the past, which had been lost in the GIA years. The group’s first communiqu\u00e9, authored by Hassan Hattab and issued on April 24, 1999, was titled \u00ab\u00a0Al-Jama’a Rahma\u00a0\u00bb – Community is a Blessing. The message of this communiqu\u00e9 was clear: Whereas the GIA declared anyone and everyone apostates, the GSPC was only concerned with fighting the government, and would try to win the support of the population. [4]<\/font><\/a> <\/span><\/p>\n
The Hassan Hattab era was characterized by relative moderation on the one hand and increasing irrelevance on the other. Once the GIA’s wild tactics were abandoned, the civil war fizzled out and it became clear that the GSPC had no chance of defeating the regime by military means. The GSPC’s local commanders grew frustrated with the direction the organization was taking, and in 2004 Hassan Hattab was deposed, though the group kept up appearances and claimed that he had stepped down. <\/span><\/p>\n
Al-Qaeda seems to have had a hand in this development, though the degree of their involvement is unclear. The first commander to challenge Hattab was the commander of the fifth zone and the group’s number two man, Abderezzak Al-Bara. Al-Bara, who had been a soldier in the Algerian Special Forces before joining the jihad, [5]<\/font><\/a> was an early defector from the GIA and was a member of the founding nucleus of the GSPC. In 2002 he hosted in his district Abu Muhammad Al-Yamani, an Al-Qaeda emissary to the region. Al-Bara broke rank and refused to present him to Hassan Hattab. In early 2003 Al-Bara moved to the ninth zone – the Sahara – and began to conduct independent operations, with at least the tacit consent of the zone’s commander, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who is known as Al-Aouer – \u00ab\u00a0the one-eyed.\u00a0\u00bb It was Abderezzak Al-Bara who kidnapped the European tourists in the Sahara in 2003 – the first time a GSPC element had acted against foreign interests – and later reportedly received a ransom of several million euros from Germany in exchange for their release. He and his troops – reportedly a 60-man contingent comprising mostly Mauritanians, but including also fighters from Algeria, Niger, and Mali [6]<\/font><\/a> – continued to operate in the desert, and engaged in battles with troops in northern Niger. [7]<\/font><\/a> He was later captured by a rebel group in Chad, who handed him over to Libya, which in turn handed him over to Algeria. <\/span><\/p>\n
The activities of the GSPC commanders in the Sahara seem to have been generally favored by Al-Qaeda, perhaps due to the activities’ international flavor. Mokhtar Belmokhtar is said to have been the only GSPC commander to have been recognized by Al-Qaeda prior to the union. [8]<\/font><\/a> Belmokhtar is also said to have been at odds with Hassan Hattab. [9]<\/font><\/a> <\/span><\/p>\n
After Hattab, the next head of the GSPC was Nabil Sahraoui, better known as Abu Ibrahim Mustafa, who served in this position for approximately one year before being killed in an Algerian army attack on a GSPC mountain stronghold in June 2004. [10]<\/font><\/a> His positions were more radical than Hattab, but failed to lead to a breakthrough on the military front; in fact, during his time, the group suffered serious setbacks, culminating in his own death in battle. <\/span> <\/p>\n
Abu Ibrahim Mustafa tried to develop closer relations with Al-Qaeda. He released a statement widely interpreted as an oath of allegiance to Osama bin Laden, but this initiative did not develop into actual contacts with him. [11]<\/font><\/a> In fact, while giving his blessing to Al-Qaeda and global jihad, he nonetheless held several positions that distanced him slightly from Al-Qaeda. For example, he believed that jihad against \u00ab\u00a0apostates\u00a0\u00bb took precedence over jihad against \u00ab\u00a0infidels,\u00a0\u00bb [12]<\/font><\/a> which in the GSPC context indicated that he would focus his activities on Algeria, and not on Europe. He expressed the same idea when he said that the GSPC would, in principle, be in favor of fighting outside of Algeria if it did not have its hands full on the home front. [13]<\/font><\/a> <\/span><\/p>\n
Abu Mus’ab ‘Abd Al-Wadoud, the group’s current Emir, was the successor of Abu Ibrahim Mustafa. ‘Abd Al-Wadoud, whose real name is Abdelmalek Droukdal, instituted a more militant line, and developed the group’s ties with Al-Qaeda. According to Abu Omar ‘Abd Al-Barr, a former top leader in the GSPC, the earliest contacts regarding a union were with Al-Zarqawi, and dated from 2004, almost immediately after ‘Abd Al-Wadoud became head of the group. From that time on, contacts with Al-Zarqawi were ongoing. One example was a message sent by ‘Abd Al-Wadoud to Al-Zarqawi urging him \u00ab\u00a0to intimidate the French government by capturing as many as possible of the French who have come to Iraq.\u00a0\u00bb [14]<\/font><\/a> The Algerian daily El-Khabar<\/i> cites unnamed sources in the GSPC as saying that Al-Zarqawi was in favor of establishing an \u00ab\u00a0Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Arab Maghreb\u00a0\u00bb with the GSPC as its nucleus. [15]<\/font><\/a> <\/span><\/p>\n
Under ‘Abd Al-Wadoud, the GSPC also began to imitate Al-Qaeda’s propaganda techniques. Most significantly, it has begun to film its operations and include them in videos distributed on the Internet, as in its two-part video \u00ab\u00a0Jahim Al-Murtadin\u00a0\u00bb – \u00ab\u00a0The Apostates’ Hell.\u00a0\u00bb This video sets the groups’ attacks, including brutal killings, to a soundtrack of jihad songs performed by a male choir; the attack sequences are interspersed with statements by Al-Qaeda commanders and footage from the GSPC training camps. All of these elements make the film virtually indistinguishable from those of jihadists in Iraq or Afghanistan. <\/span><\/p>\n
The bilateral contacts with Al-Qaeda in Iraq were part of a more general campaign to officially join Al-Qaeda. The GSPC’s official statement announcing it was joining Al-Qaeda, which was released in late August 2006, described the development as coming \u00ab\u00a0after ongoing effort and contacts that lasted close to a year.\u00a0\u00bb [16]<\/font><\/a> Traces of this campaign could be seen on Islamist forums favored by North African jihadists and their supporters. For instance, on June 22, 2005 a certain Taha Al-Maqdisi wrote: \u00ab\u00a0When will the GSPC change its name to ‘The Al-Qaeda Organization in the Arab Maghreb’?… When, when, when?\u2026\u00a0\u00bb [17]<\/font><\/a> <\/span><\/p>\n
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The GSPC’s Evolution Towards Al-Qaeda<\/span><\/b> <\/span><\/p>\n
The ideological radicalization led by ‘Abd Al-Wadoud is evident in a virulent February 2005 communiqu\u00e9 he authored, in which he attacked Hassan Hattab when the latter came out in favor of Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s National Reconciliation Plan, under which former terrorists who laid down their arms could receive amnesty. [18]<\/font><\/a> In the communiqu\u00e9, ‘Abd Al-Wadoud compared Hattab to the early Islamic apostate ‘Abdallah Bin Sa’d Bin Abi Sarh [19]<\/font><\/a> and to the Afghan commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, who had fought against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. [20]<\/font><\/a> <\/span><\/p>\n
‘Abd Al-Wadoud’s holy wrath was not sparked solely by conviction; if he wanted to keep face with the global jihad movement he had to distance himself as much as possible from the disgrace of the group’s founder and first commander being willing to strike a deal with the \u00ab\u00a0apostate\u00a0\u00bb regime. In fact, this statement was only one part of an all-out campaign against the National Reconciliation initiative and the moderate tendency within the GSPC. Abu Omar ‘Abd Al-Barr, who, before he left the group, had served as its media director and one of its top leaders, related that shortly after Bouteflika announced the National Reconciliation initiative, it was brought for discussion to the GSPC’s 10-member leadership council (majlis al-a’yan<\/i>), of which he was a member. The council decided not just to reject the reconciliation initiative, but also to eliminate any elements within the GSPC that supported it. [21]<\/font><\/a> It is unclear to what extent (if any) such a violent purge took place, but the threat itself may have sufficed. According to Algerian Interior Minister Yazid Zerhouni, hundreds of former terrorists took advantage of the amnesty provisions and left the GSPC. [22]<\/font><\/a> ‘Abd Al-Barr himself was one of them. <\/span><\/p>\n
In this sense, it appears that Bouteflika’s strategy has backfired. The intention behind the reconciliation initiative was to strike at the GSPC on two fronts: While the security forces continued the military campaign, the state would open a convenient escape route, in the hope that the organization would thus be fatally weakened. In fact, the GSPC has shown that it still has sufficient manpower to continue operations; in addition, Bouteflika unwittingly helped ‘Abd Al-Wadoud purge the organization of more moderate elements. It appears that this was a major factor in Al-Qaeda’s decision to agree to unite with the GSPC. <\/span><\/p>\n
Further evidence of the fact that the GSPC had to work hard to dispel the doubts of the Al-Qaeda leadership may be found in ‘Abd Al-Wadoud’s videotaped message (\u00ab\u00a0Innana Qadimun\u00a0\u00bb), released on the holiday of Eid Al-Adha in late 2006. The first segment was addressed to Osama bin Laden and aimed to reassure him of the GSPC’s dedication to jihad and loyalty to Al-Qaeda: \u00ab\u00a0We assure you that the state of your soldiers and your men in the land of jihad in Algeria is going from good to better\u2026 [and that] they are steadfast in the covenant and persist in the path of jihad, despite the vast conspiracy against them\u2026\u00a0\u00bb Referring more explicitly to the National Reconciliation, he said: \u00ab\u00a0Their [i.e. the government’s] stratagem has run aground on the rock of the mujahideen<\/i>‘s steadfastness.\u00a0\u00bb Most significantly, he gave expression to the GSPC’s total subordination to the Al-Qaeda leadership: \u00ab\u00a0Use us to strike wherever you will, and you will never find in us anything but compliance and obedience.\u00a0\u00bb The emphasis placed on these points indicates that they had in the past been subjects of concern for Al-Qaeda. <\/span><\/p>\n
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II. Al-Qaeda’s Interest in North Africa<\/span><\/b> <\/span><\/p>\n
The Initial Attempt: The Mohamed Raha Network in Morocco<\/span><\/b> <\/span><\/p>\n
As early as 2005, there were orders from Osama bin Laden to have the GSPC swear allegiance to Al-Qaeda and to take part in the establishment of Al-Qaeda in North Africa; what is not clear is whether it had already been decided to make it the leader of the new Al-Qaeda branch. Details of these contacts were revealed in the course of the trial of a Moroccan terror cell with intimate ties to Al-Qaeda, whose members were arrested in Casablanca in 2005. The details of the affair, as revealed in the trial, indicate that the Moroccan network of 2005 was a direct prelude to the establishment of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in 2006. <\/span><\/p>\n
The fullest account of the affair was published in the London daily Al-Hayat<\/i>. According to the paper, the central figures in the Moroccan network were Khaled Azik and Mohamed Raha, both Moroccans with Belgian citizenship; 16 others were arrested together with them. They acknowledged that they were planning to establish an organization to be called \u00ab\u00a0The Al-Qaeda Organization in the Arab Maghreb,\u00a0\u00bb in the framework of the GSPC. (This name is nearly identical to that eventually chosen by bin Laden.) The plan was to recruit volunteers, send them to Algeria to receive training in GSPC camps, and then send them to Syria, where they would establish a rear base from which suicide bombers would be sent into Iraq. In addition, they were to form sleeper cells in North Africa, which would await orders from Al-Qaeda to carry out attacks on security and intelligence offices, foreign and Jewish interests, and other targets. <\/span><\/p>\n
Khaled Azik began his jihad career in a cell of the Moroccan Al-Salafiyya Al-Jihadiyya group in Agadir, where he met, among others, Hassan Al-Haski, a member of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) later arrested in connection with the March 11, 2004 Madrid attacks. He later traveled to Syria, where he put Moroccans and Algerians in touch with Khaled Abu Basir \u00ab\u00a0the Algerian,\u00a0\u00bb who is considered to be the \u00ab\u00a0Emir of the Al-Qaeda Organization in Europe.\u00a0\u00bb Among his Al-Qaeda activities, he was sent to Istanbul to meet a Turk named Ismail, to whom he was supposed to pass on two CDs containing Al-Qaeda-related information. While in Istanbul, he met the Moroccan Mohamed Aflah, who was wanted in Spain in connection with the Madrid attacks. He put Aflah in touch with Abu Basir, and they cooperated on logistic issues related to bringing foreign jihadists into Iraq. In mid-2005, Abu Basir wanted to entrust Azik with the mission of going to Afghanistan to receive three letters from Osama bin Laden. (Ultimately, the mission was given to someone else, but the episode demonstrates that Azik enjoyed the confidence of high-level Al-Qaeda commanders). According to Azik, one of the letters dealt with \u00ab\u00a0unifying the devout youth who desire jihad in the Arab Maghreb under the banner of the GSPC.\u00a0\u00bb A Tunisian named Abu Ahmed was to organize them in Europe. Another of bin Laden’s letters explicitly stated that the GPSC should publicly swear allegiance to Al-Qaeda, with the goal of establishing \u00ab\u00a0The Al-Qaeda Organization in the Arab Maghreb.\u00a0\u00bb <\/span><\/p>\n
Mohamed Raha, the other leader of the cell, wandered throughout Europe, Turkey, and Syria, and even undertook an abortive journey to Afghanistan. In Damascus he stayed in an apartment belonging to a Moroccan sheikh by the name of Abdelkarim, where he met Moroccans who wanted to go to Iraq – among them Khaled Azik. He was entrusted with delivering a letter from Abu Basir the Algerian, which Azik had recovered from the Internet, to Abu Mus’ab Al-Zarqawi. He apparently did not deliver this letter in the end, as he was arrested in Syria and deported to Belgium when he tried to renew his passport after someone else had already used it. <\/span><\/p>\n
In Belgium, he was contacted by the wife of an imprisoned Moroccan Islamist who told him that there were \u00ab\u00a0wives of imprisoned Islamists who were ready to carry out any kind of jihad action.\u00a0\u00bb Raha informed Azik of this, and asked him to pass on the news to Abu Basir the Algerian. Raha told the woman that they would have to swear allegiance to an Emir, after receiving bin Laden’s consent. The women were interested in conducting a suicide bombing against intelligence headquarters in Holland, but Abu Basir said that \u00ab\u00a0there were two individuals in Britain who were ready to carry out the operation.\u00a0\u00bb A certain Samir Azouz also told Raha of a cell of 20 suicide bombers planning to attack Dutch intelligence headquarters. [23]<\/font><\/a> <\/span><\/p>\n
At least one of the women, a Belgian convert to Islam, did in fact carry out a suicide operation in Iraq in 2005. Belgian intelligence learned of this in the course of the trial of a GICM cell – a trial closely related to the Mohamed Raha case in Morocco. [24]<\/font><\/a> <\/span><\/p>\n
The basic pattern revealed by the Raha-Azik trial matches what we know of present-day relations between the Al-Qaeda leadership and the former GSPC: First, the close ties with jihadists in Syria and Iraq paved the way for cooperation between the two sides; and second, the goal of Al-Qaeda in North Africa is threefold: to unite jihadists in the region, to send terrorists to Iraq, and to carry out attacks in North Africa and Europe. The exposure of the Moroccan cell delayed Al-Qaeda’s expansion plans in the region for a year or so, and apparently also led it to open more direct channels with the GSPC. <\/span><\/p>\n
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III. The GSPC’S Contribution to Al-Qaeda<\/span><\/b> <\/span><\/p>\n
The North Africa-Iraq Pipeline<\/span><\/b> <\/span><\/p>\n
One of the GSPC’s major activities in recent years has been to enlist young North African mujahideen<\/i> and send them to Iraq after they receive some basic training in GSPC camps. This serves several purposes. First, in this way, the GSPC has proven its dedication to international jihad and dispelled doubts that it is clinging to a narrow, Algeria-first agenda. Second, some of these mujahideen<\/i> return to North Africa with combat experience, thus enriching the group’s terrorist capabilities. For the jihadists in North Africa and Iraq, this is a win-win proposition. The potential volunteer base for jihad in Iraq – where the fighting is widely seen as popular resistance against foreign occupation – is wider than that of the GSPC, which is fighting against fellow Algerians. Nonetheless, many North Africans seem to return from Iraq radicalized and willing to continue waging jihad in their home countries. As one Moroccan newspaper put it, \u00ab\u00a0Not long ago, we used to speak of the Afghan Moroccans; now we speak of the Iraqi Moroccans.\u00a0\u00bb [25]<\/font><\/a> <\/span><\/p>\n
There are indications that the number of jihadists being sent to Iraq has risen sharply since the GSPC officially joined Al-Qaeda. The Algerian daily Liberte<\/i> reported that while 30 jihadists were sent from Algeria over three years, in the months of December 2006 and January 2007 alone an additional 25 were sent, most of them from the eastern city of El-Oued, on the edge of the Sahara. [26]<\/font><\/a> <\/span><\/p>\n
Reports on the dismantling of networks recruiting for Iraq appear frequently in the Algerian and Moroccan press. On February 4, 2007 a Moroccan named Mbarak El-Jaafari was arrested in Spain on suspicion of belonging to the GSPC\/Al-Qaeda, and of having recruited 32 potential suicide bombers. These terrorists were sent to Iraq after having trained in GSPC camps. [27]<\/font><\/a> The 26-member \u00ab\u00a0Tetouan Cell,\u00a0\u00bb which had connections with Al-Qaeda, the GSPC (before the name change), and the GICM, is currently on trial in Morocco for recruiting Moroccans for jihad in Iraq. [28]<\/font><\/a> December 7, 2006 marked the opening in Morocco of the trial of Belhadi Msahel, a Tunisian residing in Italy who is suspected of having ties to the GSPC and Al-Qaeda, together with eight Moroccans suspected of belonging to his network. The most serious charges were membership in a terrorist organization and plotting attacks in Europe, but the network was also accused of recruiting jihadists for Iraq. [29]<\/font><\/a> <\/span><\/p>\n
The return of the \u00ab\u00a0Iraqi North Africans\u00a0\u00bb to their home countries is also cause for concern: In early February 2007, Moroccan security forces arrested 32 individuals believed to belong to a cell of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (ex-GSPC). A number of them had fought in Afghanistan and, more recently, in Iraq; others, still at large, are believed to have been in Syria on their way to Iraq. [30]<\/font><\/a> This is a pattern of activity similar to that revealed in the 2005 Mohamed Raha trial. <\/span><\/p>\n
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Threats to Europe<\/span><\/b> <\/span><\/p>\n
In the past, the North African terror cells operating in Europe have all had ties to the GSPC, but have not been members of it. This was true of the Mohamed Raha cell; it was also true of the Mohamed Belhadi Msahel network. <\/span><\/p>\n
Mohamed Belhadi Msahel is a Tunisian who resided in Milan and was arrested in April 2006 in Rabat, together with a group of Moroccans. The group is suspected of having plotted an attack on a church in Bologna that contains a fresco depicting the Prophet Muhammad, as well as attacks on a Milan subway station. The attacks were to be carried out on the eve of the April 9-10, 2006 elections, in imitation of the 2004 Madrid attacks. According to the Moroccan police, the group was also planning attacks in France – against a metro line, a commercial center, and the headquarters of the DST (French intelligence). The group was reported to have ties to the GSPC, and the three major figures in the network had traveled to Algeria to meet with ‘Abd Al-Wadoud. [31]<\/font><\/a> <\/span><\/p>\n
Now that the GSPC has joined Al-Qaeda, it will likely go beyond providing logistical support, and will attempt to strike at Europe itself. Such strikes will depend on operational capability and on the commands it receives from the Al-Qaeda leadership: ‘Abd Al-Wadoud has already said to bin Laden: \u00ab\u00a0Strike with us where you will.\u00a0\u00bb A clue as to \u00ab\u00a0where you will\u00a0\u00bb might be was given by Ayman Al-Zawahiri in his September 11, 2006 videotaped message in which he announced the union of the GSPC and Al-Qaeda: \u00ab\u00a0Our Emir, the sheikh, the mujahid<\/i>, the lion of Islam, Osama bin Laden, may Allah protect him, has assigned me to bring the good tidings to all Muslims, and to my brothers, the mujahideen<\/i>, wherever they are: The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat has joined the Al-Qaeda organization. Praise be to Allah for this blessed union. We ask Allah that it be a thorn in the throats of the American and French Crusaders and their allies, and that it be affliction, anxiety, and grief in the hearts of the apostates [i.e. the Algerian government], the traitorous sons of France.\u00a0\u00bb In the same video, Ayman Al-Zawahiri called for the liberation of \u00ab\u00a0any land that was once Islamic – from Al-Andalus [i.e. Muslim Spain] to Iraq.\u00a0\u00bb <\/span><\/p>\n
In another statement, in December 2006, Al-Zawahiri referred explicitly to Ceuta and Melilla, the two Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco. [32]<\/font><\/a> <\/span><\/p>\n
According to Al-Hayat<\/i>, a leaked top-secret French intelligence report classified the former GSPC as the main terrorist threat to France and Europe, as it had become the locus for Al-Qaeda activity in the region. The report also cited an undated letter (apparently from prior to union) from Osama bin Laden to a GSPC member, in which the Al-Qaeda chief gave his blessing to attacks on France. According to this report, the GSPC\/Al-Qaeda may also be planning to carry out a terror attack in France on the eve of the presidential elections, in an attempt to imitate the March 11, 2004 attacks in Spain, which are widely held to have led to the defeat of Jose Maria Aznar and the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq. [33]<\/font><\/a> Taken together with the Msahel plan to influence the Italian elections, it appears that the attempt to influence European elections has become a strategic goal of Al-Qaeda in North Africa. <\/span><\/p>\n
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Afghanistan in the Sahara<\/span><\/b> <\/span><\/p>\n
The GSPC has an extensive history of operations in the Sahara desert. <\/span><\/p>\n
As previously mentioned, in February-April, 2003, the GSPC (or renegade elements within the group) took dozens of European tourists hostage in the Sahara. The second major attack in the Sahara was against the Mauritanian army. In the early morning hours of June 4, 2005 the group attacked the Lemgheity military base in northeastern Mauritania, near the borders with Algeria and Mali. In a large-scale four-hour gun battle (several hundred Mauritanian soldiers were on the base, and some 150 GSPC troops participated in the attack), the group managed to take control of the base, killing 17 Mauritanian soldiers and wounding many others. After seizing weapons and military equipment, including army vehicles, the GSPC abandoned the base. [34]<\/font><\/a> More recently, there have been reports of clashes between Tuareg tribesmen and the GSPC, which is said to deploy two \u00ab\u00a0battalions\u00a0\u00bb in northern Mali, made up largely of Mauritanians. [35]<\/font><\/a> <\/span><\/p>\n
The main danger, however, is in the use of the Sahara as a logistics base; the region’s topography and the lack of effective government control make the border regions of Algeria, Mauritania, and Mali an excellent rear base for the terrorists. The former GSPC runs mobile camps there, where members of various North African groups receive weapons and explosives training. [36]<\/font><\/a> The region is also a major supply route for weapons deliveries to forces in the northern regions. <\/span><\/p>\n
In response to these developments, the U.S. has launched the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, which provides counterterrorism training and encourages cooperation among the nine participant countries: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal. The latest meeting of the partnership was on February 6, 2007, in Dakar. The meeting was headed by U.S. General William Ward, who warned that the Sahel-Sahara region had become a terrorist \u00ab\u00a0incubator,\u00a0\u00bb playing much the same role as Afghanistan under Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. [37]<\/font><\/a> <\/span><\/p>\n
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Uniting the Jihad in North Africa<\/span><\/b> <\/span><\/p>\n
Even before joining Al-Qaeda, the GSPC had developed extensive ties with other North African jihad groups, especially in Morocco. The Al-Qaeda name, though, has enhanced the GSPC’s prominence in the region. It remains to be seen whether the informal and personal ties that characterized these relations in the past will develop into fully operational links within a defined organizational hierarchy. <\/span><\/p>\n
The former GSPC’s extensive ties with Moroccan Islamists have already been described in some detail. Other recent developments include the trial of the Moroccan group Jama’at Al-Tawhid w’Al-Jihad, which is believed to have ties to the GSPC. The commander of this organization is Hamid Marzouq, also known as Abu Al-Zubayr Al-Maghribi. The group is accused of sending a message in 2005 to Al-Zarqawi urging him to execute two Moroccan hostages, Abdelrahim Boualem and Abdelrahim Al-Muhafizi, and of planning to establish a training camp in the Atlas mountains. Members of the group are believed to be capable of manufacturing a remote-control bomb detonated by cellular phone. [38]<\/font><\/a> Also, on January 19, 2007, a Moroccan court in Sale sentenced the leader of the \u00ab\u00a0Sahel and Sahara Cell\u00a0\u00bb to 10 years’ imprisonment. The group was accused of cooperating with the GSPC in establishing terrorist training camps in the Sahara; the other 13 members of the cell also received prison sentences. [39]<\/font><\/a> <\/span><\/p>\n
The extent of GSPC\/Al-Qaeda penetration into Tunisia is less clear. In the first terrorist incident since the Djerba attacks, Tunisian security forces engaged in gunfights with a terrorist cell on December 23, 2006 and January 3, 2007, killing 12 members of the group and arresting the others. Tunisian Interior Minister Rafik Kacem, while not mentioning the GSPC by name, said that six of the terrorists had infiltrated into Tunisia from the Algerian border, smuggling weapons in with them. One of these six was reported to be a Mauritanian. Official Tunisian sources also reported that the group possessed blueprints of foreign embassies, lists of diplomats, and quantities of explosives. [40]<\/font><\/a> The commander of the cell was a certain Lassad Sassi, a former security services member, who had fought in the jihad in Afghanistan and Algeria. [41]<\/font><\/a> The GSPC did not issue a claim of responsibility; instead, an unknown group called \u00ab\u00a0Shabab Al-Tawhid w’Al-Jihad Bi-Tunis\u00a0\u00bb (\u00ab\u00a0The Youth of Monotheism and Jihad in Tunisia) released a communiqu\u00e9 claiming that it was behind the cell. [42]<\/font><\/a> <\/span><\/p>\n
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Recent Attacks<\/span><\/b> <\/span><\/p>\n
The GSPC has carried out hundreds of attacks in recent years in Algeria, mostly against security forces, but at times against other targets as well. However, two recent GSPC\/Al-Qaeda attacks in Algeria are worthy of special attention, as they are the first indications of a change in the group’s pattern of operation since the union with Al-Qaeda. <\/span><\/p>\n
On December 10, 2006, the GSPC attacked a bus transporting employees of the Brown & Root – Condor Corporation, which is linked to the U.S. construction firm Halliburton. [43]<\/font><\/a> This attack signaled a new strategy of directly targeting Western interests in Algeria. <\/span><\/p>\n
On February 13, 2007, the GSPC, which in the meantime had become The Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb, simultaneously exploded seven car bombs in various areas of the Kabylie region, killing six and wounding many others. This attack was clearly patterned on recent attacks in Baghdad and was meant to show a qualitative advance in the capabilities of the new branch of Al-Qaeda. The organization’s communiqu\u00e9 claiming responsibility asserted that it had used new remote-guidance technology for the car bombs. The invention and use of this technology had been announced two weeks previously by jihadist groups in Iraq. If there is substance to these claims, it would be an indication of the timely transfer of technology from the Middle East to Algeria. [44]<\/font><\/a> <\/span><\/p>\n
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Conclusion<\/span><\/b> <\/span><\/p>\n
Never in the past has Al-Qaeda had such a solid territorial base in such proximity to Western states, and it has threatened to employ this base to attack Europe. The unification of the North African jihad groups under the banner of Al-Qaeda, the use of the Sahara for training and arms-smuggling, and the number of North African cells discovered in Europe in the past all indicate the magnitude of the threat. <\/span><\/p>\n
In the mid- to long-term, the rise of political Islamism in North Africa may cast a pall over security cooperation among North African states and between them and the West. While the various participationist Islamist movements in North Africa often adopt moderate positions on domestic issues and take pains to distance themselves from terrorists in their own countries, they all have a radical foreign policy agenda, which, were it to influence security policy, would call into question cooperation with the West or with secularist regimes in North Africa. It is also possible that governments that are supportive of fundamentalism, or are tolerant of it, could further erode local traditions of religious moderation and spawn a substratum of armed jihadists, as occurred in Saudi Arabia in the 1980s and 90s. <\/span><\/p>\n
Morocco’s political culture is quietly undergoing a radical transformation, with the Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD) expected to garner close to 50% of the vote in the September 7, 2007 legislative elections. [45]<\/font><\/a> In the short term, not all of this popularity will translate directly into political power: For one, the sensitive ministries are controlled by the king, not by the coalition; and second, the electoral districts have recently been redrawn to give more weight to the rural vote – which will likely work to the Islamists’ disadvantage. [46]<\/font><\/a> Nonetheless, once the PJD has firmly established itself as the dominant political party in the country, future structural changes may open up new opportunities for it to advance its agenda, which is supportive of jihadists in Iraq, Somalia, and basically anywhere else they fight the West or its allies. [47]<\/font><\/a> <\/span><\/p>\n
In Algeria, the fact that the Islamist MSP party takes part in the \u00ab\u00a0Presidential Alliance\u00a0\u00bb (the three-party governing coalition) has not hampered the fight against terrorism. However, more heavyweight Islamists from the dissolved FIS have repeatedly made attempts over the last year to reenter the political arena – for the time being without success. As in Morocco, future political reforms may possibly change this dynamic. The newly democratic Mauritania also presents an opening to political Islamists, who have recently struck a deal with presidential candidate Saleh Ould Hanena. [48]<\/font><\/a> The exception to this pattern is Tunisia, where Islamists continue to be categorically excluded from the political process. <\/span><\/p>\n
In essence, North Africa is today facing the same turning point at which our story began, when the botched 1991 elections in Algeria set off a chain of events that eventually made possible the establishment of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Today, though, circumstances have changed. The political Islamists have learned a patient and incremental approach to gaining political power, and the North African regimes have shown themselves to be more accepting of this process. [49]<\/font><\/a> The flipside of this emerging nationalist-Islamist alliance is that it will likely further erode whatever popular support exists for the jihadists fighting against the governments of the region. On the other hand, the jihadists no longer truly seek popular legitimization in the local arena. The global jihad movement is an autonomous subculture, with its own norms and points of reference. It is something of a historical irony that the GSPC, whose founding rationale was to win back the support of the masses, has now become The Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb, which answers not to popular sentiment in Algiers or Casablanca, but to its commanders, somewhere in the mountains of Pakistan and Afghanistan. <\/span> <\/p>\n
* Daniel Lav is a Research Fellow at MEMRI.<\/span><\/i> <\/span><\/p>\n
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<\/span> <\/div>\n
[1]<\/font><\/a> The convention is to use the acronym of the French names of the North African groups, even for those that employ exclusively Arabic. The FIS is the Front Islamique de Salut; the GIA is the Groupe Islamique Arme; the GSPC is the Groupe Salafiste pour le Predication et le Combat; and the GICM is the Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain. <\/span><\/p>\n
As for proper names, this report generally follows the orthography used in the North African French-language press; i.e. \u00ab\u00a0Mohamed\u00a0\u00bb instead of the standard transcription \u00ab\u00a0Muhammad.\u00a0\u00bb Nonetheless, for the sake of convenience some forms have been altered, i.e. ‘Abd Al-Wadoud (for Abdelouadoud). <\/span><\/p>\n
[2]<\/font><\/span><\/a> <\/span> El-Khabar <\/span><\/i>(Algeria), January 2, 2007. <\/span><\/p>\n
[3]<\/font><\/a> http:\/\/www.alarabiya.net\/Articles\/2004\/06\/20\/4501.htm<\/font><\/a>, June 20, 2004. <\/span><\/p>\n
[4]<\/font><\/a> Majallat Al-Jama’a<\/i> 1 (May-June 2004), p. 23. <\/span><\/p>\n
[5]<\/font><\/a> This is the origin of his nickname \u00ab\u00a0Al-Bara,\u00a0\u00bb from \u00ab\u00a0Paratrooper\u00a0\u00bb (Arabic speakers pronounce \u00ab\u00a0p\u00a0\u00bb as \u00ab\u00a0b\u00a0\u00bb). http:\/\/www.echoroukonline.com\/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=4856<\/font><\/a>. <\/span><\/p>\n
[6]<\/font><\/a> Al-Sharq Al-Awsat<\/i> (London), July 3, 2005. <\/span><\/p>\n
[7]<\/font><\/a> L’expression<\/i> (Algeria), October 30, 2004. <\/span><\/p>\n
[8]<\/font><\/a> Liberte<\/i> (Algeria), November 26, 2006. <\/span><\/p>\n
[9]<\/font><\/a> L’Expression<\/i> (Algeria), October 30, 2004. <\/span><\/p>\n
[10]<\/font><\/a> http:\/\/www.alarabiya.net\/Articles\/2004\/06\/20\/4501.htm<\/font><\/a>, June 20, 2004. <\/span><\/p>\n
[11]<\/font><\/a> Interview with former GSPC leader Abu Omar ‘Abd Al-Barr; El-Khabar<\/i> (Algeria), September 10, 2006. However, in an \u00ab\u00a0interview\u00a0\u00bb in Majallat Al-Jama’a<\/i> 1 (p. 17), when asked about the perception that he had sworn allegiance to bin Laden, he gave an ambiguous answer. <\/span><\/p>\n
[12]<\/font><\/a> Interview with former GSPC leader Abu Omar ‘Abd Al-Barr; El-Khabar<\/i> (Algeria), Sseptember 10, 2006, pp.16-17. <\/span><\/p>\n
[13]<\/font><\/span><\/a> <\/span> Majallat Al-Jama’a <\/span><\/i> 1, p. 19. <\/span> <\/p>\n
[14]<\/font><\/a> Al-Sharq Al-Awsat<\/i> (London), July 3, 2005. <\/span><\/p>\n
[15]<\/font><\/span><\/a> <\/span> El-Khabar<\/span><\/i> (Algeria), September 12, 2006. <\/span><\/p>\n
[16]<\/font><\/span><\/a> http:\/\/www.almaqdese.net\/a?i=462&PHPSESSID=50a931aff534b807a0a5348f4a5635bd<\/font><\/span><\/a><\/span>. <\/span><\/p>\n
[17<\/font><\/span>]<\/span><\/font><\/span><\/a>http:\/\/209.85.135.104\/search?q=cache:nZ-_H91Vr1gJ:www.tajdeed.org.uk\/forums\/showthread.php%3Fs%3D2481416acb668c8a77c76f940755f4c5%26postid%3D141075+%22%D9%85%D8%AA%D9%89+%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%BA%D9%8A%D8%B1+%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A9+%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A9%22&hl=iw&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=il<\/span><\/font><\/span><\/a><\/span>. <\/span><\/p>\n
[18]<\/font><\/a> In the meantime, a statement published in Hattab’s name retracted his previous support for the Reconciliation program. <\/span> El-Khabar<\/span><\/i> (Algeria), August 21, 2006. <\/span><\/p>\n
[19]<\/font><\/a> ‘Abdallah Bin Sa’d Abi Sarh was a companion of the Prophet Muhammad; the Prophet used to dictate to him the Koranic verses as they were revealed. ‘Abdallah later claimed that not all of the Koran was divinely revealed, and that at times he had suggested emendations which the Prophet had accepted. In Muslim tradition, this claim is considered an act of apostasy. <\/span><\/p>\n
[20]<\/font><\/a> http:\/\/www.tawhed.ws\/r?i=4012&PHPSESSID=6e7cd3991ebce2b89175bbbacb81ca16<\/font><\/a>. <\/span><\/p>\n
[21]<\/font><\/span><\/a> <\/span> El-Khabar<\/span><\/i> (Algeria), September 10, 2006. <\/span><\/p>\n
[22]<\/font><\/a> El-Watan<\/i> (Algeria), August 21, 2006. <\/span><\/p>\n
[23]<\/font><\/a> Al-Hayat<\/i> (London), November 29, 2005. http:\/\/www.alwatanvoice.com\/arabic\/news.php?go=show&id=31477<\/font><\/a>. <\/span><\/p>\n
[24]<\/font><\/a> www.elaph.com<\/font><\/a>, November 25, 2005. The European media has since given her name as Muriel Degauque. <\/span><\/p>\n
[25]<\/font><\/a> Al-‘Alam<\/i> (Morocco), January 14, 2007. Al-‘Alam<\/i> also cited U.S. intelligence services as saying that at least nine suicide bombers in Iraq came from Tetouan and its immediate vicinity. (See also \u00ab\u00a0Nos kamikazes a Bagdad,\u00a0\u00bb Le Journal Hebdomadaire<\/i> (Morocco), November 25, 2006). Al-‘Alam<\/i> also reported that over the last two years, 100 fighters of Moroccan origin have been arrested in Iraq. According to Moroccan expert Abdellah Rami, some of these Moroccan recruits pass through GSPC training camps before being sent to Iraq. <\/span> Le Journal hebdomadaire<\/span><\/i> (Morocco), November 25, 2006. <\/span><\/p>\n
In late 2006, five Algerians were convicted of recruiting youth in Biskra, a traditional GSPC stronghold, for the Iraqi jihad. El-Shorouq El-Yawmi<\/i> (Algeria), December 6, 2006. <\/span><\/p>\n
[26]<\/font><\/span><\/a> <\/span> Liberte<\/span><\/i> (Algeria), February 7, 2007. <\/span><\/p>\n
[27]<\/font><\/span><\/a> <\/span> Aujourd’hui le Maroc<\/span><\/i> (Morocco), February 5, 2007. <\/span><\/p>\n
[28]<\/font><\/a> Al-Hayat<\/i> (London), February 16, 2007. <\/span><\/p>\n
[29]<\/font><\/span><\/a> <\/span> Le Jour d’Algerie <\/span><\/i> (Algeria), December 7, 2007. <\/span> Msahel himself is believed to have fought in Iraq, after having received training in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya. <\/span><\/p>\n
[30]<\/font><\/span><\/a> <\/span> Aujourd’hui le Maroc <\/span><\/i> (Morocco), February 16, 2007. <\/span><\/p>\n
[31]<\/font><\/a> La Repubblica<\/i> (Italy), April 5, 2006. <\/span><\/p>\n
[32]<\/font><\/a> http:\/\/www.muslm.net\/vb\/showthread.php?t=194321<\/font><\/a>. <\/span><\/p>\n
[33]<\/font><\/a> Al-Hayat<\/i> (London), February 9, 2007; http:\/\/www.thememriblog.org\/blog_personal\/en\/615.htm<\/font><\/a>. <\/span><\/p>\n
[34]<\/font><\/a> http:\/\/www.akhbarnouakchott.com\/mapeci\/Ar\/446\/national.htm<\/font><\/a>. <\/span><\/p>\n
[35]<\/font><\/a> El-Shorouq El-Yawmi<\/i> (Algeria), November 13, 2006, based on report in Le Monde<\/i>. According to the Spanish daily El Periodico<\/i>, the GSPC killed some 10 Tuareg in an ambush, and as a result, a Tuareg leader in Mali, Eglasse Ag Idar, declared war on the GSPC. El Periodico<\/i> (Spain), November 20, 2006. The overall position of the Tuareg in Mali, however, tends toward neutrality; leaders of \u00ab\u00a0The May 23 Democratic Alliance for Change,\u00a0\u00bb which represents the Tuareg of the autonomy-seeking Kidal region, told the president of the World Amazigh [Berber] Congress that they were in favor of stability and peace, but had no wish to be dragged into the conflict. http:\/\/www.kabyle.com\/Resistance-Touaregue-du-Mali,11840.html<\/font><\/a>, February 4, 2007. <\/span><\/p>\n
[36]<\/font><\/a> El Periodico<\/i> (Spain), November 20, 2006. <\/span><\/p>\n
[37]<\/font><\/span><\/a> <\/span> Aujourd’hui le Maroc<\/span><\/i> (Morocco), February 9, 2007. <\/span><\/p>\n
[38]<\/font><\/a> Al-Ahdath Al-Maghribiyya<\/i> (Morocco), November 16, 2006. The Moroccan Jama’at Al-Tawhid w’Al-Jihad had close ties with Abu Bilal Al-Albani, former director of external relations in the GSPC, who turned himself in to the Algerian authorities (together with Abu Omar ‘Abd Al-Barr) on December 26, 2005. This Abu Bilal had close ties to Abu Basir the Algerian. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat<\/i> (London), January 3, 2006. <\/span><\/p>\n
[39]<\/font><\/a> Al-Sharq Al-Awsat<\/i> (London), January 21, 2007. <\/span><\/p>\n
[40]<\/font><\/a> Al-Shorouq<\/i> (Tunisia), January 13, 2007. <\/span><\/p>\n
[41]<\/font><\/a> Al-Hayat<\/i> (London), January 7, 2007. <\/span><\/p>\n
[42]<\/font><\/a> For their claim of responsibility, see www.muslm.net\/vb\/showthread.php?t=197589<\/font><\/a>. The communiqu\u00e9 referred to the Tunisian government’s recent campaign against the Islamic head-covering; if the GSPC really was behind the group, it might have considered it convenient to create a front organization for the cell that would address an issue currently popular with large parts of the Tunisian population. The fact that the group chose the name \u00ab\u00a0Al-Tawhid w’Al-Jihad,\u00a0\u00bb which is the name used by Al-Zarqawi before joining Al-Qaeda, may also be a hint of an Al-Qaeda affiliation. It should also be taken into consideration that the cell’s plans were foiled, which is another disincentive to claiming responsibility. At this point in time, though, no definite link can be established between the Tunisian cell and the GSPC\/Al-Qaeda. <\/span><\/p>\n
[43]<\/font><\/a> http:\/\/www.thememriblog.org\/blog_personal\/en\/144.htm<\/font><\/a>, December 12, 2007. <\/span><\/p>\n
[44]<\/font><\/a> See MEMRI Islamist Websites Monitor Project No. 64 (Special Dispatch No. 1463), January 14, 2007, and http:\/\/www.thememriblog.org\/blog_personal\/en\/522.htm<\/font><\/a>, February 1, 2007. <\/span><\/p>\n
[45]<\/font><\/span><\/a><\/span> \u00ab\u00a0Scenario 2007: Et si le PJD prenait le pouvoir?\u00a0\u00bb Tel Quel<\/i> (Morocco), January 14, 2007. <\/span><\/p>\n
[46]<\/font><\/span><\/a><\/span> \u00ab\u00a0Decoupage electoral: La colere du PJD,\u00a0\u00bb La Gazette du Maroc<\/i> (Morocco), February 12, 2007. <\/span><\/p>\n
[47]<\/font><\/a> For instance, in a December 26, 2006 communiqu\u00e9, the MUR (Movement for Unity and Reform, the PJD’s parent movement), sharply denounced the offensive against the Union of the Islamic Courts in Somalia. The communiqu\u00e9 was published in the party organ, Al-Tajdid<\/i>, on December 28, 2006. Throughout the recent fighting in Gaza, Al-Tajdid<\/i> regularly used Hamas’s terminology, referring to Muhammad Dahlan and his supporters as \u00ab\u00a0the putschist faction.\u00a0\u00bb A few months earlier, the Palestinian diplomatic representative in Rabat publicly attacked the PJD and Al-Tajdid<\/i> for their support for Hamas and their opposition to Fatah; http:\/\/www.pjd.ma\/article_ar.php3?id_article=1625<\/font><\/a>. <\/span><\/p>\n
[48]<\/font><\/a> Al-Tajdid<\/i> (Morocco), February 18, 2007. <\/span><\/p>\n
[49]<\/font><\/a> In an interview with the Algerian weekly Al-Muhaqqiq Al-Sirri<\/i>, Madani Mezrag, former commander of the AIS (Islamic Army of Salvation, the armed wing of the FIS), outlined his plans to return the FIS to the political scene. At first they will run candidates – not all of them FIS members – on an already existing ticket. Candidates will be presented in only a fraction of the electoral districts, and the sole aim of these candidates is to establish the former FIS as an accepted participant in the political process. He claimed that the regime has already given its consent to this project. Once this has been achieved, the party will try to expand its share of political power. Al-Muhaqqiq Al-Sirri<\/i> (Algeria), February 17, 2007. This is a strategy patterned on the Moroccan PJD, which, having established itself as a permanent feature of Moroccan politics, will run candidates in all electoral districts for the first time this coming September. <\/span><\/p>\n\n
<\/p>\n
Ces \u00e9lections qui vont changer la France<\/o:p><\/font><\/span><\/b><\/div>\n
par Chokri Hamrouni<\/span><\/b><\/div>\n
<\/font><\/span> <\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n
Le premier tour des \u00e9lections pr\u00e9sidentielles continue d\u2019attiser les attentions et de susciter un engouement populaire qui rompt incontestablement avec l\u2019apathie des deux derni\u00e8res d\u00e9cennies.Mais l\u2019augmentation significative des inscrits sur les listes \u00e9lectorales, ainsi que l\u2019\u00e9volution du nombre des t\u00e9l\u00e9spectateurs suivant les \u00e9missions politiques, ne traduisent pas n\u00e9cessairement des transformations profondes et qualitatives dans les modes de perception des Fran\u00e7ais, de la politique en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, et de leurs repr\u00e9sentants en particulier.<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
Et pour cause, la politique spectacle, o\u00f9 l\u2019image prime souvent sur le contenu et o\u00f9 les id\u00e9es s\u2019effacent derri\u00e8re les apparences, a envahi les espaces publics et priv\u00e9s et s\u2019est empar\u00e9e des esprits.<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
Des Fran\u00e7ais accros aux sondages<\/o:p><\/span><\/b><\/div>\n
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En ces temps de populisme ambiant et de course effr\u00e9n\u00e9e au sensationnel, les intentions de vote des Fran\u00e7ais sont scrut\u00e9es, selon une cadence tr\u00e8s soutenue, par des instituts de sondage \u00e0 l\u2019aff\u00fbt du moindre \u00e9v\u00e8nement, de la moindre d\u00e9claration et du moindre faux pas pour solliciter \u00e0 nouveau l\u2019avis de Fran\u00e7ais accul\u00e9s d\u00e9sormais \u00e0 consommer leur dose de sondages \u00e0 chaque petit d\u00e9jeuner.<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
Les sondages ont fini par rythmer la campagne et structurer le comportement \u00e9lectoral des candidats et des \u00e9lecteurs \u00e0 la fois (plus de 300 enqu\u00eates d\u2019opinion depuis le d\u00e9but de cette campagne et 100 de plus par rapport \u00e0 2002), entra\u00eenant par la m\u00eame occasion un d\u00e9ficit abyssal au niveau de l\u2019analyse politique de la campagne et des programmes dont les Fran\u00e7ais savent r\u00e9ellement peu de choses.<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
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Il est vrai que les commentaires des r\u00e9sultats de sondages omnipr\u00e9sents, souvent contradictoires et par cons\u00e9quent \u00ab volatils \u00bb comme l\u2019est le suppos\u00e9 \u00ab vote volatil \u00bb des Fran\u00e7ais, emp\u00eache toute analyse profonde et s\u00e9rieuse.<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
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Aujourd\u2019hui, les sondages ont cess\u00e9 d\u2019\u00eatre de \u00ab simples photographies de l\u2019opinion \u00e0 un moment donn\u00e9 \u00bb comme aiment \u00e0 le r\u00e9p\u00e9ter sondeurs et journalistes obnubil\u00e9s par ce nouvel instrument de pouvoir aussi fascinant que d\u00e9routant. Les sondages, qu\u2019on le veuille ou non, font et d\u00e9font la campagne, d\u00e9cident des candidats, des th\u00e8mes, des priorit\u00e9s, des alliances, des tactiques et des strat\u00e9gies de vote (comme par exemple raviver le r\u00e9flexe du \u00ab vote utile \u00bb en insistant sur les diff\u00e9rents sc\u00e9narios du deuxi\u00e8me tour). En somme, un pouvoir in\u00e9galement r\u00e9parti sur les candidats. Certains en b\u00e9n\u00e9ficient outrageusement pour asseoir une l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9, rassurer les troupes ou imposer une th\u00e9matique.<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
D\u2019autres, faute de notori\u00e9t\u00e9 ou de moyens, en p\u00e2tissent\u2026R\u00e9duits \u00e0 une simple arithm\u00e9tique comptable, ils sont oblig\u00e9s de constater que leurs efforts de campagne sont vite dilapid\u00e9s quand des sondages, si peu soucieux de \u00ab petits candidats plant\u00e9s dans le d\u00e9cor pour jouer le r\u00f4le de simples figurants \u00bb, continuent d\u2019attribuer les chiffres \u00ab selon la t\u00eate du ou des clients \u00bb !<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
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Rien ne sera plus comme avant<\/o:p><\/span><\/b><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
Mais les sondages, s\u2019occupent de l\u2019actualit\u00e9, ils ne s\u2019occupent pas de l\u2019avenir de la France. En focalisant presque exclusivement sur le premier et l\u2019entre deux tours, ils privent les Fran\u00e7ais d\u2019une vision d\u2019avenir, de voir surtout que ces \u00e9lections ne ressemblent pas \u00e0 toutes les autres\u2026que les enjeux qui en \u00e9manent risquent de bouleverser durablement un \u00e9chiquier politique qui a agenc\u00e9 la vie politique fran\u00e7aise depuis la vague rose de 1981.<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
\u00c9ni\u00e8me manifestation des multiples frustrations engendr\u00e9es par cette campagne, peu de Fran\u00e7ais se doutent qu\u2019une fois leur bulletin dans les urnes, ils ne vont pas changer uniquement de pr\u00e9sident mais de syst\u00e8me politique\u2026et qu\u2019au lendemain du 6 mai rien ne sera plus comme avant dans un pays r\u00e9put\u00e9 pourtant pour \u00eatre frileux au changement.<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
Les \u00e9lections de tous les dangers<\/o:p><\/span><\/b><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
Paradoxalement, les deux favoris du deuxi\u00e8me tour (annonc\u00e9s- certains ironiseront \u00ab \u00e9lus \u00bb- depuis des mois par la presse et les sondages) sont ceux qui ont le plus \u00e0 perdre de ces \u00e9lections.<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
Tout d\u2019abord, le candidat de la droite r\u00e9publicaine, Nicolas Sarkozy, joue son va-tout dans ses \u00e9lections ! Pour avoir commenc\u00e9 sa campagne tr\u00e8s t\u00f4t (depuis son c\u00e9l\u00e8bre \u00ab pas seulement quand je me rase \u00bb en r\u00e9ponse au journaliste de France 2 qui l\u2019interrogeait sur ses intentions pr\u00e9sidentielles), le Pr\u00e9sident de l\u2019UMP a d\u00fb mobiliser des moyens colossaux pour parvenir \u00e0 ses fins. Ressources de l\u2019Etat (place Beauvau, Bercy, ministres en campagne), parti taill\u00e9 sur mesure, m\u00e9dias majoritairement favorables, soutien appuy\u00e9 des grands patrons\u2026Rien n\u2019a \u00e9t\u00e9 m\u00e9nag\u00e9 pour assurer la victoire de Sarkozy.<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
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Cependant, la candidature de Nicolas Sarkozy n\u2019a rien de consensuel. L\u2019ancien ministre de l\u2019Int\u00e9rieur qui ne fait pas dans la ti\u00e9deur, a d\u00fb \u00e9liminer toutes sortes d\u2019obstacles (humains entre autres) qui se dressaient sur le chemin de son sacre. Tant d\u2019animosit\u00e9s, m\u00eame au sein de son propre camp, qui risquent de rejaillir sur lui en cas de d\u00e9faite et prolonger par cons\u00e9quent le fameux TSS (Tout Sauf Sarkozy du premier et probablement deuxi\u00e8me tour) pour \u00ab un troisi\u00e8me tour vindicatif \u00bb !<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
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D\u2019autre part, l\u2019\u00e9ventuelle d\u00e9faite de Nicolas Sarkozy plongerait l\u2019Union Pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP) dans une crise profonde. Il faut rappeler que ce parti (appel\u00e9 \u00e0 sa cr\u00e9ation Union pour la Majorit\u00e9 Pr\u00e9sidentielle) a vu le jour par et pour le pouvoir, en vue de soutenir la candidature du Pr\u00e9sident Jacques Chirac \u00e0 sa propre succession en 2002. Un parti cr\u00e9\u00e9 par le haut et formant un ensemble h\u00e9t\u00e9roclite (RPR, d\u00e9mocratie lib\u00e9rale, les dissidents de l\u2019UDF, les sans \u00e9tiquettes\u2026) qui risque de s\u2019effondrer si le ciment (Pouvoir) qui a permis un semblant de coh\u00e9sion venait \u00e0 manquer.<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
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Car nul doute qu\u2019une d\u00e9faite de Sarkozy entra\u00eenerait une autre, celle de l\u2019UMP. \u00ab Un parti de pouvoir \u00bb qui n\u2019a jamais connu les bancs de l\u2019opposition depuis sa cr\u00e9ation, qui serait d\u00e9fait aux pr\u00e9sidentielles et aux l\u00e9gislatives apr\u00e8s s\u2019\u00eatre fait malmen\u00e9 aux r\u00e9gionales, risquerait de conna\u00eetre \u00e0 son tour une longue travers\u00e9e du d\u00e9sert.<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
La candidate socialiste n\u2019est pas en reste. Accus\u00e9e d\u2019\u00eatre un \u00ab pure produit des sondages et des m\u00e9dias \u00bb, son catapultage au devant de la seine a surpris m\u00eame les vieux routards de la politique au sein du PS. Son intronisation brusque et inattendue aurait laiss\u00e9 des traces ind\u00e9l\u00e9biles sur le moral de ses adversaires qu\u2019une d\u00e9faite mettrait in\u00e9vitablement \u00e0 jour. Et pour preuve les primaires qui lui ont servi de tremplin d\u00e9mocratique se sont apparent\u00e9es \u00e0 un r\u00e9f\u00e9rendum contre les \u00e9l\u00e9phants bannis un \u00e0 un \u00e0 coups de balai m\u00e9diatiques.<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
La recomposition, de circonstance, du PS avec le ralliement du NPS (Nouveau Parti Socialiste) et le remorquage des vaincus des primaires risquerait de partir en \u00e9clats si le sc\u00e9nario cauchemardesque du 21 avril venait \u00e0 se reproduire. Le Parti socialiste se couperait d\u00e8s lors en deux : ceux qui partiront vers d\u2019autres cieux et ceux qui resteront pour ramasser les restes du parti.<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
La gauche lib\u00e9rale, habilement dragu\u00e9e par Bayrou, entamerait son exode vers un Centre vraisemblablement premier b\u00e9n\u00e9ficiaire de la d\u00e9route de la Gauche. Elle abandonnerait ainsi le parti \u00e0 des courants press\u00e9s de s\u2019entred\u00e9chirer dans des luttes intestines et appel\u00e9s \u00e0 r\u00e9soudre une \u00e9quation aussi difficile qu\u2019in\u00e9dite : comment faire du changement quand les t\u00e9nors du renouveau (S\u00e9gol\u00e8ne, NPS et les nouveaux adh\u00e9rents) ont \u00e9t\u00e9 envoy\u00e9s au front pour \u00eatre massacr\u00e9s \u00e0 leur tour comme le furent leurs a\u00een\u00e9s cinq ans auparavant. Les \u00ab vieux \u00bb d\u00e9faits \u00e0 l\u2019int\u00e9rieur, les \u00ab jeunes \u00bb \u00e0 l\u2019ext\u00e9rieur ! Qui se remettrait le premier de ses blessures et engagerait le parti dans une refonte qui n\u2019a que trop tard\u00e9 ?<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
Le zapping id\u00e9ologique<\/o:p><\/span><\/b><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
L\u2019autre possible grand perdant de ces \u00e9lections est Dominique Voynet, si on doit se fier aux sondages et \u00e0 la campagne en demi-teinte que m\u00e8ne la candidate des Verts. Eclips\u00e9s par \u00ab le pacte \u00e9cologique \u00bb de Nicolas Hulot sign\u00e9 par la majorit\u00e9 des principaux candidats, les \u00e9cologistes peinent \u00e0 trouver leurs marques.<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
Paradoxalement c\u2019est au moment o\u00f9 la d\u00e9fense de l\u2019environnement devient un enjeu national et plan\u00e9taire, mobilisant des personnalit\u00e9s de tout premier plan (\u00e0 l\u2019instar de l\u2019ex-vice-pr\u00e9sident am\u00e9ricain Al Gore qui s\u2019est mu\u00e9 en d\u00e9fenseur de l\u2019environnement plan\u00e9taire), que les \u00e9cologistes fran\u00e7ais connaissent leur pire d\u00e9sillusion.<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
Ils viennent de l\u2019apprendre \u00e0 leurs d\u00e9pens : l\u2019\u00e9cologie est devenue un enjeu si important qu\u2019il ne faut plus le laisser au seul soin des Verts. Apr\u00e8s le social sans le socialisme (Jacques Chirac et sa c\u00e9l\u00e8bre pr\u00e9tendue \u00ab lutte contre la fracture sociale \u00bb en 1995) et le lib\u00e9ralisme sans les lib\u00e9raux (Le Gouvernement Jospin 1997-2002 avait plus privatis\u00e9 que les gouvernements Balladur et Jupp\u00e9 r\u00e9unis), l\u2019exaltation du sentiment national et la stigmatisation de l\u2019immigration sans le Front national\u2026Aujourd\u2019hui, c\u2019est l\u2019\u00e9cologie sans \u00e9cologisme qui confirme le d\u00e9passement des clivages traditionnels et l\u2019extr\u00eame porosit\u00e9 du corps \u00e9lectoral fran\u00e7ais.<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
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Force est de constater que les Fran\u00e7ais ne se situent plus par rapport \u00e0 des id\u00e9ologies (port\u00e9es par des partis) qu\u2019ils trouvent obsol\u00e8tes mais plut\u00f4t par rapport \u00e0 des th\u00e9matiques qui les pr\u00e9occupent dans leur vie de tous les jours. En faisant dans le populisme primaire et en pratiquant le zapping id\u00e9ologique qui consiste \u00e0 suivre les tendances de l\u2019opinion en s\u2019y accommodant, les partis politiques cessent d\u2019\u00eatre des points d\u2019ancrage, des rep\u00e8res de lisibilit\u00e9 pour le pr\u00e9sent et de visibilit\u00e9 pour le futur. La d\u00e9mocratie en p\u00e2tira.<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
Des \u00e9lections dans l\u2019\u00e9lection<\/o:p><\/span><\/b><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
Faute de peser de tout leur poids sur l\u2019issue des \u00e9lections, plusieurs candidats se sont fix\u00e9s d\u2019autres objectifs dans cette campagne.<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
Tout d\u2019abord il y a la bataille autour de la repr\u00e9sentativit\u00e9 d\u2019une extr\u00eame gauche qui commence \u00e0 exasp\u00e9rer par la multiplicit\u00e9 de ses candidats qui disent en gros la m\u00eame chose. La bonne campagne d\u2019Olivier Besancenot, les adieux d\u2019Arlette Laguiller (LO), la d\u00e9ception du leader alter mondialiste Jos\u00e9 Bov\u00e9 de la Politique en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral et des politiciens en particuliers \u00e0 la suite d\u2019une am\u00e8re premi\u00e8re exp\u00e9rience, la d\u00e9perdition des communistes placent le candidat de la LCR (Ligue Communiste R\u00e9volutionnaire) en p\u00f4le position. Fort de cette l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 populaire, Olivier Besancenot pourrait engager l\u2019indispensable unification de la gauche de la gauche afin de pr\u00e9server sa place dans le paysage politique fran\u00e7ais.<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
A la droite de la droite, les choses sont moins compliqu\u00e9es. Apr\u00e8s le retour au bercail de Bruno M\u00e9gret pr\u00e9sident du MNR (Mouvement national r\u00e9publicain), la tr\u00e8s probable d\u00e9convenue de Philippe de Villiers (Mouvement pour la France), Jean-Marie le Pen et \u00e0 d\u00e9faut de r\u00e9\u00e9diter l\u2019exploit de 2002, devrait se satisfaire de l\u2019enracinement durable du FN dans la vie politique fran\u00e7aise en r\u00e9ussissant \u00e0 chaque fois \u00e0 \u00e9liminer les concurrents directs, et d\u2019autre part en \u00e9vitant \u00e0 son parti une guerre de succession p\u00e9rilleuse par la d\u00e9signation de sa fille Marine pour reprendre le flambeau. Une d\u00e9marche fortement l\u00e9gitim\u00e9e par la campagne dynamique qu\u2019ils m\u00e8nent en duo.<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
Une France au Centre<\/o:p><\/span><\/b><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
Surprise de cette campagne, Fran\u00e7ois Bayrou aurait marqu\u00e9 ces \u00e9lections de son empreinte quel qu\u2019en soit le r\u00e9sultat.<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
Vainqueur, il provoquera un bouleversement dans la vie politique fran\u00e7aise et s\u2019appuiera sur le verdict populaire pour d\u00e9barrasser la France du clivage Droite\/Gauche. Sa victoire signifiera que les Fran\u00e7ais veulent \u00eatre gouvern\u00e9s au Centre. Il s\u2019y appliquera. Les partis s\u2019y rangeront et les soft (centristes) de tout bord pourraient prendre le pouvoir partout.<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
Vaincu, il vendra la d\u00e9faite \u00e9lectorale la plus ch\u00e8re. Courtis\u00e9 par les deux finalistes, le mot d\u2019ordre qu\u2019il donnera pourrait d\u00e9cider de l\u2019issue des \u00e9lections pr\u00e9sidentielles et l\u00e9gislatives \u00e0 la fois. Les enjeux sont tellement importants que les concessions pourraient \u00eatre tellement \u00e9normes. Gauche ou Droite, le vainqueur sinon se ralliera avec le Centre, du moins il s\u2019en approchera. Les id\u00e9es centristes auraient triomph\u00e9 ainsi de toutes les autres en traversant les fronti\u00e8res partisanes.<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
A d\u00e9faut de prendre le pouvoir, Fran\u00e7ois Bayrou en aurait balis\u00e9 le terrain pour les \u00e9ch\u00e9ances \u00e0 venir.<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/o:p><\/span><\/div>\n
(Source\u00a0: le site Oumma.com (France), le 19 avril 2007)<\/o:p><\/span><\/b><\/div>\n
Lien\u00a0: <\/span> http:\/\/oumma.com\/spip.php?article2411<\/a><\/o:p><\/span><\/b><\/div>\n
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LE LONG SOMMEIL DES DIPLOMATES ARABES<\/font><\/h3>\n
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Houcine Ghali, Gen\u00e8ve<\/strong><\/font> Lorsqu’un ambassadeur arabe est nomm\u00e9 dans une capitale occidentale, c’est pour le r\u00e9compenser pour services rendus, ou pour l’\u00e9loigner du pays parce qu’il d\u00e9range donc pour le punir, ou enfin parce qu’il appartient \u00e0 la famille au pouvoir et ainsi on l’envoie \u00e0 l’\u00e9tranger pour s’occuper de la g\u00e9rance des int\u00e9r\u00eats de ceux qui monopolisent l’Etat. C’est pourquoi, les ambassadeurs arabes \u00e0 Gen\u00e8ve ou Berne par exemple, passent trois, quatre ans ou plus sans que personne n’entende parler d’eux. Aucune intervention \u00e0 la t\u00e9l\u00e9vision ou dans le reste des mas m\u00e9dias helv\u00e9tiques, aucune participation \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense des causes arabes et aucun effort pour faire conna\u00eetre l’histoire, la culture ou la civilisation de leurs pays respectifs. Certains d’entre eux consacrent la majeur partie de leur temps \u00e0 recevoir et pr\u00e9parer le s\u00e9jours des membres des familles r\u00e9gnantes, d’autres veillent \u00e0 bien r\u00e9ceptionner le contenu des valises diplomatiques pour les acheminer sur des comptes \u00e0 num\u00e9ros dans les banques suisses et enfin quelques uns s’adonnent au plaisir du jeu dans les casinos et aux s\u00e9ances de massage et de fitness. \u00a0Par contre, la majorit\u00e9 des ambassadeurs arabes ne se privent gu\u00e8re de surveiller leurs compatriotes en chargeant plusieurs de leurs fonctionnaires de noter toute activit\u00e9 des opposants aux r\u00e9gimes qu’ils repr\u00e9sentent pour en tirer des rapports qui sont envoy\u00e9s r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement aux pays, avec les d\u00e9sastreuses cons\u00e9quences que tout le monde sait. Ils sont l\u00e0 aussi, dans les vastes salons d’h\u00f4tels 5 \u00e9toiles, avec tout le faste n\u00e9cessaire, lorsqu’il s’agit de f\u00eater l’ind\u00e9pendance du pays ou pour c\u00e9l\u00e9brer la prise du pouvoir par l’un des 22 tenants d’un pouvoir r\u00e9pressif et arbitraire. Mais quand il s’agit de probl\u00e8mes de tout ordre auxquels se trouvent confront\u00e9s des Arabes r\u00e9sidant dans le pays \u00e9tranger, ni l\u2019ambassadeur ni ses subalternes ne se sentent concern\u00e9s. Et c’est ainsi que les travailleurs arabes en Suisse par exemple se trouvent d\u00e9laiss\u00e9s par leurs ambassades qui ne pensent \u00e0 eux que pour leur demander d’aider mat\u00e9riellement leur pays d’origine, comme par l’interm\u00e9diaire du 26\/26 concernant la Tunisie. Les relations commerciales entre la Suisse et les pays arabes s’av\u00e8rent insignifiantes par rapport \u00e0 la situation financi\u00e8re et strat\u00e9gique de la Suisse et des \u00e9normes possibilit\u00e9s des pays arabes. Si on prend le cas de la Tunisie, qui a rappel\u00e9 son ambassadeur \u00e0 Berne depuis 2005, en ne gardant qu’un charg\u00e9 d’affaires, le volume des \u00e9changes commerciaux ne d\u00e9passe gu\u00e8re 120 millions de francs suisses par ann\u00e9e. C’est une goutte d’eau dans le lac de Gen\u00e8ve en tenant compte des possibilit\u00e9s financi\u00e8res \u00e9normes de la Conf\u00e9d\u00e9ration helv\u00e9tique. Contrairement \u00e0 leurs coll\u00e8gues arabes, les ambassadeurs europ\u00e9ens en Suisse font un travail \u00e9norme pour tirer profit des grandes potentialit\u00e9s du march\u00e9 suisse. En voici un r\u00e9cent exemple: Gonzalo de Benito, ambassadeur d’Espagne \u00e0 Berne, vient de s’adresser aux clients de la grande chaine de distribution COOP, qui brasse un capital d\u00e9passant le budget tunisien, dans l’hebdomadaire Coop\u00e9ration n\u00b0 16 du 17 avril 2007, pour les inciter \u00e0 acheter le vin de son pays. Voici ce qu’il \u00e9crit, avec sa photo \u00e0 l’appui: \u00a0\u00bb Chers clients Coop, l’Espagne est aujourd’hui le 2\u00e8me fournisseur de la Suisse en bouteilles de vin rouge, devant la France. Ce succ\u00e8s refl\u00e8te le d\u00e9veloppement exceptionnel qu’a connu la production de vins espagnols ces derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es. Il faut dire que c\u00f4t\u00e9 vins, l’Espagne a tout d’une grande! Non seulement elle dispose de la plus importante surface de culture au monde pour la production de vins de qualit\u00e9, mais elle b\u00e9n\u00e9ficie aussi d’une situation privil\u00e9gi\u00e9e entre la M\u00e9diterran\u00e9e et l’Atlantique, d’une \u00e9norme diversit\u00e9 g\u00e9ologique et climatique ainsi que d’une grande richesse en c\u00e9pages r\u00e9gionaux. Tous ces atouts font d’elle l’un des grands pays viticoles au monde. Coop, qui importe nos vins depuis de nombreuses ann\u00e9es, est parfaitement consciente de ce d\u00e9veloppement, et je suis convaincu que cette op\u00e9ration promotionnelle contribuera \u00e0 rapprocher encore davantage la Suisse des vignobles espagnols. \u00a0\u00bb Un ambassadeur arabe ne pourrait intervenir ainsi dans les m\u00e9dias suisses pour promouvoir l’huile, les dattes ou le tourisme, tout simplement parce qu’il n’est nullement concern\u00e9 par le d\u00e9veloppement de son pays et le bien \u00eatre de son peuple. Il ne repr\u00e9sente que les tenants du pouvoir de son pays et n’agit que sur ordre de ceux qui l’ont nomm\u00e9. Il n’a ni marge de man\u0153uvre ni prise de conscience pour travailler pour le bien de son peuple. 19 avril 2007 \u00a0<\/font><\/div>\n
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Tunisie : Une entreprise, autoris\u00e9e par les Fran\u00e7ais, r\u00e9alise un sondage sur les pr\u00e9sidentielles !<\/font><\/p>\n
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par : K. Boumiza<\/font><\/strong> Il n’y avait jusque l\u00e0 que 5 instituts de sondage en France \u00e0 avoir obtenu l’autorisation pour r\u00e9aliser de telles \u00e9tudes relatives aux intentions de votes pour les pr\u00e9sidentielles Fran\u00e7aises de 2007, ils sont d\u00e9sormais 6. Le dernier n\u00e9 est, premi\u00e8re du genre dans le paysage des sondeurs d’opinion fran\u00e7ais, tunisien. 3C Etudes (http:\/\/www.3cetudes.com ), de Hichem Guerfali, institut d’\u00e9tudes tunisien exer\u00e7ant exclusivement ou presque sur le march\u00e9 fran\u00e7ais depuis 2002, a pu en effet d\u00e9crocher l’autorisation de la commission des sondages en France, pour r\u00e9aliser des sondages d’opinion sur les intentions de vote des fran\u00e7ais pour les pr\u00e9sidentielles de 2007, \u00e0 partir de son terrain d’\u00e9tudes en \u00abCATI\u00bb (Computer Aided Telephony Interviewing ou centre d’interviews par t\u00e9l\u00e9phone), install\u00e9 en Tunisie. Les interviews, r\u00e9alis\u00e9es sur un \u00e9chantillon de 1000 personnes (France m\u00e9tropolitaine) repr\u00e9sentatif de la population fran\u00e7aise \u00e2g\u00e9e de 18 ans, sont en cours. La repr\u00e9sentativit\u00e9 de l’\u00e9chantillon est garantie par la m\u00e9thode des quotas, stratifi\u00e9s par sexe, \u00e2ge, cat\u00e9gories socioprofessionnelles et par r\u00e9gions. Ces personnes ont \u00e9t\u00e9 interview\u00e9es par t\u00e9l\u00e9phone \u00e0 leurs lieux de domicile. La notice de l’enqu\u00eate a \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9pos\u00e9e \u00e0 la commission des sondages, mercredi 18 avril 2007, et demeure consultable aupr\u00e8s de ladite commission. Les r\u00e9sultats pr\u00e9liminaires d’intentions de vote, sortis par ce sondage d’opinion dont la fin est pr\u00e9vue pour aujourd’hui jeudi 19 avril 2007, montrent \u00e0 mi-chemin une l\u00e9g\u00e8re avance prise par S\u00e9gol\u00e8ne Royal (32 % de ceux qui d\u00e9signent d\u00e9j\u00e0 un candidat) sur Nicolas Sarkozy (31,5 % de ceux qui d\u00e9signent d\u00e9j\u00e0 un candidat) qui la talonnerait d’un demi-point. Fran\u00e7ois Bayrou arriverait \u00e0 la 3 \u00e8me place avec 17,5 % des intentions de vote des Fran\u00e7ais m\u00e9tropolitains qui ont l’intention de d\u00e9signer un candidat. Le taux d’abstention ne d\u00e9passerait pas les 3% et celui des ind\u00e9cis serait de 57% en premi\u00e8re intention et de 37 % en deuxi\u00e8me intention. Chez 3C Etudes, on nous assure qu’on pourra suivre en ligne l’avancement du d\u00e9pouillement de l’enqu\u00eate en temps r\u00e9el, sur le site de l’entreprise. Qui est 3C Etudes ?<\/strong> 3C Etudes est un institut d’Etudes promu en 2002 par une \u00e9quipe de jeunes tunisiens dipl\u00f4m\u00e9s des grandes \u00e9coles fran\u00e7aises, tunisiennes et am\u00e9ricaines. Deux de ses actionnaires ayant eu le privil\u00e8ge rare d’obtenir des prix pr\u00e9sidentiels, l’un des \u00e9tudes et l’autre de la recherche, ce serait donc l’une des entreprises tunisiennes les plus dipl\u00f4m\u00e9es, pourrait-on dire. Ce pionnier des t\u00e9l\u00e9-services se consacre aux \u00e9tudes marketing. Fort du savoir-faire de ses dirigeants, l’entreprise, dont le directeur g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Hichem Guerfali \u00e9tait ex-directeur marketing du groupe priv\u00e9 tunisien Poulina puis directeur commercial et marketing de Tunisiana, le premier op\u00e9rateur priv\u00e9 de t\u00e9l\u00e9phonie mobile en Tunisie, fait le bonheur de bon nombre d’instituts d’\u00e9tudes fran\u00e7ais et europ\u00e9ens, pour lesquels il r\u00e9alise, \u00e0 partir de Tunis, les enqu\u00eates t\u00e9l\u00e9phoniques aupr\u00e8s des particuliers et des professionnels. Avec une batterie d’outils technologiques, et munie d’une liaison en fibre optique Tunis-Paris, ses services peuvent \u00eatre rendus de mani\u00e8re tout \u00e0 fait transparente pour les personnes interview\u00e9es, aux m\u00eames conditions que ceux r\u00e9alis\u00e9s \u00e0 partir de Paris ou de Gen\u00e8ve. Disposant d’un personnel hautement qualifi\u00e9, elle r\u00e9alise l’analyse des donn\u00e9es et livre \u00e0 ses clients europ\u00e9ens au choix, soit des bruts de sondage, soit des \u00e9tudes cl\u00e9s en main. (Source : African Manager (Portail \u00e9conomique \u2013 Tunis) , le 19 avril 2007)<\/font><\/strong> Lien : http:\/\/www.africanmanager.com\/articles\/113385.html<\/a> \u00a0<\/div>\n\n
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A l’\u00e9coute du Palais<\/font><\/h3>\n
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Par Ma\u00eetre Fethi El Mouldi<\/font><\/strong> Un de plus !<\/strong> Ma\u00eetre Abderrazak Kilani, membre du conseil de l’Ordre, vient d’annoncer sa candidature pour la pr\u00e9sidence du Conseil r\u00e9gional de Tunis. Ainsi, ils seront, d\u00e9sormais, pas moins de cinq candidats pour cette importante responsabilit\u00e9 puisque, outre Ma\u00eetre Kilani, quatre autres habitu\u00e9s des institutions sont annonc\u00e9s : Ma\u00eetres Mohamed Hedfi, Mohamed Jmour, Chawki Tebib et Adel Chemli. Inutile de dire que l’incertitude la plus totale va dominer cette \u00e9lection s’agissant de cinq t\u00e9nors qui ont une assise fort respectable. \u00c7a chauffe vraiment !<\/strong> \u00c7a y est ! La fi\u00e8vre monte et la campagne \u00e9lectorale \u00ab\u00a0chauffe\u00a0\u00bb. En effet, tous les candidats d\u00e9clar\u00e9s sont, d\u00e9sormais, visibles et tr\u00e8s actifs, se d\u00e9pla\u00e7ant partout avec leur \u00ab\u00a0\u00e9tat-major\u00a0\u00bb, faisant montre d’une disponibilit\u00e9 et d’une bienveillance qui fait plaisir. Et force est de constater que, \u00e0 ce jour, il n’y a pas eu de \u00ab\u00a0d\u00e9rapage\u00a0\u00bb et chaque candidat se limite \u00e0 sa propre personne ou \u00e0 son programme (s’il en a) et il n’y a pas d’attaques ext\u00e9rieures. Pourvu que \u00e7a dure. Bienvenue \u00e0 Sousse !<\/strong> Le Conseil r\u00e9gional de Tunis pr\u00e9sid\u00e9 par Ma\u00eetre Hafedh Brigui (par ailleurs candidat au Conseil national en tant que membre) a affich\u00e9 ses v\u0153ux de bienvenue\u00a0\u00bb \u00e0 tous les candidats qui veulent tenir les r\u00e9unions d’information avec les avocats de Sousse d’en informer le Conseil de Sousse pour qu’il pr\u00e9pare le \u00ab\u00a0terrain\u00a0\u00bb pour une bonne r\u00e9ception des candidats. Une initiative plus que louable ! Comment plaider ?<\/strong> L’Association Tunisienne des Jeunes Avocats (ATJA) innove : elle organise, le vendredi 27 avril 2007, \u00e0 partir de 15h30 une rencontre in\u00e9dite sur le th\u00e8me \u00ab\u00a0Comment plaider ?\u00a0\u00bb dans un h\u00f4tel de la capitale. On \u00e9voquera le projet d’assurance responsabilit\u00e9 civile des adh\u00e9rents de l’ATJA puis suivra une intervention de l’honnorable magistrat p\u00e9naliste, M. Hassen Ben Slah et le \u00ab\u00a0clou\u00a0\u00bb sera l’intervention de Ma\u00eetre B\u00e9chir Ferchichi, professeur et avocat tr\u00e8s \u00ab\u00a0pertinent\u00a0\u00bb sur les techniques de la plaidoirie. A ne pas manquer. Correctionnel ou criminel ?<\/strong> Encore une fois la question est pos\u00e9e. En effet, il suffit de jeter un coup d’\u0153il sur les piles de dossiers entass\u00e9es, \u00e0 chaque audience criminelle, devant la cour pour se rendre compte que le volume est plut\u00f4t compatible avec les audiences correctionnelles ! En effet, la justice, au sens noble du terme, est, avant tout, qualit\u00e9 avant d’\u00eatre quantit\u00e9 ! Et quand une audience criminelle dure jusqu’au d\u00e9but de soir\u00e9e et si l’on compte le temps des d\u00e9lib\u00e9rations, cela fait un peu trop et c’est fort usant ! (Source : \u00ab Le Temps \u00bb (Quotidien \u2013 Tunis), le 5 avril 2007) <\/font><\/strong> <\/div>\n
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<\/p>\nM. Wolfowitz, la Banque mondiale et la lutte contre la corruption<\/font><\/h3>\n
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Par : Ridha KEFI Depuis sa prise de fonction \u00e0 la t\u00eate de la Banque Mondiale (BM), M. Paul Wolfowitz, ancien secr\u00e9taire-adjoint \u00e0 la D\u00e9fense dans l’administration Bush et l’un des architecte de la guerre en Irak, a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 que sa mission num\u00e9ro un \u00e9tait la lutte contre la corruption. Corruption \u00e0 l’int\u00e9rieur de l’institution, et corruption autour des aides ou pr\u00eats distribu\u00e9s par celle-ci dans les pays destinataires. En d’autres termes, il veut s’assurer que l’argent pr\u00eat\u00e9 par la BM arrive effectivement aux gens qui en ont besoin et n’est pas d\u00e9tourn\u00e9 par des acteurs locaux publics ou priv\u00e9s \u00e0 des fins d’enrichissement personnel. Pour r\u00e9aliser cette noble mission, M. Wolfowitz (Wolfie pour les intimes) a pr\u00e9sent\u00e9, d\u00e9but 2006, un \u00abplan pour une campagne contre la corruption\u00bb. Dans sa premi\u00e8re version, qui pr\u00e9voyait de contourner les gouvernements nationaux pour s’assurer que l’aide arrive bien \u00e0 ceux qui en ont besoin, le plan a \u00e9t\u00e9 rejet\u00e9 par les pays membres, ainsi que par les administrateurs de l’institution. Le chairman a donc d\u00fb en pr\u00e9senter une seconde version, revue et corrig\u00e9e, qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 enfin accept\u00e9e par le Conseil d’administration, le 20 mars dernier. Pour justifier les concessions faites entre-temps par rapport au projet initial, M. Wolfowitz a d\u00e9clar\u00e9: \u00abNous devons nous impliquer. Mais, ce faisant, nous apportons de l’argent et nous devons aussi travailler avec les gouvernements pour am\u00e9liorer la gestion des affaires publiques\u00bb. Et d’ajouter, un brin r\u00e9aliste: \u00abNous ne pouvons pas rester sur la touche pendant trois ou cinq ans en attendant que la situation en mati\u00e8re de gestion des affaires publiques devienne parfaite. Nous devons produire des r\u00e9sultats et d’une mani\u00e8re qui contr\u00f4le ce qui est fait de l’argent d\u00e9pens\u00e9\u00bb. Est-ce pour donner l’\u00abexemple\u00bb aux partenaires de la BM – qui sont, comme on le sait, les pays en d\u00e9veloppement -, en mati\u00e8re de transparence et de bonne gouvernance, que M. Wolfowitz a commenc\u00e9 par… placer ses copains (et ses \u00abcoquins\u00bb) dans des postes cl\u00e9s au sein de l’organisme dont il a la charge ? La question s’impose d’autant que l’Am\u00e9ricain a nomm\u00e9 Kevin Kellem, ancien directeur de la communication et porte-parole du vice-pr\u00e9sident am\u00e9ricain Dick Cheney, \u00e0 un poste – nouvellement cr\u00e9\u00e9 pour lui – de directeur de la strat\u00e9gie de la communication, en plus de sa position de conseiller du pr\u00e9sident, mettant ainsi sur la touche le vice-pr\u00e9sident de la BM, charg\u00e9 de la communication, les affaires externes et des relations avec les Nations Unies. M. Wolfowitz a \u00abimpos\u00e9 une nomination politique au niveau de la direction, chose plut\u00f4t rare, en particulier depuis que les postes de direction sont moins \u00e9lev\u00e9s dans la hi\u00e9rarchie administrative et sont traditionnellement pourvus \u00e0 la suite d’un processus de s\u00e9lection transparent et bas\u00e9 sur le m\u00e9rite, non par choix politique\u00bb, a expliqu\u00e9 Mohamed Hakki, un ancien membre du personnel de la BM, dans un article intitul\u00e9 \u00abCopinage et corruption: Wolfowitz \u00e0 la BM\u00bb, publi\u00e9 initialement dans le quotidien \u00e9gyptien \u00a0\u00bbAl-Ahram\u00a0\u00bb et dont une traduction fran\u00e7aise a \u00e9t\u00e9 mise en ligne, le 3 mars 2006, sur le site \u00a0\u00bbhttp:\/\/www.counterpunch.org\u00a0\u00bb. L’Egyptien cite un autre exemple de passe-droit pr\u00e9sidentiel, la nomination de Suzanne Rich Folsom en tant que nouvelle directrice de \u00abl’int\u00e9grit\u00e9 institutionnelle\u00bb, c’est-\u00e0-dire\u00a0 responsable en chef du d\u00e9partement anticorruption, \u00aben dehors de tout processus de comp\u00e9tition transparent et ouvert\u00bb. Celle-ci, qui est l’\u00e9pouse d’un puissant dirigeant r\u00e9publicain et elle-m\u00eame puissante lobbyiste r\u00e9publicaine, porte en outre le titre de conseill\u00e8re du pr\u00e9sident. Ce scandaleux de coup de force du pr\u00e9sident a pouss\u00e9 Alison Cave, la tr\u00e8s respect\u00e9e pr\u00e9sidente de l’Association du personnel de la BM, \u00e0 adresser \u00e0 tout le personnel de l’institution une lettre ouverte de protestation. Une premi\u00e8re – et un grave pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent – dans\u00a0 l’histoire de la banque. Troisi\u00e8me (mauvais) exemple: la nomination de Karl Jackson au poste de conseiller du pr\u00e9sident. Ce dernier n’est certes pas un intrus dans la maison puisqu’il a d\u00e9j\u00e0 g\u00e9r\u00e9 le portefeuille d’activit\u00e9s de la Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 financi\u00e8re internationale (SFI), la branche de soutien au secteur priv\u00e9 de la BM. Il n’en demeure pas un ami de longue date de Wolfowitz qu’il a c\u00f4toy\u00e9 \u00e0 l’universit\u00e9 Johns Hopkins, mais aussi au gouvernement. Et cela a sans doute beaucoup compt\u00e9 aussi dans sa nomination. \u00abL’exemple sans doute le plus choquant du copinage de Wolfowitz, et de son absence totale de consid\u00e9ration pour les principes de l’institution qu’il a \u00e9t\u00e9 charg\u00e9 de diriger, sans parler des manifestations \u00e9videntes de conflits d’int\u00e9r\u00eat, implique le r\u00f4le toujours plus important donn\u00e9 \u00e0 sa conseill\u00e8re en chef, Robin Cleveland\u00bb, note Mohamed Hakki. Ancienne membre de l’administration Bush, Mme Cleveland avait quitt\u00e9 son poste dans des circonstances moyennement mouvement\u00e9es. Elle avait en effet essay\u00e9 d’utiliser ses relations pour faire entrer un membre de sa famille dans une grande entreprise d’armement, tandis qu’elle n\u00e9gociait avec cette m\u00eame entreprise un contrat pour le compte du gouvernement des Etats-Unis. Non content de nommer des copain(e)s, des oblig\u00e9(e)s voire des mercenaires politiques \u00e0 des postes qui devraient \u00eatre occup\u00e9s par des professionnels hautement qualifi\u00e9s, suscitant ainsi une vive inqui\u00e9tude chez les vice-pr\u00e9sidents, directeurs et employ\u00e9s de l’institution, ainsi qu’un exode massif de talents de haut niveau, le champion anti-corruption de la BM a fait encore mieux (ou pis !) en faisant b\u00e9n\u00e9ficier sa campagne Shaha Ali Riza, qui \u00e9tait \u00e0 la BM avant qu’il n’y arrive comme pr\u00e9sident, d’une super-promotion. C’est, en tout cas, ce qu’a rapport\u00e9 r\u00e9cemment le \u00a0\u00bbWashington Post\u00a0\u00bb, cit\u00e9 par Corine Lennes, correspondante du\u00a0 quotidien fran\u00e7ais \u00a0\u00bbLe Monde\u00a0\u00bb \u00e0 Washington sur son blog \u00a0\u00bbhttp:\/\/clesnes.blog.lemonde.fr\u00a0\u00bb. Qui est Shaha Ali Riza ? N\u00e9e Tripoli, d’un p\u00e8re libyen et d’une m\u00e8re syro-saoudienne, Shaha (f\u00e9minin arabe de Shah) a grandi en Tunisie, en Arabie saoudite et au Royaume Uni, avant de partir aux Etats-Unis apr\u00e8s son mariage avec Mr Bulent Ali Riza (d’o\u00f9 son nom actuel) au d\u00e9but des ann\u00e9es 1980. Dipl\u00f4m\u00e9e en relations internationales, Shaha a \u00e9tudi\u00e9 \u00e0 la London School of Economics, \u00e0 l’University of Oxford et au St Antony’s College. Sp\u00e9cialiste du Moyen-Orient, on lui doit des \u00e9tudes sur plusieurs pays de la r\u00e9gion. Au d\u00e9but de sa carri\u00e8re, Shaha a coordonn\u00e9 des programmes pour le Moyen-Orient au sein de la National Endowment for Democracy. Apr\u00e8s avoir int\u00e9gr\u00e9 la BM, en 1997, elle a travaill\u00e9 au sein du Groupe pour le d\u00e9veloppement social et \u00e9conomique de la r\u00e9gion MENA (Middle East and North Africa). Elle \u00e9tait en charge du dossier des droits des femmes arabes. Sa liaison avec Wolfowitz date de l’\u00e9poque o\u00f9 ce dernier \u00e9tait encore secr\u00e9taire d’Etat adjoint \u00e0 la D\u00e9fense. Shaha Ali Riza travaille actuellement pour Liz Cheney, la fille du vice-pr\u00e9sident am\u00e9ricain, Dick Cheney, au sein du D\u00e9partement d’Etat. A en croire le \u00a0\u00bbWashington Post\u00a0\u00bb, elle travaille au D\u00e9partement d’Etat, tout en \u00e9tant toujours pay\u00e9e par… la BM. Mieux (ou pis !): en un an, elle a obtenu une augmentation de 13 500 dollars. Son salaire est maintenant de 193 590 dollars (annuels). Soit 7 000 dollars de plus que sa \u00abpatronne\u00bb, la secr\u00e9taire d’Etat Condoleezza Rice. Toujours selon le \u00a0\u00bbWashington Post\u00a0\u00bb, les employ\u00e9s de la BM sont ulc\u00e9r\u00e9s par ces m\u00e9thodes, bien qu’ils soient eux-m\u00eames \u00ab\u00a0grossly overpaid\u00a0\u00bb (grassement surpay\u00e9s). A en croire un autre m\u00e9dia am\u00e9ricain, le magazine \u00a0\u00bbVanity Fair\u00a0\u00bb de mars 2007, Shaha loue \u00e9galement ses services, parall\u00e8lement \u00e0 son activit\u00e9 principale, \u00e0 la Science Applications International Corporation, qui a un contrat avec le Pentagone, le minist\u00e8re am\u00e9ricain de la D\u00e9fense. De l\u00e0 \u00e0 parler de conflit d’int\u00e9r\u00eats… Tout \u00e7a pour dire qu’en mati\u00e8re de client\u00e9lisme, de concussion et de corruption, M. Wolfowitz en conna\u00eet… un bon petit bout. Et qu’on pourrait compter sur lui pour nous assainir tout \u00e7a… (Source : \u00ab Le Temps \u00bb (Quotidien \u2013 Tunis), le 5 avril 2007) <\/font><\/strong><\/div>\n\nHome<\/font><\/span> – Accueil <\/span>– <\/span><\/font><\/font>\u0627\u0644\u0631\u0626\u064a\u0633\u064a\u0629<\/font><\/span><\/a><\/b><\/p>\n
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Home – Accueil – \u0627\u0644\u0631\u0626\u064a\u0633\u064a\u0629 TUNISNEWS 7\u00a0\u00e8me\u00a0ann\u00e9e, N\u00b0\u00a02522 du 19.04.2007 \u00a0archives : www.tunisnews.net Descente polici\u00e8re violente chez les parents du prisonnier politique Noureddine Amdouni ACIJLP: For the second time, the UN General Assembly approves the statement presented by the ACIJLP on the conditions of justice Ridha KEFI: Enqu\u00eate – Al-Qa\u00efda au Maghreb: Evaluation de la […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":22040,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"inline_featured_image":false,"site-sidebar-layout":"default","site-content-layout":"","ast-site-content-layout":"default","site-content-style":"default","site-sidebar-style":"default","ast-global-header-display":"","ast-banner-title-visibility":"","ast-main-header-display":"","ast-hfb-above-header-display":"","ast-hfb-below-header-display":"","ast-hfb-mobile-header-display":"","site-post-title":"","ast-breadcrumbs-content":"","ast-featured-img":"","footer-sml-layout":"","ast-disable-related-posts":"","theme-transparent-header-meta":"","adv-header-id-meta":"","stick-header-meta":"","header-above-stick-meta":"","header-main-stick-meta":"","header-below-stick-meta":"","astra-migrate-meta-layouts":"default","ast-page-background-enabled":"default","ast-page-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"ast-content-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"footnotes":""},"categories":[],"tags":[56,38,29],"class_list":["post-17317","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","tag-56","tag-38","tag-fr"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/tunisnews.net\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17317","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/tunisnews.net\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/tunisnews.net\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tunisnews.net\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tunisnews.net\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=17317"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/tunisnews.net\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17317\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tunisnews.net\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/22040"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/tunisnews.net\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=17317"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tunisnews.net\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=17317"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tunisnews.net\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=17317"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}