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6\u00a0\u00e8me\u00a0ann\u00e9e, N\u00b0\u00a02117 du 09.03.2006<\/span><\/font><\/font><\/strong><\/div>\n
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Huit familles de prisonniers politiques: \u00ab\u00a0A\u00efd, comment nous reviens-tu, A\u00efd\u00a0?\u00a0\u00bb<\/span><\/font><\/p>\n
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Les Verts en France : Tunisie\u00a0, la dictature de Ben Ali choisit ses Verts<\/font> U. S. Department of state: Tunisia – Country Reports on Human Rights Practices\u00a0 – 2005 AFP: Tunisie \/ EU – Reprise du dialogue \u00e9conomique dans le cadre du Plan d’action voisinage<\/font> AFP: Six offres pour la privatisation de Tunisie-Telecom AFP:\u00a0 Premi\u00e8re r\u00e9union de l’Otan dans un pays arabe en avril au Maroc <\/font>AFP:\u00a0 Le HCR ouvre un bureau dans le centre de transit pour immigr\u00e9s de Lampedusa AP: Swedish police allowed to wear turbans, head scarves and skull caps as part of uniform<\/font> Abou Zaydane: Tout le monde a bien entendu, sauf Ben Ali Hamime: Tunisie : \u00ab la mafia politique et les signes annonciateurs de la chute \u00bb<\/font> Dr. Sahbi Amri: Lettre Ouverte \u00e0\u00a0 son excellence l\u2019ambassadeur des Etats Unis d\u2019Am\u00e9rique en Tunisie <\/font><\/p>\n
EHESS: Avis aux jeunes chercheurs!<\/font><\/strong> <\/font> <\/font><\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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\u00ab\u00a0A\u00efd, comment nous reviens-tu, A\u00efd\u00a0?\u00a0\u00bb<\/font><\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
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Nous, m\u00e8res, \u00e9pouses et filles de prisonniers politiques tunisiens, aspirons \u00e0 ce que la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 civile nationale et internationale nous prenne en consid\u00e9ration et connaisse nos \u00e9preuves durant ces quinze ann\u00e9es d\u2019all\u00e9es et venues entre les prisons tunisiennes, ainsi que la perte des p\u00e8res pour les enfants. Tout cela nous a fait endurer en silence, en tant que femmes tunisiennes, d\u2019immenses tourments, sans que ne s\u2019interrompe la s\u00e9rie des supplices hebdomadaires et quotidiens.<\/span><\/p>\n
Citons nombres d\u2019entre elles\u00a0: \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n
Madame Bakhta Zaalouni, dont le mari, Chedly Mahfoudh, est \u00e0 la prison de Borj Er Roumi<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
Madame Faouzia Snoussi, dont le fr\u00e8re, Lotfi Snoussi, est \u00e0 la prison de Borj El Amri<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
Madame Zohra Lassoued, \u00e2g\u00e9e de plus de soixante dix ans, qui vit dans l\u2019espoir de la lib\u00e9ration de son fils, Adel Ben Amor, qui est \u00e0 la prison de Borj Er Roumi<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
Madame Souad Abdelmalek, \u00e9pouse de Monsieur Hamadi Abdelmalek, qui est \u00e0 la prison de Messaadine Madame M\u2019barka El Ir, s\u0153ur de Maatoug El Ir, qui est \u00e0 la prison de Nadhor<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
Madame Ouassila Bouhjila, m\u00e8re de monsieur Abdellatif Bouhjila, qui est \u00e0 la prison du 9 avril \u00e0 Tunis.<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
Madame Taallah Khalsi, m\u00e8re de jumeaux Maher et Ramzi Khalsi,<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
<\/span><\/b> \u00a0incarc\u00e9r\u00e9s dans des prisons diff\u00e9rentes depuis quinze ans (Maher \u00e0 Borj El Amri, et Ramzi \u00e0 Mehdia), situation qui a engendr\u00e9 fatigues et \u00e9preuves pour cette femme \u00e0 chaque fois qu\u2019elle rend visite \u00e0 l\u2019un de ces fils qui ont \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9crou\u00e9s un peu avant le baccalaur\u00e9at en 1991.<\/span><\/p>\n
De m\u00eame nous tenons \u00e0 mettre le doigt sur les graves probl\u00e8mes psychiques dont souffrent les enfants qui attendent l\u2019apparition de leur p\u00e8re \u00e0 chaque A\u00efd, en vain jusqu\u2019\u00e0 aujourd\u2019hui. Sabrine Chniter\u00a0 qui est n\u00e9e sans conna\u00eetre son p\u00e8re, et pour qui la paternit\u00e9 est rest\u00e9e une notion confuse, Nouha Mahfoudh, fille de Chedly Mahfoudh, qui ne dessine de son p\u00e8re que \u00ab\u00a0le haut\u00a0\u00bb, car elle ne conna\u00eet de lui que ce qu\u2019elle en voit derri\u00e8re la double rang\u00e9e de barreaux, depuis qu\u2019elle en a \u00e9t\u00e9 s\u00e9par\u00e9e \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e2ge d\u2019un an, et la liste serait longue\u2026<\/span><\/p>\n
Sans compter la perte de soutien mat\u00e9riel qui a fait de notre vie un m\u00e9lange de difficult\u00e9s mat\u00e9rielles, morales et sociales. La torture est devenue notre pain quotidien, \u00e0 l\u2019oppos\u00e9 de la vie civile ordinaire dont jouissent les femmes et que nous avons droit nous aussi de vivre.<\/span><\/p>\n
En tant que familles des prisonniers d\u2019opinion en Tunisie et en tant que partie prenante des femmes de Tunisie, nous attirons l\u2019attention de l\u2019opinion publique sur notre situation mis\u00e9rable et notre droit \u00e0 une vie normale sans les injustices ou les tourments pr\u00e9cit\u00e9s et qui nous absorbent, entre le poids des probl\u00e8mes mat\u00e9riels, sociaux et psychologiques. Quand s\u2019arr\u00eatera la s\u00e9rie des supplices abominables que nous endurons\u00a0?<\/span><\/p>\n
Nous n\u2019oublions pas que nombre de femmes ont \u00e9t\u00e9 soumises \u00e0 des tracasseries qui les ont oblig\u00e9es \u00e0 demander le divorce pour se d\u00e9barrasser des poursuites de la s\u00fbret\u00e9\u00a0: l\u2019\u00e9pouse de monsieur Tahar Harrathi, celle de monsieur Frej Jami, celle d\u2019Ali Neffati, celle d\u2019Ali Zeroui, celle de Maatoug El Ir, et de nombreuses autres qui ont \u00e9t\u00e9 contraintes d\u2019une fa\u00e7on ou d\u2019une autre de demander le divorce. Ce genre de tracasserie est toujours de mise et les provocations \u00e0 l\u2019encontre des femmes tunisiennes, m\u00e8res, \u00e9pouses et s\u0153urs des prisonniers d\u2019opinion continuent. La punition est devenue familiale ou collective, et non plus personnelle. Le prisonnier d\u2019opinion est incarc\u00e9r\u00e9 pour une accusation quelconque et sa famille est tortur\u00e9e par des moyens divers, dont le moindre est le harc\u00e8lement. En tant que familles des prisonniers politiques en Tunisie, nous repr\u00e9sentons la voix de la victime qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 condamn\u00e9e sans proc\u00e8s, tortur\u00e9e sans accusation, sinon celle d\u2019appartenir \u00e0 un \u00e9poux, un fr\u00e8re, un p\u00e8re ou un fils, et qui est une nouvelle cat\u00e9gorie de prisonniers.<\/span><\/p>\n
Les Aids se succ\u00e8dent chaque ann\u00e9e, sans que nous acc\u00e9dions \u00e0 ce que nous ressentons comme notre droit \u00e0 la citoyennet\u00e9. C\u2019est Moutannabi qui a dit\u00a0: \u00ab\u00a0A\u00efd, comment nous reviens-tu\u00a0?A\u00efd<\/span><\/p>\n
Comme par le pass\u00e9\u00a0? Ou t\u2019es-tu transform\u00e9\u00a0?\u00a0\u00bb<\/span><\/p>\n
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8 familles de prisonniers politiques.<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
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(traduction ni revue ni corrig\u00e9e par les auteures de la version en arabe, LT)<\/span><\/p>\n
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Tunisie : la dictature de Ben Ali choisit ses Verts<\/strong><\/font><\/h2>\n
\u00a0 COMMUNIQU\u00c9 \u00c0 LA PRESSE DU 8 MARS 2006 <\/font><\/strong>\u00a0<\/div>\n
Les Verts d\u00e9noncent avec indignation l\u2019imposture par laquelle le pouvoir dictatorial de Ben Ali vient de l\u00e9galiser un pseudo parti Vert enti\u00e8rement \u00e0 ses ordres quand le v\u00e9ritable parti Vert tunisien, \u00ab La Tunisie Verte \u00bb, dirig\u00e9 par Abdelkader Zitouni, attend vainement sa l\u00e9galisation depuis pr\u00e8s de deux ans. C\u2019est le 24 avril 2004, en effet, que \u00ab La Tunisie Verte \u00bb avait remis au Minist\u00e8re de l\u2019Int\u00e9rieur un dossier complet satisfaisant \u00e0 toutes les conditions l\u00e9gales sans m\u00eame que le Minist\u00e8re ne daigne accorder le r\u00e9c\u00e9piss\u00e9 de d\u00e9p\u00f4t comme l\u2019y oblige la loi. \u00a0 Cela s\u2019explique du point de vue de la dictature : \u00ab Tunisie Verte \u00bb mettait en effet en avant non seulement la d\u00e9fense de l\u2019environnement mais aussi la d\u00e9mocratie, les droits de l\u2019Homme et les droits des femmes. D\u2019autre part ce parti a inscrit d\u2019embl\u00e9e son action aux c\u00f4t\u00e9s des forces progressistes et de gauche du pays tout en initiant un f\u00e9cond travail commun avec les Verts fran\u00e7ais et europ\u00e9ens : M. Abdelkader Zitouni a ainsi particip\u00e9 au s\u00e9minaire euro-m\u00e9diterran\u00e9en organis\u00e9 par le Parti Vert Europ\u00e9en \u00e0 Malte en novembre 2005 et \u00ab la Tunisie Verte \u00bb a re\u00e7u le plein et entier soutien du PVE. \u00a0 Dans ce contexte la soudaine l\u00e9galisation par le Ministre de l\u2019Int\u00e9rieur d\u2019un soi-disant \u00ab Parti des Verts pour le Progr\u00e8s \u00bb dirig\u00e9 par M. Mongi Khamassi ne doit surtout pas faire illusion : il s\u2019agit d\u2019une imposture et d\u2019un hold politique, destin\u00e9 \u00e0 usurper le label \u00ab Vert \u00bb dans un pays o\u00f9 il risquait de devenir g\u00eanant. \u00a0 S\u2019il y avait le moindre doute, le parcours et les premi\u00e8res d\u00e9clarations de M. Mongi Khamassi en attestent : il \u00e9tait jusqu\u2019\u00e0 ce jour un d\u00e9put\u00e9 du \u00ab Parti Social Lib\u00e9ral \u00bb un de ces petits partis ironiquement dits \u00ab d\u2019opposition administrative \u00bb dont les rares d\u00e9put\u00e9s sont d\u00e9sign\u00e9s arbitrairement par le pouvoir sur la base de scores imaginaires et qui rivalisent donc de louanges envers le dictateur pour assurer leur \u00ab \u00e9lection \u00bb et leur financement public. Et ses premi\u00e8res paroles de \u00ab Vert \u00bb ont \u00e9t\u00e9 pour \u00ab remercier vivement le pr\u00e9sident Zine El Abidine Ben Ali qui a toujours fait preuve d\u2019engagement en faveur du renforcement et de la consolidation du processus d\u00e9mocratique et pluraliste \u00bb. Accablant. \u00a0 Les Verts d\u00e9noncent l\u2019imposture. Ils r\u00e9it\u00e8rent leur soutien \u00e0 \u00ab La Tunisie Verte \u00bb et exigent des autorit\u00e9s tunisiennes que ce v\u00e9ritable parti Vert soit enfin l\u00e9galis\u00e9. \u00a0 Les Verts \u00a0 (Source : le site officiel des Verts en France www.lesverts.fr , le 9 mars 2006)<\/font><\/strong>\u00a0 <\/div>\n
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Tunisia <\/font><\/p>\n
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices\u00a0 – 2005<\/font><\/h2>\n
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Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor<\/strong><\/font> March 8, 2006 \u00a0 Tunisia is a constitutional republic with a population of approximately 10 million, dominated by a single political party, the Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD). Zine El\u2011Abidine Ben Ali has been the president since 1987. \u00a0 In the October 2004 presidential and legislative elections, President Ben Ali ran against three opposition candidates and won approximately 94 percent of the popular vote, with official turnout quoted as higher than 90 percent of registered voters, although there were indications that voter turnout figures were artificially inflated. \u00a0 A second legislative body, the Chamber of Advisors, was created in a 2002 referendum amending the constitution. Elections for the Chamber of Advisors were held in July; members were either appointed by the president or elected by parliamentary deputies and other government officials. The civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces. \u00a0 The government’s human rights record remained poor, and the government persisted in committing serious abuses. However, the government continued to demonstrate respect for the religious freedom of minorities, as well as the human rights of women and children. The following human rights problems were reported: \u00a0 \u00a0\u2022 torture and abuse of prisoners and detainees \u00a0\u2022 arbitrary arrest and detention \u00a0\u2022 police impunity \u00a0\u2022 lengthy pretrial and incommunicado detention \u00a0\u2022 infringement of citizens’ privacy rights \u00a0\u2022 restrictions on freedom of speech and press \u00a0\u2022 restrictions of freedom of assembly and association <\/font><\/strong>\u00a0 The government signed an agreement to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit all prison and detention facilities in the country. In addition, the government eliminated long-term solitary confinement. In a significant development, the government declared an end to \u00ab\u00a0depot legal\u00a0\u00bb, or prior review, for newspapers, although other press restrictions continued, including prior review on books.\u00a0<\/p>\n
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS<\/span><\/b> <\/span><\/p>\n
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:<\/span><\/p>\n
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life <\/span><\/p>\n
The government or its agents did not commit any politically motivated killings; however, on June 17, Moncef Ben Ahmed Ouahichi, a Jendouba resident, died of a cerebral hemorrhage at La Rabta Hospital in Tunis. This followed his arrest June 10 and his release the next day, at which time he was unconscious and bearing bruises, according to the Jendouba regional chapter of the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH). Following his death, Ouahichi’s defense lawyer filed a case before the public prosecutor calling for an investigation into Ouahichi’s death and indicated that authorities prevented him from visiting his client when he was initially in the Jendouba Hospital. The Association for the Struggle Against Torture in Tunisia (ALTT) stated that security agents in Jendouba claimed that Ouahichi, a commercial driver, had \u00ab\u00a0transported terrorists\u00a0\u00bb and that the security agents told Ouahichi’s brother not to hospitalize him nor speak publicly of the incident. <\/span><\/p>\n
In 2004 the LTDH reported that Badreddine Rekeii died in police custody in 2003. Police reportedly told Rekeii’s family that he committed suicide, although Reheii’s family did not believe the police report because the body showed signs of abuse. According to Amnesty International (AI), the family called for a further investigation, as the original investigation failed to establish the cause of extensive bruising on his body and a deep wound on his back. There was no further information on whether an investigation was carried out. <\/span> <\/p>\n
b. Disappearance <\/span><\/p>\n
There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances. <\/span><\/p>\n
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment <\/span> <\/p>\n
The law prohibits such practices; however, security forces reportedly tortured detainees to elicit confessions and discourage resistance. The forms of torture and other abuse included: electric shock; submersion of the head in water; beatings with hands, sticks, and police batons; suspension, sometimes manacled, from cell doors and rods resulting in loss of consciousness; and cigarette burns. According to AI, police and prison officials used sexual assault and threats of sexual assault against the wives of Islamist prisoners to extract information, to intimidate, and to punish. <\/span><\/p>\n
Charges of torture in specific cases were difficult to prove because authorities often denied the victims of torture access to medical care until evidence of abuse disappeared. The government maintained that it investigated all complaints of torture and mistreatment filed with the prosecutor’s office, and noted that alleged victims sometimes accused police of torture without filing a complaint, which is a prerequisite for an investigation. <\/span><\/p>\n
According to defense attorneys, local human rights groups, and AI, police routinely refused to register complaints of torture. In addition, judges dismissed complaints without investigation and accepted as evidence confessions extracted through torture. The government may open an administrative investigation of allegations of torture or mistreatment of prisoners without a formal complaint; however, it was unlikely in those cases to make the results public or available to the lawyers of affected prisoners. <\/span><\/p>\n
Consistent with an effort to extract information or coerce confessions, more reports of torture came from pretrial detention centers than prisons. Human rights activists, citing prisoner accounts, identified facilities at the Ministry of Interior as the most common location for torture. Political prisoners and Islamists allegedly received harsher treatment than criminals. <\/span><\/p>\n
Several domestic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including the National Council for Freedoms in Tunisia (CNLT) and the Association for the Fight Against Torture in Tunisia (ALTT), reported on multiple torture cases throughout the year. For example, on June 25, according to CNLT, 25-year-old Zied Ghodhbane appeared in court in a state of physical and psychological distress, bearing marks of abuse on his body. He reportedly testified that officials at the Ministry of Interior tortured him by beatings, electrocution, and holding his head under water in detention facilities at the interior ministry after his extradition from Algeria to the country. Defense lawyers for the accused requested that the judge recommend a medical examination, but the judge reportedly ruled that such a request should come from the general prosecutor. <\/span><\/p>\n
In April authorities sentenced the \u00ab\u00a0Bizerte Group,\u00a0\u00bb 11 defendants arrested in 2004 and charged with various terrorism-related crimes, to prison terms ranging from 10 to 30 years. On July 2, the court acquitted five of the defendants, while the remaining six received sentence reductions. The Committee of the Defense of Victims of the Law on Terrorism released multiple communiqu\u00e9s charging that authorities gathered confessions from the group using torture (see section 1.e.). <\/span><\/p>\n
There were no further developments on reports that three individuals, alleged members of the security forces, assaulted journalist Sihem Ben Sedrine in January 2004 (see section 2.a.), or on reports in October 2004 of an assault on former political prisoner Hamma Hammami, whose political party urged the boycott of the October 2004 presidential elections. <\/span><\/p>\n
In June 2004, according to the International Association for the Support of Political Prisoners (AISPP), the senior official of Borj Erroumi Prison beat and placed in solitary confinement Nabil El Ouaer, whom a military tribunal had sentenced to 15 years of prison in 1992. While in solitary confinement, four other prisoners allegedly raped him. Based on its timing and location, human rights activists believed prison officials sanctioned the incident. El Ouaer conducted a hunger strike and filed a complaint through a lawyer, despite reported pressure from prison officials to withdraw the complaint. When the case received international attention, President Ben Ali ordered the Higher Commission on Human Rights and Basic Freedoms (a state\u2011appointed body) to conduct an inquiry into the case, but the authorities did not publicize the results. According to AI, authorities transferred El Ouaer to three different prisons, admitted him to Rabta Hospital in Tunis, and subsequently released him conditionally in November 2004. El Ouaer reportedly suffered psychological distress as a result of the assault. Despite several requests by his lawyer for an independent criminal inquiry into the assault, no investigation was carried out. <\/span><\/p>\n
Authorities did not charge any police or security force official with abuse during the year. <\/span><\/p>\n
Prison and Detention Center Conditions <\/span><\/p>\n
Prison conditions ranged from spartan to poor, and generally did not meet international standards. Foreign diplomatic observers who visited prisons described the conditions as \u00ab\u00a0horrible.\u00a0\u00bb Overcrowding and limited medical care posed a significant threat to prisoners’ health. Sources reported that 40 to 50 prisoners were typically confined to a single 194 square foot cell, and up to 140 prisoners shared a 323 square foot cell. Current and former prisoners reported that inmates were forced to share a single water and toilet facility with more than 100 cellmates, creating serious sanitation problems. <\/span> <\/p>\n
In March AI reported that most prisoners shared beds or slept on the floor. Contagious diseases, particularly scabies, were widespread, and prisoners did not have access to adequate medical care. Additional discriminatory and arbitrary measures worsened the conditions of detention, particularly when prisoners sought redress for grievances about treatment and conditions. <\/span> <\/p>\n
In 2004 the LTDH released a 63\u2011page report on the country’s prisons entitled \u00ab\u00a0The Walls of Silence,\u00a0\u00bb which stated that there were approximately 26 thousand prisoners in 29 prisons and 7 juvenile detention centers. The report described a number of abuses, alleging that torture and humiliating treatment of prisoners were widespread. <\/span><\/p>\n
On April 20, Human Rights Watch (HRW) held a press conference in Tunis to release a report describing the government practice of holding political prisoners in prolonged solitary confinement. During the conference, HRW announced that the government promised not to place prisoners in solitary confinement for more than 10 days, the maximum time allowed for punishment according to the law. Shortly thereafter, the government confirmed that it had eliminated longterm solitary confinement. However, HRW reported that the government continued to keep some political prisoners, most of whom were An-Nahdha leaders, in small-group isolation. <\/span><\/p>\n
Prison conditions for women were generally better than those for men. Conditions for detainees and convicts were the same. <\/span><\/p>\n
International and local NGOs reported that political prisoners regularly were moved among jails throughout the country, thereby making it more difficult for their families to deliver food to them and to discourage their supporters or the press from inquiring about them (see section 1.b.). The National Council for Liberties in Tunisia (CNLT) reported that other inmates were instructed to stay away from political prisoners and were punished severely for making contact with them. <\/span><\/p>\n
In April the government reportedly approved access for HRW to make prison visits. Following this verbal agreement, however, HRW submitted a formal request for prison access, but by year’s end had received no response. In June the ICRC began conducting prison and detention center visits, following more than a year of negotiations with the government. In December the ICRC reported that prison authorities had respected their mission and had allowed them to conduct visits without obstacle. The government did not permit media to inspect or monitor prison conditions.<\/span><\/p>\n
d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention<\/span><\/p>\n
The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, but, in practice, arbitrary arrest and detention occurred. <\/span><\/p>\n
Role of the Police and Security Apparatus<\/span><\/p>\n
The Interior Ministry controls several law enforcement organizations including: the police, who have primary responsibility within the major cities; the National Guard, which has responsibility in smaller cities and the countryside; and state security forces, which monitor groups and individuals the government considers to be a dangerous threat, such as opposition parties and leaders, the media, Islamists, and human rights activists.<\/span><\/p>\n
In general, law enforcement groups were disciplined, organized, and effective; however, there were episodes involving petty corruption and police brutality. Law enforcement organizations operated with impunity, and the police committed attacks, sanctioned by high officials, on dissidents and oppositionists. <\/span><\/p>\n
In March 2004 the Minister of Interior announced the creation of the Higher Institute of Internal Security Forces and Customs, a new oversight body for law enforcement officers in the ministries of interior and customs. The organization’s stated mission was to reinforce human rights and improve law enforcement; however, no information was available about its subsequent operations, and no information was available about punishment of police and prison guards for committing infringements against detainees since 2002. <\/span><\/p>\n
Arrest and Detention <\/span><\/p>\n
The law provides that the police must have a warrant to arrest a suspect, unless the crime committed is a felony or is in progress; however, arbitrary arrests and detentions occurred. The penal code permits the detention of suspects for up to six days prior to arraignment, during which time the government may hold suspects incommunicado. Arresting officers are required to inform detainees of their rights, immediately inform detainees’ families of the arrest, and make a complete record of the times and dates of such notifications, but those rules were sometimes ignored. Detainees were allowed access to family members when they were not being held incommunicado, although the government did not always facilitate the efforts of family members to identify the whereabouts of their detained relatives. <\/span><\/p>\n
Detainees have the right to know the grounds of their arrest before questioning, and may request a medical examination. They do not have a right to legal representation during the pre\u2011arraignment detention. Attorneys, human rights monitors, and former detainees maintained that the authorities illegally extended detainment by falsifying arrest dates. Police reportedly extorted money from families of innocent detainees in exchange for dropping charges against them. <\/span><\/p>\n
The law permits the release of accused persons on bail, and detainees have the right to be represented by counsel during arraignment. The government provides legal representation for indigents. At arraignment, the examining magistrate may decide to release the accused or remand him to pretrial detention. <\/span> <\/p>\n
The government denied detaining anyone for political crimes. The lack of public information on prisoners and detainees made it impossible to estimate the number of political detainees. However, it was likely that the number of those held without charge was low because criminal convictions of dissidents and Islamists were easy to secure under laws prohibiting membership in outlawed organizations and \u00ab\u00a0spreading false information aimed at disturbing of the public order.\u00a0\u00bb <\/span><\/p>\n
In cases involving crimes for which the sentence may exceed five years or that involve national security, pretrial detention may last an initial period of six months and may be extended by court order for two additional four\u2011month periods. For crimes in which the sentence may not exceed five years, the court may extend the initial six\u2011month pretrial detention by an additional three months only. During this pretrial stage, the court conducts an investigation, hears arguments, and accepts evidence and motions from both parties. Complaints of prolonged pretrial detention were common. <\/span><\/p>\n
Amnesty <\/span><\/p>\n
Judges and the government exercised their authority to release prisoners or suspend their sentences, often on conditional parole (see section 1.e.). On March 20, President Ben Ali pardoned an unannounced number of prisoners in commemoration of Independence Day. On March 23, the unregistered Tunisian Islamist An-Nahdha party announced that six of the movement’s \u00ab\u00a0former\u00a0\u00bb members were among those released. According to the An-Nahdha statement, all were arrested in the southern town of Gabes in early 1992 and were sentenced to 16 years imprisonment. On July 24, on the occasion of Republic Day, the government again granted amnesty to an unannounced number of prisoners, who were not identified. <\/span><\/p>\n
On November 4, President Ben Ali pardoned an unknown number of unidentified prisoners. The website of An-Nahdha later claimed that 40 political prisoners were among those released. AISPP listed many of those, convicted in the 1990s for ties to An-Nahdha, as political prisoners, a number of whom had nearly completed 15-year sentences. <\/span><\/p>\n
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial <\/span><\/p>\n
The law provides for an independent judiciary; however, the executive branch and the president strongly influenced judicial procedures, particularly in political cases. The executive branch exercised an indirect authority over the judiciary through the appointment, assignment, tenure, and transfer of judges, rendering the system susceptible to pressure. In addition, the president was head of the Supreme Council of Judges, composed primarily of presidential appointees. <\/span><\/p>\n
The law provides citizens legal recourse to an administrative tribunal to address grievances against government ministries, although government officials rarely respected the tribunal’s nonbinding decisions. Throughout the year the government permitted observers from diplomatic missions, members of the European Parliament, and foreign journalists to monitor trials. The government did not permit observers to attend sessions of military tribunals. <\/span><\/p>\n
In June, as it had in the previous year, the Association of Tunisian Judges (AMT), a 1,700-member professional organization, released a communiqu\u00e9 calling for reform of the recruitment, transfer, and promotion system for judges and proposing more elections of judges to the Supreme Council of Judges, the governing body for the judiciary (see section 2.b.). The government did not officially respond to the association’s communiqu\u00e9, but human rights organizations stated that the government tried to remove AMT leadership due to its demonstrated independence. <\/span><\/p>\n
The civil court system is a four\u2011tiered hierarchy. At the first level, there are 51 district courts, in which a single judge hears each case. At the second level are 24 courts of first instance, which serve as the appellate courts for the district courts, but they also have original jurisdiction for more serious cases. There is a three-judge court of first instance in each region, empowered to consider all commercial and civil cases. At the third level are three appeals courts. The Court of Cassation or Supreme Court serves as the final court of appeals. The Supreme Court only considers arguments pertaining to points of law. The organization of the criminal court system is similar to that of the civil court system. In most cases, the presiding judge or panel of judges dominates a trial, and attorneys have little opportunity to participate substantively. <\/span><\/p>\n
Military courts fall under the ministry of defense and an administrative tribunal. <\/span><\/p>\n
Trial Procedures<\/span><\/p>\n
Trials in the regular courts of first instance and in the courts of appeal are open to the public. By law the accused has the right to be present at trial, to be represented by counsel, and to question witnesses; however, judges do not always observe these rights in practice. The law permits the trial in absentia of fugitives from the law. Both the accused and the prosecutor may appeal decisions of the lower courts.<\/span><\/p>\n
The law provides that defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty \u00ab\u00a0following a procedure offering essential defense guarantees.\u00a0\u00bb However, that presumption was sometimes ignored in practice, especially in politically sensitive cases. Defendants may request a different judge if they believe the assigned one is not impartial; however, judges are not required to recuse themselves. There were no reports that judges offered the alternative of community service in political cases. <\/span><\/p>\n
Although family and inheritance law is codified, civil law judges were known to apply Shari’a (Islamic law) in family cases if the two systems conflicted. For example, codified laws provided women with the legal right to custody over minor children; however, judges sometimes refused to grant women permission to leave the country with them, holding that Shari’a appoints the father as the head of the family and the one who must grant children permission to travel. Some families avoided the application of Shari’a inheritance rules by executing sales contracts between parents and children to ensure that daughters received shares of property equal to that of sons. <\/span><\/p>\n
Lengthy trial delays remained a problem (see section 1.d.). Defendants do not have the right to a speedy trial, nor is there any limit to how much time a case can take. Defense lawyers claimed that judges sometimes refused to let them call witnesses on their clients’ behalf or to question key government witnesses. Defense lawyers contended that the courts often failed to grant them adequate notice of trial dates, or to allow them time to prepare their cases. Some reported that judges restricted access to evidence and court records, and in some cases, required all the lawyers working on a case to examine documents together on a single date in judges’ chambers, without allowing them to copy relevant documents. <\/span><\/p>\n
Lawyers and human rights organizations reported that courts routinely failed to investigate allegations of torture and mistreatment and accepted as evidence confessions extracted through torture (see section 1.c.). They noted that the summary nature of court sessions sometimes prevented reasoned deliberation. They also stated that erratic court schedules and procedures were designed to deter observers of political trials. <\/span><\/p>\n
Military tribunals have the authority to try cases involving military personnel and civilians accused of national security crimes. A military tribunal consists of a civilian judge and four military deputy judges. Defendants may appeal the military tribunal’s verdict to the civilian Supreme Court, which considers arguments on points of law as opposed to the facts of a case. <\/span><\/p>\n
Political Prisoners<\/span><\/p>\n
The government denied that it held any political prisoners, and there was no definitive information regarding the number, if any, of such prisoners. Nevertheless, in 2004 the AISPP published a list of 542 names of individuals whom it considered political prisoners. The AISPP stated that impediments to gathering information about prisoners made it very likely that the total number of political prisoners was higher. Nearly all of these prisoners were Islamists, but very few were convicted for acts of violence. Most of those who were identified by international human rights groups as political prisoners or prisoners of conscience were arrested for violating laws that prohibit membership in illegal organizations and spreading false information aimed at undermining public order. Many were arrested for disseminating information produced by organizations such as An\u2011Nahdha. Former political prisoners said their identity papers were marked in a way that resulted in their receiving harsher treatment. <\/span><\/p>\n
On June 15, the government released Lotfi Amoudi, who the AISPP stated was a political prisoner. He had served 14 years in prison and was released in poor health after having undergone a 26-day hunger strike. <\/span><\/p>\n
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence <\/span> <\/p>\n
The law prohibits such actions \u00ab\u00a0except in exceptional cases defined by law\u00a0\u00bb; however, the government generally did not respect these prohibitions in practice. Police sometimes ignored the requirement to have a warrant before conducting searches if authorities considered state security to be involved. On March 20, unknown persons broke into AISPP President Mohamed Nouri’s car and searched his papers. Nouri charged that the thieves stole his car stereo to disguise the search as a theft. <\/span><\/p>\n
Authorities may invoke state security to justify telephone surveillance. There were numerous reports by NGOs, the news media, and diplomatic representatives that the government intercepted faxes and emails. The law does not explicitly authorize these activities, but the government stated that the code of criminal procedure implicitly gives investigating magistrates such authority. Many political activists experienced frequent and sometimes extended interruptions of service to home and business telephones, faxes, and the Internet. Human rights activists accused the government of using the postal code, with its broad but undefined prohibition against mail that threatens the public order, to interfere with their correspondence and interrupt the delivery of foreign publications. Security forces routinely monitored the activities, telephone, and Internet exchanges of opposition, Islamist, and human rights activists, as well as journalists, and also placed some under surveillance (see section 2.a.). <\/span><\/p>\n
Human rights activists claimed that the government used charges of \u00ab\u00a0association with criminal elements\u00a0\u00bb to punish family members of Islamist activists for crimes allegedly committed by the activists. Family members reportedly were denied jobs, business licenses, and the right to travel due to their relatives’ activism. They also alleged that relatives of Islamist activists, in jail or living abroad, were subjected to police surveillance and mandatory visits to police stations for questioning about their activist relatives. The government maintained that the relatives were themselves members or associates of the An-Nahdha movement, and therefore were subject to laws prohibiting membership in or association with that organization. <\/span> <\/p>\n
Human rights activists reported that upon release from prison, detainees suspected of An-Nahdha membership received identity cards marked to restrict their employment, unlike past reports that the identity cards were confiscated. Even if they had not been jailed, the authorities confiscated the identity cards of some activists and Islamists. For example, AISPP member Lasaad Johri has been deprived of an identity card since 1999. <\/span><\/p>\n
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including: <\/span><\/p>\n
a. Freedom of Speech and Press <\/span><\/p>\n
The law provides for freedom of speech and of the press \u00ab\u00a0exercised within the conditions defined by the law\u00a0\u00bb; however, the government generally did not respect these rights in practice. It limited press freedom and intimidated journalists, editors, and publishers into practicing self\u2011censorship. Security forces closely monitored press activity. <\/span><\/p>\n
The law prohibits citizens from discussing national politics on foreign radio or television channels during the two weeks prior to national elections; however, there were no cases in which the law was invoked during the year. <\/span><\/p>\n
Security forces often questioned citizens seen talking with foreign visitors or residents, particularly visiting international human rights monitors and journalists. The government attempted to influence public meetings by surrounding meeting places with scores of plainclothes policemen (see section 2.b.), as happened at the May 6 meeting on World Press Freedom Day, when plainclothes policemen lined the street leading up to the office of the Tunisian League of Human Rights. <\/span><\/p>\n
The government stated that there were 950 foreign publications and newspapers distributed in the country and that 90 percent of the newspapers were \u00ab\u00a0privately owned and editorially independent.\u00a0\u00bb However, of the eight mainstream dailies, two were government owned, two were owned by the ruling party, and two, though nominally private, took editorial direction from senior government officials. All media were subject to significant governmental pressure over subject matter. <\/span><\/p>\n
There were three opposition party newspapers with small circulations and editorial independence from the government. Nevertheless, two of them, Ettariq El Jadid<\/i> and Al-Wahda<\/i>, received government subsidies under a law that provides government financing to papers representing opposition parties with seats in parliament. The third, Al-Mawqif<\/i>, did not receive the subsidy since its party was not represented in parliament. <\/span><\/p>\n
While the government permitted public criticism in opposition newspapers, the government impeded similar criticism in the mainstream press. Individuals and certain groups faced reprisal for statements critical of the government. For example, on April 28, a court found Mohamed Abbou, a lawyer, guilty of publishing statements \u00ab\u00a0likely to disturb the public order\u00a0\u00bb in which he compared the fate of Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib to that of citizen prisoners. He was arrested following the online publication of another article in which he unfavorably compared the country’s president to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. <\/span><\/p>\n
During the year there were no reports of journalists being arrested. Abdullah Zouari, a journalist who once worked for Al-Fajr<\/i>, the weekly newspaper of the An-Nahdha party, remained under administrative control and in internal exile. Zouari undertook a number of hunger strikes during the year to bring attention to his situation. Hamadi Jebali, a former editor of Al-Fajr<\/i>, remained in prison serving his six-year sentence for insurrection and \u00ab\u00a0membership in an illegal organization.\u00a0\u00bb In April, Jebali undertook a hunger strike to end his solitary confinement in prison. According to Reporters Without Borders (RWB), Jebali’s conditions of imprisonment improved, and he ended his strike in late April. However, Jebali undertook two other hunger strikes later in the year to protest his continued imprisonment. <\/span><\/p>\n
In the days before and during the UN World Summit on the Information Society, held in Tunis from November 16-18, the government harassed journalists and restricted press freedom. <\/span><\/p>\n
On the night of November 11, four men attacked Christophe Boltanski, a journalist for the French newspaper Liberation<\/i>, beating and slashing him with a knife and stealing his mobile telephone and documents. Boltanski had been reporting on demonstrations in support of the Movement of 18 October hunger strikers (see section 2.b.). Following the attack, international and local civil society organizations accused the security forces of organizing the assault. The government claimed it had arrested two suspects in the attack. <\/span><\/p>\n
On November 14, according to international media and NGO reports, plainclothes policemen pulled Jean Jacques Mathy of the Belgian TV station RBF from his car and seized his video camera and cassette. The camera was subsequently returned without the cassette. Mathy was accompanying reporter Marianne Klaric and local human rights activist Rahdia Nasraoui to a meeting of NGOs at the foreign government-sponsored Goethe Institute (see section 2.b.). <\/span><\/p>\n
During the year the government moved to abolish \u00ab\u00a0depot legal<\/i>,\u00a0\u00bb which had been a requirement that the government approve all printed material prior to publication or distribution. The action followed the president’s announcement May 27 that \u00ab\u00a0depot legal<\/i>\u00a0\u00bb would be abolished and the subsequent lifting of restrictions on printed media. Other press restrictions continued, including prior review of books. <\/span><\/p>\n
Article 25 of the Press Code stipulates that the publication, introduction, and circulation of foreign works may be restricted. Authorities restricted the timely purchase of foreign publications that included articles deemed critical of the country. For example, authorities held the distribution of the May 22 edition of Jeune Afrique L’Intelligent<\/i> due to its article on the reaction of local lawyers to the Abbou case. <\/span><\/p>\n
The law authorizes sentences of up to three years in prison for defamation of constituted bodies, the administration, government members or deputies, and up to five years in prison for offensive statements against the president. Charges for defamation were brought against the editor of Al Mawqif<\/i> for a 2004 article calling for an investigation into the railroad system. The case remained pending at year’s end. <\/span><\/p>\n
Directors and owners of existing private media, as well as journalists at the government and ruling party-owned press, practiced a high degree of self-censorship. Journalists in the mainstream press regularly refrained from investigative reporting on national issues. Only the small opposition press reported regularly on controversial national issues. <\/span><\/p>\n
On May 3, three independent members of the Board of the Tunisian Journalists Association published a report in the name of the association that reported the \u00ab\u00a0rampant violations undergone by journalists under the form of censorship, harassment and various other sorts of oppression.\u00a0\u00bb On May 27, one of the members, Neji Bghouri, was held in police headquarters, but no formal charges were brought against him. <\/span><\/p>\n
Government regulations required foreign correspondents to obtain written approval before videotaping in any public area. The government also controlled the satellite transmissions of local correspondents reporting for foreign television stations by refusing to license correspondents and insisting that all correspondents use government-owned facilities for satellite uplinks. <\/span><\/p>\n
Newspapers were often pressured to carry the government wire service’s version of an event, even when their own journalists were present. Following a press conference held by the Tunisian Lawyer’s Association on the Mohamed Abbou case, government representatives told journalists present not to write about the event. <\/span><\/p>\n
The government maintained tight control of the broadcast media. Although the private broadcast media made some inroads in social and sports commentary, both private and government-owned radio stations confined broadcast news to international and uncontroversial national issues.<\/span><\/p>\n
The negotiations over the licensing of the Hannibal private television station included a stipulation that it would not broadcast news. The granting of the licenses for the three existing private broadcast media was not transparent, and several requests for licenses, some dating back for years, remained in limbo. However, the government did not restrict the widespread possession of satellite dishes. <\/span><\/p>\n
The government pressured journalists and the media in a variety of ways, including control over licensing, journalist accreditation, and directing the placement of government advertising. The government continued to exercise tight control over the licensing of new newspapers. Although there were at least 11 existing applications, the government did not allow the creation of any new newspaper. The government withheld press credentials from, and delayed granting passports to, journalists with whom it was displeased, including Slim Boukhdir, who in 2004 posed a question in a press conference implying that relatives of the president had pressured the judiciary to influence a legal case. The government did not grant government press cards to other experienced journalists, including Lotfi Hajji, Abdelatif Fourati, Slaheddine Jourchi, and Mohamed Fourati. Such press cards were needed for official accreditation as a journalist and were reviewed on an annual basis. <\/span><\/p>\n
On September 10, officials at the Ministry of Interior prevented Sihem Ben Sedrine, a journalist, publisher, and one of the founders of the CNLT, from registering her newspaper Kalima<\/i>, whose website remained blocked within the country (see section 2.b.) It was Ben Sedrine’s fourth attempt to register the publication. Ben Sedrine and international human rights NGOs alleged that the government refused registration of Kalima<\/i> due to its commentary critical of the government. <\/span><\/p>\n
According to media editors, senior government officials routinely called news directors and editors to inform them which issues they were forbidden to print and to direct editorial content and news coverage. The Tunisian Agency for External Communications enforced this policy and other informal censorship mechanisms by selective placement of government advertising. In addition, private companies were consistently unwilling to advertise in newspapers no longer receiving government advertisements to avoid the appearance of siding with the media organization being punished. <\/span><\/p>\n
Book publishing continued to be subject to \u00ab\u00a0depot legal<\/i>\u00a0\u00bb as set out in Article 8 of the press code. In its February report, the Tunisia Monitoring Group of the International Exchange on Freedom of Expression provided a list of 21 books or academic works by local authors who were censored in the country. <\/span><\/p>\n
The government blocked access to a number of Internet websites, including nearly all sites belonging to domestic human rights, opposition, and Islamist groups. In April 2004 the government allowed access to several foreign websites that previously had been blocked, including Hotmail, Al Jazeera, AI, and the French daily Liberation<\/i>. Some foreign human rights websites remained blocked, including that of RWB. In November the OpenNet Initiative, a collaboration of universities in several nations studying government attempts to control Internet information, reported that the government had blocked 10 percent of the 2 thousand websites it tested. AISPP reported that potentially hundreds of persons had been arrested for visiting suspicious terrorism-related websites and were detained without proper legal procedures or sufficient evidence of having committed a crime. A July report on \u00ab\u00a0cyber freedom,\u00a0\u00bb published by the Arab Information Network on Human Rights, ranked the country last among 11 Arab countries. <\/span><\/p>\n
The government limited academic freedom and sought to foster a culture of self\u2011censorship in universities. The government closely monitored administrators, teachers, and students to identify any political activity. Police on university campuses, both in uniform and in plainclothes, discouraged students from openly expressing dissent. In March police assaulted students during campus demonstrations against the government’s invitation to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to attend a UN summit. Police arrested one faculty member and several students (see section 2.b.). <\/span><\/p>\n
Authorities subjected academic publications to the pro forma process of submission to the government before publication, and university libraries did not purchase foreign books or subscribe to foreign magazines deemed critical of the government. Tight government control over academic research funds prevented university administrators from applying for grants on research topics that they believed the government would find objectionable. Professors avoided teaching classes on subjects considered sensitive, such as legal courses on political systems or classes on civil liberties. University professors often avoided discussion of any subject deemed sensitive enough to interest the government, and faculty members reported that they were hesitant to gather in groups outside the classroom. <\/span><\/p>\n
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association <\/span><\/p>\n
The law provides for freedom of assembly and association, but the government restricted this right in practice. <\/span><\/p>\n
Freedom of Assembly <\/span><\/p>\n
The law requires groups wishing to hold a public meeting, rally, or march to obtain a permit from the Ministry of Interior no later than three days before the proposed event and to submit a list of participants; the authorities routinely approved such permits for groups that supported government positions and generally refused permission for groups that expressed dissenting views. As in previous years, NGO leaders reported difficulty in renting space to hold large meetings. They maintained that police pressured hotel and hall managers to prevent them from renting meeting space. Hotel managers and businessmen denied that there was a specific ban on renting space to opposition groups; however, they said they cooperated with the Ministry of Interior and accommodated its requests when possible. <\/span><\/p>\n
In September a local hotel withdrew the reservation of the Tunisian Journalist’s Syndicate (SJT), which had planned to hold a congress at the hotel. On August 24, police told SJT leader Lotfi Hajji that the government did not recognize the SJT and that the organization would not be permitted to hold a congress. <\/span><\/p>\n
On November 10, organizers of the \u00ab\u00a0Citizen’s Summit on the Information Society,\u00a0\u00bb an unofficial parallel summit to the UN World Summit on the Information Society and sponsored by a group of international and national civil society organizations, reported that after reserving a venue for the conference at a hotel in Tunis, the hotel notified them that the hall was no longer available, citing the sudden need for repair work. On November 14, representatives of the organizations planning the citizen’s summit tried to meet at the Goethe Institute, but they were prevented from entering by several dozen plainclothes police. According to HRW representatives, the police, who did not identify themselves, \u00ab\u00a0manhandled local and foreign activists, knocking down several individuals as they pushed them along the streets.\u00a0\u00bb <\/span><\/p>\n
The government used police and other state security forces to monitor, control, and sometimes disrupt demonstrations. The government broke up several unsanctioned demonstrations during the year. In general demonstrators and security forces did not resort to violence; however, there were some exceptions, such as scuffles ensuing from demonstrators’ attempts to cross police lines or demonstrators not dispersing when ordered by police. <\/span> <\/p>\n
In March the government refused to allow several demonstrations to take place. Opposition groups, human rights NGOs, and students had petitioned to demonstrate in protest of the government’s invitation to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to attend the World Summit on the Information Society. Despite the ban, several protests took place. There were multiple reports that police assaulted several opposition leaders, human rights activists, and students during one demonstration. <\/span><\/p>\n
Freedom of Association <\/span><\/p>\n
The law provides for freedom of association; however, the government generally did not respect this right in practice. The law requires that new NGOs submit an application to the government to gain recognition and to operate legally. According to the law, an NGO that has filed an application to register may operate freely while the government processes its application. If the government does not reject the application within 90 days, the NGO is automatically registered. <\/span><\/p>\n
The government routinely blocked the registration of new independent NGOs by refusing to provide receipts for their registration applications. Without such a receipt, NGOs were unable to counter the government’s assertions that they had not applied to register and therefore were not allowed to operate. In such cases, NGOs could be shut down, their property seized, and their members prosecuted for \u00ab\u00a0membership in an illegal organization.\u00a0\u00bb <\/span><\/p>\n
During the year significant numbers of RCD members attempted to join independent NGOs, such as the LTDH and other civil society groups, with the apparent intent of eventually gaining control of the NGOs through elections or disrupting their operations. For example, in September a court ruled that the LTDH could not hold its national congress because of a suit filed by seven members of the LTDH allegedly loyal to the RCD. In some cases RCD members used the NGOs’ own bylaws, while in other cases they exploited a provision of the law on associations that requires \u00ab\u00a0organizations of a general character\u00a0\u00bb to grant membership to all who apply. <\/span><\/p>\n
Leaders of the AMT also alleged that the government used members loyal to the RCD to disrupt its meetings and operations. AMT members under government and RCD control held new elections for AMT leadership after the current president proposed new judicial reform initiatives and supported a group of lawyers that alleged improprieties in the trial of Mohamed Abbou (see section 1.c.). These RCD-loyal AMT members claimed that the president’s communiqu\u00e9 was not representative of all AMT members. In August the government evicted AMT leadership from the association’s headquarters in Tunis. Human rights organizations stated that the government removed the current AMT leadership due to its demonstrated independence. c. Freedom of Religion <\/span><\/p>\n
The law provides for freedom of religion that does not disturb public order, and the government generally respected this right in practice, although there were some restrictions and abuses. Islam is the state religion, and the law stipulates that the president must be a Muslim. <\/span><\/p>\n
The government recognizes all Christian and Jewish religious organizations that were established before independence in 1956. Although it permitted other Christian denominations to operate, the government formally recognized only the Catholic church. <\/span><\/p>\n
The government allowed the re-opening of a Catholic church in Djerba, but did not permit Christian groups to establish new churches. <\/span><\/p>\n
While it is not illegal to change religions, Muslims who convert to another religion face social ostracism. The government requires non-Muslim men to convert to Islam before marrying a Muslim woman. The government did not allow married couples to register their children with non\u2011Muslim names. <\/span><\/p>\n
While authorities did not deport foreigners suspected of proselytizing, the government did not renew the visas of suspected missionaries. During the year there were no reported cases of official action against persons suspected of proselytizing. <\/span><\/p>\n
The government required Islamic religious education in public schools, and the religious curriculum for secondary school students also included histories of Judaism and Christianity. <\/span><\/p>\n
The government did not permit the establishment of political parties based on religion, and it used this prohibition to continue to outlaw the Islamist party An\u2011Nahdha and to prosecute suspected An-Nahdha members for \u00ab\u00a0membership in an illegal organization\u00a0\u00bb (see section 1.e.). The government continued to maintain tight surveillance over Islamists and monitored activity in mosques. <\/span><\/p>\n
The law provides that only persons appointed by the government may lead activities in mosques. The government required that mosques remain closed except during prayer times and other authorized religious ceremonies, such as marriages or funerals. According to human rights lawyers, the government regularly questioned individuals observed praying frequently in mosques. Authorities instructed imams to espouse governmental social and economic programs during prayer times in mosques. The government paid the salaries of imams. <\/span> <\/p>\n
The government sought to suppress certain outward signs of citizens’ religious practice. For example, authorities characterized the hijab as a \u00ab\u00a0garment of foreign origin having a partisan connotation\u00a0\u00bb and officially prohibited its use in public institutions in order to \u00ab\u00a0observe impartiality required of officials in their professional relations with others.\u00a0\u00bb However, in practice, wearing of the hijab in public places was sometimes permitted. In several cases, school officials took disciplinary action to punish and deter hijab use by attempting to have women sign written oaths renouncing its use. There were reports that police sometimes detained men with what were termed \u00ab\u00a0Islamic\u00a0\u00bb beards, compelling them to shave. <\/span><\/p>\n
Religious publications were subject to the same restrictions on freedom of speech and the press as secular publications. Christian groups were generally allowed to distribute religious documents in English but not in Arabic. Only sanctioned religious groups were allowed to distribute religious documents. In the government’s view, distribution by other groups constituted an illegal \u00ab\u00a0threat to public order\u00a0\u00bb (see section 2.a.). The government held a lottery to determine which citizens could make the hajj due to country quotas from the Saudi Arabian government on how many nationals from each country could participate in the Hajj. <\/span><\/p>\n
Societal Abuses and Discrimination <\/span><\/p>\n
Privately owned newspapers on occasion published cartoons and articles critical of Israel. Some cartoons used derogatory images of orthodox Jews to portray the state of Israel and Israeli interests. These cartoons were drawn by cartoonists outside of the country and reprinted locally. <\/span><\/p>\n
Christians and Jews living in the country, including foreigners, constituted less than 1 percent of the population. The government permitted Christians and Jews who did not proselytize to worship as they wished, and it allowed Jewish communities to operate private religious schools. Jewish children on the island of Djerba were permitted to divide their academic day between public secular schools and private religious schools. The government also encouraged Jewish foreigners to return for the annual pilgrimage to the historic El\u2011Ghriba Synagogue on Djerba. <\/span><\/p>\n
Jewish community leaders reported that the government increased its traditionally active role in protecting synagogues, particularly during Jewish holidays. The government allowed the Jewish community freedom of worship and paid the salary of the grand rabbi. The government partially subsidized restoration and maintenance costs for some synagogues. While the government during the year did not act on a 1999 application to grant permanent registration to the Provisional Committee of the Jewish community to function as a sanctioned association, the leadership of the committee met weekly and performed religious activities and charity work. <\/span><\/p>\n
In December 2004 the government announced that it would no longer require Israeli citizens to deposit their passports at the border for the duration of their visit to the country. The government also announced that a former Hebrew school would be restored and made into a training center of the arts for persons with disabilities, and indicated that the Jewish cemetery of Tunis would be restored. The number of Jewish pilgrims to El-Ghriba in May increased dramatically from previous years. According to Jewish leaders, approximately one thousand pilgrims were Israeli citizens. <\/span><\/p>\n
During the year authorities did not report any anti-Semitic activities. <\/span> <\/p>\n
While Baha’is do not consider themselves Muslims, the government regarded the Baha’i faith as a heretical sect of Islam and permitted its adherents to practice their faith only in private. Interior ministry officials periodically met with prominent Baha’i leaders to discuss their community’s activities, leading to an improved relationship between their community and the government. <\/span><\/p>\n
For a more detailed discussion, see the <\/span> 2005 International Religious Freedom Report<\/font><\/span><\/a><\/span>.<\/span><\/i> <\/span><\/p>\n
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, Repatriation, and Exile <\/span><\/p>\n
The law provides for these rights, and the government generally respected them in practice; however, the government refused to issue, renew, amend, or accept passports of some dissidents, Islamists, and their relatives. The government also may impose a five\u2011year period of \u00ab\u00a0administrative controls\u00a0\u00bb at sentencing on certain former prisoners that constituted a type of internal exile. <\/span> <\/p>\n
The law authorizes the courts to cancel passports and contains broad provisions that both permit passport seizure on national security grounds and deny citizens the right either to present their case against seizure or to appeal the judges’ decision. The Ministry of Interior is required to submit requests to seize or withhold a citizen’s passport through the public prosecutor to the courts; however, the ministry routinely bypassed the public prosecutor with impunity. <\/span><\/p>\n
Many citizens reported difficulty applying for or renewing their passports and accused the government of blocking their applications solely on the basis of political opposition. <\/span><\/p>\n
Former Islamist leader Dr. Mohamed Sedki Labidi has been deprived of his passport for the last decade without a court decision. During the year the government issued a passport to Mokhtar Boubaker, a labor leader and former chief editor of the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT) weekly, Esch\u2011Chaab<\/i>, after refusing to issue one since 2001. No reason was given by the Ministry of Interior, either for the original denial or the current issuance. <\/span><\/p>\n
The law prohibits forced exile; however, the penal code provides for the imposition of a form of internal exile (which the government calls \u00ab\u00a0administrative control\u00a0\u00bb) on convicts for up to five years. Administrative control measures, which take effect upon a convict’s release from prison, are similar to parole restrictions, except that they may be applied to prisoners even after they have completed their sentences. The government requires those individuals to reside in an indicated place, chosen by the government, which may be anywhere in the country, and they are required to stay \u00ab\u00a0in the area of their residence.\u00a0\u00bb They also may be required to report to a police station frequently each day, at times determined only the previous evening. At the police station, they may be forced to wait hours before they are allowed to sign in, making employment impossible. Numerous Islamists released from prison in recent years have been subjected to such continuing punishment. <\/span><\/p>\n
By law, administrative control measures may only be imposed at sentencing; however, a former high school teacher, Nouri Chniti, claimed that, although his sentence did not include administrative control, he has been subject to extrajudicial administrative control measures since 1991 when he received a suspended sentence for membership in An\u2011Nadha. <\/span><\/p>\n
Some political opponents in self\u2011imposed exile abroad were prevented from obtaining or renewing their passports to return to the country. During the year a group of citizens abroad who had been refused passports formed an organization called \u00ab\u00a0Tunisians Without Passports\u00a0\u00bb and released communiqu\u00e9s calling on the government to allow all citizens to receive passports. <\/span><\/p>\n
Protection of Refugees<\/span><\/p>\n
The law provides for the granting of asylum or refugee status in accordance with the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol. The government cooperated to a certain degree with the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees and asylum seekers, but the government has not established a system for providing protection to refugees or foreign nationals who may not qualify as refugees under the 1951 Convention and 1967 protocol, but who still need some form of international protection. In practice, the government did not provide protection against refoulement<\/i>, the return of persons to a country where they feared persecution<\/span><\/p>\n
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government <\/span><\/p>\n
The law provides that citizens shall directly elect the president and members of the chamber of deputies for five\u2011year terms; however, there were significant limitations on citizens’ right to change their government. Moreover, there were irregularities that routinely called into question the legitimacy of elections. <\/span><\/p>\n
Elections and Political Participation <\/span><\/p>\n
In the October 2004 national elections, President Ben Ali faced three candidates and received approximately 94 percent of the popular vote to secure a fourth term. The third opposition candidate, Mohamed Halouani of the Et Tajdid party, cited government restrictions and other irregularities to explain why he received less that 1 percent of the official vote count. According to official election returns, more than 90 percent of registered voters went to the polls; however, independent NGOs estimated that the actual turnout was closer to 30 percent, casting serious doubt on the election. <\/span><\/p>\n
Irregularities such as voter intimidation also characterized the polling. A coalition of three local independent NGOs (LTDH, CNLT, and the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women) cited as serious problems the opposition’s lack of media access during the campaign and media bias in favor of the ruling party. Opposition candidates and other observers also cited restrictions on disseminating campaign materials and organizing campaign events. <\/span><\/p>\n
The Electoral Code significantly limits the number of individuals eligible to run for president. A candidate must be Muslim and must receive the endorsement of 30 sitting deputies or municipal council presidents to be eligible to run. By law, 20 percent of the seats in one house of the legislature (Chamber of Deputies) are reserved for opposition party candidates. The ruling party’s domination of state institutions and political activity precluded any credible and competitive electoral challenges. <\/span><\/p>\n
On March 15, the National Election Observatory, formed by the government in 2004 to monitor all stages of the 2004 elections, issued its report, concluding that the electoral process in general proceeded fairly and according to law. The report contained references to opposition and NGO criticism of the election, including the non-distribution of voting cards to opposition party members, the ruling party’s media advantage, the lack of transparency of the actual balloting, and secret ballot counts. While the report refuted the claims, it also listed 12 specific recommendations to address problems. Independent human rights activists complained that the real purpose of the observatory was to deflect criticism over the lack of independent or international observers. <\/span><\/p>\n
The ruling party has maintained power continuously since the country’s independence in 1956. It dominates the cabinet, the chamber of deputies, and regional and local governments. <\/span><\/p>\n
On July 3, the government conducted elections for the Chamber of Advisors, a second parliamentary chamber created by a 2002 constitutional amendment. The voters consisted of 4,555 officials, including municipal counselors, deputies, and mayors, plus the 189 members of the Chamber of Deputies. Of the 4,555 voters, only 305 belonged to opposition parties. The constitutional amendment creating the chamber specified that its 126 seats must be allocated among various regional and professional organizations, including 14 seats for the UGTT, which refused to name candidates, citing a lack of independence and democracy in the candidate selection process. The president appointed directly 41 candidates. The elected members of the new chamber were overwhelmingly members or supporters of the ruling RCD party. <\/span><\/p>\n
The president appoints the prime minister, the cabinet, and the 24 governors. The government and the party are closely integrated; current and former senior government officials constitute the top ranks of the RCD. The president of the country is also the president of the party, and the party’s vice president and secretary general each hold the rank of minister. All the members of the RCD politburo hold ministerial rank based on their current or former government service. <\/span><\/p>\n
RCD membership conferred tangible advantages. For example, there were widespread reports that RCD members and their families were much more likely to receive educational housing benefits, small business permits, and waivers on zoning restrictions. <\/span><\/p>\n
To mitigate the advantages wielded by the ruling party, the Electoral Code reserves 20 percent of seats in the Chamber of Deputies (37 of 189) for the seven officially recognized opposition parties, and distributes them on a proportional basis to those parties that won at least a single directly elected district seat. In the October 2004 elections, five of the opposition parties gained seats under that provision. The RCD continued to hold the remaining 152 seats. <\/span><\/p>\n
The government partially funded opposition parties. Each party represented in the chamber of deputies received a public subsidy of approximately $42,000 (60,000 dinars), plus an additional payment of $3,500 (5,000 dinars) per deputy. The government also provided $105,000 (120,000 dinars) to each newspaper of an opposition party represented in the legislature. On November 30, the president announced an increase in the level of support for opposition parties represented in the chamber. The government raised the public subsidy for operational costs of opposition parties $56,300 (75,000 dinars) per year, raised the additional payment per deputy to $5,300 (7,500 dinars), and increased the level of government funding for opposition newspapers to $112,500 (150,000 dinars). <\/span><\/p>\n
By law, the government does not permit the establishment of political parties on the basis of religion, language, race, or gender. The government used the prohibition to continue to outlaw the Islamist An\u2011Nahdha party and to prosecute suspected members for \u00ab\u00a0membership in an illegal organization\u00a0\u00bb (see sections 2.b. and 2.c.). The government refused to recognize the creation of the Tunisian Green Party. <\/span><\/p>\n
On a number of occasions, the president expressed the desire to increase the level of representation of women in the government to 25 percent. In April 2004 he appointed the country’s first female governor. There were 50 women in the 301\u2011seat legislature, 2 women in the 25-seat cabinet, and 5 women among the 18 secretaries of state. Following municipal elections in May, more than one\u2011fourth of municipal council members elected were women. Three women served as presidents of chambers on the Supreme Court, and two women served on the 15\u2011member Higher Council of the Magistracy. The government conducted the first elections without gender segregation during a September 2004 by-election in a governorate on the outskirts of Tunis. <\/span><\/p>\n
Government Corruption and Transparency <\/span><\/p>\n
There are 13 articles of the penal code concerning penalties for corruption, and there were a small number of corruption cases prosecuted throughout the year. In March 2004 the Minister of Interior announced the creation of the \u00ab\u00a0Higher Institute of Security Forces and Customs,\u00a0\u00bb tasked not only with \u00ab\u00a0reinforcing human rights and improving law enforcement,\u00a0\u00bb but also reducing corruption. There were no public reports of the organization’s subsequent activities. There are no laws to provide government documents to citizens. <\/span><\/p>\n
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights <\/span><\/p>\n
A variety of domestic and international groups generally were able to investigate and publish their findings, although with some difficulty, but the government actively discouraged investigations of human rights abuses. According to the government, there were more than eight thousand NGOs in the country devoted exclusively to social and economic development issues. The government sought to monitor and control the activities of some foreign NGOs within the country. There were approximately one dozen domestic human rights NGOs, although only half were authorized. The government met with registered domestic human rights NGOs and responded to their inquiries; however, it also harassed, targeted, and prosecuted some of them. <\/span><\/p>\n
The LTDH was one of the most active independent advocacy organizations, with 41 branches throughout the country. The organization received and investigated complaints and protested abuses, although the government rarely responded to LTDH communiqu\u00e9s. The government continued to block a European Union grant to the LTDH, citing a law on NGO financing that includes broad prohibitions on funding of NGOs without government approval. <\/span><\/p>\n
Other independent human rights NGOs included: the legally registered Arab Human Rights Institute; the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (ATFD); the unregistered AISPP; and the ALTT. <\/span><\/p>\n
Since 1998 the government has refused to authorize the CNLT’s registration as an NGO. The CNLT issued statements sharply criticizing the government’s human rights practices. Government officials have accused CNLT members of violating the pro forma submission requirements by publishing communiqu\u00e9s without prior government approval (see section 2.a.). <\/span><\/p>\n
During the year significant numbers of ruling party RCD members continued attempts to join independent NGOs, such as the LTDH and other civil society groups, with the apparent intent of eventually gaining control of the NGOs through elections (see section 2.b). <\/span><\/p>\n
In May the government refused to issue a visa to a member of AI’s regional office in Beirut. According to local news sources, the AI member was attempting to participate in a human rights training session. On November 17, Robert Menard, Secretary General of RWB, attempted to enter the country to attend the UN World Summit on the Information Society. According to Menard, security agents boarded his plane upon landing and informed him that he was not allowed to enter the country. A government spokesman later said Menard could not enter because of ongoing legal proceedings in the country relating to a 2002 protest of the country’s tourist office in Paris. The government blocked RWB’s website, which contained critical material on the country’s human rights record. <\/span> <\/p>\n
In April HRW held a press conference in Tunis to announce a report on solitary confinement (see section 1.c.). <\/span><\/p>\n
The International Freedom of Expression Exchange \u2013 Tunisia Monitoring Group (IFEX-TMG), a coalition of international human rights and freedom of expression NGOs, conducted fact-finding missions during the year. The IFEX-TMG reported heavy police surveillance of their activities and government interference with their mission. Police prevented translators and private citizens traveling with the group from attending some meetings. <\/span><\/p>\n
In April the ICRC signed an agreement with the government that the local office could conduct visits to all prisons and detention centers in the country. The agreement followed more than a year of negotiations. The ICRC conducted visits starting in June and reported that access and cooperation with the government were good (see section 1.c). There were credible reports that police prevented some family members of prisoners from visiting ICRC offices. In September police allegedly assaulted the wife of an Islamist prisoner when she left AISPP offices, and they also prevented her from entering ICRC offices, reportedly telling her that she would be \u00ab\u00a0put in prison with (her) husband\u00a0\u00bb if she tried to enter the ICRC office. <\/span><\/p>\n
The Ministry of Justice and Human Rights has the lead on government policy on human rights issues in the country, although other ministries also had human rights offices. The ministry did not release any public reports of cases or investigations. A government\u2011appointed and funded body, the Higher Commission on Human Rights and Basic Freedoms, addressed, and occasionally resolved human rights complaints. The commission submitted confidential reports directly to the president. The government maintained several government-run news sites that include sections on human rights, but the sites are not specifically identified as government sponsored. However, the government continued to block access to the sites of domestic human rights organizations (see section 2.a.).<\/span><\/p>\n
Section 5 Discrimination, Societal Abuse, and Trafficking in Persons<\/span><\/p>\n
The law provides that all citizens are equal before the law, and the government generally respected this right, although in inheritance and family law, biased\u2011based provisions in the civil code adversely affected women.<\/span><\/p>\n
Women <\/span><\/p>\n
Laws against domestic violence provide for fines and imprisonment for assaults committed by a spouse or family member that are double those for the same crimes committed by an unrelated individual, but enforcement was lax, as police and the courts generally regarded domestic violence as an internal family problem. Violence against women and spousal abuse occurred, but there were no statistics to measure its extent. The National Union of Tunisian Women (UNFT), a government\u2011sponsored organization that ran a center to assist women and children in difficulty, sponsored national educational campaigns for women. The UNFT reported that its shelter handled one thousand cases during the year. The ATFD, active in debating and publicizing women’s issues, operated a counseling center for female victims and reported that its shelter assisted approximately 100 women using the shelter for the first time during the year, in addition to a continuing caseload from previous years. <\/span><\/p>\n
The penal code specifically prohibits rape, including spousal rape, and the government enforced the laws vigorously,<\/span> <\/span>giving significant<\/span> <\/span>press coverage to rape cases<\/span>. <\/span>Perhaps due to social stigma, there were no reports of prosecution for spousal rape. The death sentence is the penalty for rape with the use of violence or threat with a weapon. For all other rape cases, the penalty is life imprisonment. <\/span><\/p>\n
The penal code prohibits prostitution, although individuals were rarely charged. The penalty for prostitution is up to two years in prison. The law applies to both women and men and their accomplices. There were no reported cases of trafficking or forced prostitution involving women. <\/span><\/p>\n
In August 2004 the chamber of deputies passed the country’s first law making sexual harassment a criminal offense, but the government subsequently suspended the law after civil society groups vociferously criticized it. Nevertheless, sexual harassment was a problem, although there were no comprehensive data to measure its extent. <\/span><\/p>\n
Women enjoyed substantial rights, and the government advanced those rights in the areas of divorce and property ownership. Women enjoy the same legal status as men. The law explicitly requires equal pay for equal work, and although there were no statistics comparing the average earnings of men and women, anecdotal evidence indicated that women and men performing the same work received the same wages. A slight majority of university students were women. <\/span><\/p>\n
Women served in high levels of the government as cabinet ministers and secretaries of state, comprising more than 13 percent of the total, and President Ben Ali appointed the country’s first female governor in April 2004 (see section 3). Women constituted approximately 37 percent of the civil service and 24 percent of the nation’s jurists. However, women still faced societal and economic discrimination. <\/span><\/p>\n
Codified civil law is based on the Napoleonic code, although judges often used Shari’a as a basis for customary law in family and inheritance. Most property acquired during marriage, including property acquired solely by the wife, is held in the name of the husband. Muslim women are not permitted to marry outside their religion. Marriages of Muslim women to non\u2011Muslim men abroad are considered common\u2011law and are voided when the couple returns to the country. Application of inheritance law continued to discriminate against women, and there was a double standard based on gender and religion: non\u2011Muslim women and Muslim men who are married may not inherit from each other. The government considers all children from those marriages to be Muslim, and forbids those children from inheriting anything from their mothers. Female citizens can convey citizenship rights to their children whether the father is a citizen or not. <\/span><\/p>\n
In February 2004 the government launched a morality campaign invoking a 1940 law penalizing \u00ab\u00a0immoral behavior\u00a0\u00bb that observers said primarily affected women. For example, women were detained for wearing jeans that police judged too tight, for holding hands with men in public, and for driving with young men \u00ab\u00a0without authorization.\u00a0\u00bb However, this campaign was discontinued later in 2004, and there was no enforcement of these penalties during the year. <\/span><\/p>\n
The Ministry for Women’s Affairs, Family, Children and Senior Citizens sponsored several national media campaigns to promote awareness of women’s rights. Nearly two\u2011thirds of its budget was devoted to ensuring the legal rights of women, while simultaneously improving their socioeconomic status. The government supported and funded the UNFT, the Center for Research, Documentation, and Information on Women (CREDIF), and women’s professional associations. Several NGOs focused on women’s advocacy and research in women’s issues, and a number of attorneys represented women in domestic cases. <\/span><\/p>\n
Children <\/span> <\/p>\n
The government demonstrated a strong commitment to free and universal public education, which is compulsory from age 6 to 16 years. According to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 95 percent of boys and 93 percent of girls were in primary school, and approximately 73 percent of boys and 76 percent of girls were in secondary school. During the year, female students graduated from secondary school at a higher rate than their male counterparts. There were schools for religious groups (see section 2.c.). The government sponsored an immunization program targeting preschool\u2011age children and reported vaccinating more than 95 percent of children. Male and female students received equal access to medical care. <\/span><\/p>\n
Convictions for abandonment and assault on minors carried severe penalties. There was no societal pattern of child abuse. <\/span><\/p>\n
Child labor and child prostitution were not significant problems. There were two ministries responsible for rights of children: the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, Family, and Childhood, and the Ministry of Youth, Sports, and Physical Training. Each had secretaries of state responsible for safeguarding the rights of children. <\/span><\/p>\n
Trafficking in Persons <\/span><\/p>\n
The law prohibits trafficking in persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked to, from, or within the country. <\/span><\/p>\n
In January 2004 the legislature approved amendments to the 1975 law on passports and travel documents. The law includes provisions for sentencing convicted traffickers to prison terms of 3 to 20 years, and fines of $67 thousand to $83 thousand (80 thousand to 100 thousand dinars). The amendments brought national law into conformance with the international protocol agreement on trafficking of persons. The government prepared to use provisions of the penal code to combat trafficking should the need arise. For example, traffickers could be prosecuted under laws prohibiting forced displacement of persons. <\/span><\/p>\n
The Ministry of Interior and Local Development and the Ministry of Social Affairs, Solidarity and Tunisians Abroad were the agencies responsible for antitrafficking efforts. Since trafficking was not deemed a problem, there were no specific government campaigns to prevent trafficking. <\/span><\/p>\n
Persons with Disabilities <\/span><\/p>\n
The law prohibits discrimination against those with physical or mental disabilities and mandates at least 1 percent of public and private sector jobs be reserved for persons with disabilities, and the government generally enforced these provisions. There was little discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education, access to health care, or in the provision of other state services. All public buildings constructed since 1991 must be accessible to persons with physical disabilities, and this was enforced. The government issued special cards to persons with disabilities for benefits such as unrestricted parking, priority medical services, preferential seating on public transportation, and consumer discounts. The government provided tax incentives to companies to encourage the hiring of persons with physical disabilities, and the government strongly supported NGOs working to help persons with disabilities. <\/span><\/p>\n
Several active NGOs provided educational, vocational, and recreational assistance to children and young adults with mental disabilities. The government and international organizations funded several programs. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Solidarity and Tunisians Abroad was responsible for protecting the rights of persons with disabilities. <\/span><\/p>\n
Section 6 Worker Rights <\/span><\/p>\n
a. The Right of Association <\/span><\/p>\n
The law provides workers the right to organize and form unions, and the government generally respected this right in practice. The UGTT was the country’s only labor federation. There were some unauthorized, independent trade unions: the Democratic Confederation for Labor and the Tunisian Journalists Syndicate. Approximately 30 percent of the work force belonged to the UGTT, including civil servants and employees of state\u2011owned enterprises, and a considerably larger proportion of the work force was covered by union contracts. A union may be dissolved only by court order. Approximately 27 percent of the total workforce was unionized. <\/span><\/p>\n
The UGTT and its member unions were legally independent of the government and the ruling party; however, they operated under regulations that restricted their freedom of action. The UGTT membership included persons associated with all political tendencies. There were credible reports that the UGTT received substantial government subsidies to supplement union dues; however, UGTT leaders stated that their only funding came from modest union dues and revenue from an insurance company and hotel owned by the union. Union members and their families received additional support from the National Social Security Account (CNSS). The government provided the UGTT with land for its new headquarters and support for its construction. The central UGTT leadership generally cooperated with the government regarding its economic reform program. Throughout the year, the UGTT board showed some independence regarding economic and social issues, and in support of greater democracy. At mid-year, the UGTT refused to submit a list of candidates for 14 UGTT-designated seats in the newly created Chamber of Advisors, citing a lack of independence and democracy in the selection process and an unfair distribution of seats (see section 3). The UGTT supported the LTDH and allowed LTDH regional chapters to use UGTT facilities for conferences and meetings. <\/span><\/p>\n
The law prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers, although the UGTT claimed that there was antiunion activity among private sector employers, such as the firing of union activists and using temporary workers to avoid unionization. In certain industries, such as textiles, hotels, and construction, temporary workers accounted for a large majority of the work force. The labor code protects temporary workers, but enforcement was more difficult than in the case of permanent workers. A committee chaired by an officer from the Labor Inspectorate of the Office of the Inspector General approved all worker dismissals. The committee is composed of representatives from the Ministry of Social Affairs, Solidarity and Tunisians Abroad, the UGTT, and the company dismissing the worker. <\/span><\/p>\n
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively <\/span><\/p>\n
The law protects the right to organize and bargain collectively, and the government protected this right in practice. Wages and working conditions are set in triennial negotiations between the UGTT member unions and employers. Numerous collective bargaining agreements set standards for industries in the private sector and covered 80 percent of the total private sector workforce. The government’s role in private sector negotiations was minimal, consisting mainly of lending its good offices as a mediator if talks stalled. The government must approve, but may not modify, all agreements; once approved, the agreements are binding on both union and nonunion workers in the line of work that they cover. The UGTT also negotiated wages and work conditions of civil servants and employees of state\u2011owned enterprises. The government was the partner in such negotiations. During the year the triennial labor negotiations with the UGTT, the Union of Tunisian Employers (the private sector employer’s association) and the government continued as the UGTT sought more favorable wage increases for employees. <\/span><\/p>\n
Unions, including those representing civil servants, have the right to strike, provided that they give 10 days advance notice to the UGTT, and it grants approval. The ICFTU has characterized the requirement for prior UGTT approval of strikes as a violation of worker rights, but such advance approval rarely was sought in practice. There were numerous short\u2011lived strikes over failure by employers to fulfill contract provisions regarding pay and conditions and over efforts by employers to impede union activities. While the majority of the strikes technically were illegal, the government did not prosecute workers for illegal strike activity. The law prohibited retribution against strikers. Labor disputes were settled through conciliation panels in which labor and management were represented equally. Tripartite regional arbitration commissions settle industrial disputes when conciliation fails. <\/span><\/p>\n
There are export\u2011processing zones (EPZs) subject to regular labor laws. <\/span><\/p>\n
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor <\/span><\/p>\n
The law prohibits forced and compulsory labor, including by children, and there were no reports that such practices occurred. However, some parents of teenage girls placed their daughters as domestic servants and collected their wages (see section 6.d.). <\/span><\/p>\n
d. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment <\/span><\/p>\n
The law prohibits the employment of children under 18 in jobs whose nature and environment present a serious threat to their health, security and morality, and the UGTT and CNSS conducted inspection tours of factories and industrial sites to ensure compliance with the law. <\/span><\/p>\n
In April the government amended the Household Workers Law to prohibit the employment of children under the age of 16 years, which is consistent with the age for completing educational requirements, and inspectors of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Solidarity examined the records of employees to verify that employers complied with the minimum age law. However, there were no reports of sanctions against employers. Child labor also existed in the informal sector disguised as apprenticeship, particularly in the handicraft industry. <\/span> <\/p>\n
The minimum age for light work in the nonindustrial and agricultural sectors during nonschool hours was 13 years. Workers between the ages of 14 and 18 must have 12 hours of rest per day, which must include the hours between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. In nonagricultural sectors, children between the ages of 14 and 16 years may work no more than 2 hours per day. The total time that children spend in school and work may not exceed seven hours per day. Nonetheless, young children sometimes performed agricultural work in rural areas, and worked as vendors in towns, primarily during their summer vacation from school. <\/span><\/p>\n
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work <\/span><\/p>\n
The labor code provides for a range of administratively determined minimum wages. In August the industrial minimum wage was raised to $179 (224 dinars) per month for a 48\u2011hour workweek and to $155 (194 dinars) per month for a 40\u2011hour workweek. The agricultural daily minimum wage was $5.87 (7.33 dinars) per day for \u00ab\u00a0specialized\u00a0\u00bb agricultural workers and $6.17 (7.71 dinars) per day for \u00ab\u00a0qualified\u00a0\u00bb agricultural workers. With the addition of transportation and family allowances, the minimum wage provided a decent standard of living for a worker and family, although that income was only enough to cover essential costs. More than 500 thousand workers were employed in the informal sector, which was not covered by labor laws. <\/span><\/p>\n
Regional labor inspectors were responsible for enforcing standards related to hourly wage regulations. They inspected most firms approximately once every two years. The government often had difficulty enforcing the minimum wage law, particularly in nonunionized sectors of the economy. The labor code sets a standard 48\u2011hour workweek for most sectors and requires one 24\u2011hour rest period per week. <\/span><\/p>\n
Special government regulations governed employment in hazardous occupations like mining, petroleum engineering, and construction, and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Solidarity and Tunisians Abroad had responsibility for enforcing health and safety standards in the workplace. Working conditions and standards generally were better in export-oriented firms than in those firms producing exclusively for the domestic market. Workers were free to remove themselves from dangerous situations without jeopardizing their employment, and they could take legal action against employers who retaliated against them for exercising this right. <\/span><\/p>\n
The few foreign workers in the country had the same protections as citizen workers. <\/span><\/p>\n
http:\/\/www.state.gov\/g\/drl\/rls\/hrrpt\/2005\/61700.htm<\/a><\/font><\/p>\n\n
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Reprise du dialogue \u00e9conomique dans le cadre du Plan d’action voisinage<\/font><\/h2>\n
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AFP, le 09.03.2006 \u00e0 12h41 TUNIS, 9 mars 2006 (AFP) – L’Union europ\u00e9enne (UE) et la Tunisie\u00a0 ont discut\u00e9 jeudi \u00e0 Tunis des perspectives de d\u00e9veloppement de leurs\u00a0 rapports \u00e9conomiques dans le cadre du Plan d’Action entr\u00e9 en vigueur\u00a0 en juillet 2005, apprend-on aupr\u00e8s de la D\u00e9l\u00e9gation europ\u00e9enne. \u00a0 Une s\u00e9rie de r\u00e9unions groupant des repr\u00e9sentants de la\u00a0 Commission de Bruxelles et des responsables tunisiens devait\u00a0 permettre de faire le point des relations et d’examiner les\u00a0 perspectives d’\u00e9volution dans l’agriculture, l’agroalimentaire et\u00a0 les services. \u00a0 La politique mon\u00e9taire et les r\u00e9formes structurelles \u00e9taient\u00a0 aussi au menu des r\u00e9unions auxquelles ont pris part notamment des\u00a0 repr\u00e9sentants de la Banque europ\u00e9enne d’investissement (BEI) et\u00a0 ambassadeurs d’Etats membres de l’UE. \u00a0 Ces discussions, qui constituent une reprise du dialogue\u00a0 \u00e9conomique entre l’UE et la Tunisie, sont les premi\u00e8res du genre\u00a0 depuis l’entr\u00e9e en vigueur du Plan d’action conclu entre les deux\u00a0 parties en juillet dernier. \u00a0 Elles pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent la visite du vice-pr\u00e9sident de la BEI, Philippe\u00a0 de Fontaine Vive, le 23 mars en Tunisie, alors que le gouvernement\u00a0 tunisien met au point les orientations du 11\u00e8me plan quinquennal de\u00a0 d\u00e9veloppement (2007-2011). \u00a0 Premier partenaire m\u00e9diterran\u00e9en \u00e0 signer un accord\u00a0 d’association avec l’UE d\u00e8s 1995, la Tunisie \u00e9tait aussi l’un des\u00a0 premiers pays du Maghreb \u00e0 adopter le Plan d’Action propos\u00e9 par\u00a0 Bruxelles aux pays voisins de l’UE, dans le cadre de la Politique\u00a0 europ\u00e9enne de voisinage. \u00a0 Ce Plan est cens\u00e9 ouvrir la voie \u00e0 un dialogue \u00ab\u00a0plus approfondi\u00a0\u00bb\u00a0 dans les domaines \u00e9conomique et politique entre l’Europe et la\u00a0 Tunisie, ce pays effectuant plus de 80% de ses \u00e9changes avec l’UE. \u00a0<\/div>\n
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Six offres pour la privatisation de Tunisie-Telecom<\/font><\/h2>\n
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AFP, le 09.03.2006 \u00e0 12h30 TUNIS, 9 mars 2006 (AFP) – Six firmes internationales, dont\u00a0 Vivendi International et France Telecom (France), ont d\u00e9pos\u00e9 leurs\u00a0 offres pour l’achat de 35% du capital de Tunisie-Telecom, a-t-on\u00a0 annonc\u00e9 jeudi de source officielle. \u00a0 Les autres groupes en lice sont : Mobil Telephone Networks\u00a0 (MTN\/Afrique du Sud), Etisalet, Tecom (Emirats Arabes Unis) et un\u00a0 consortium italo-saoudien (Telecom Italia et Saudi Oger). \u00a0 \u00ab\u00a0La prochaine \u00e9tape sera consacr\u00e9e \u00e0 l’examen des dossiers\u00a0 administratifs et techniques relatifs \u00e0 ces offres avant de passer \u00e0\u00a0 l’ouverture des offres financi\u00e8res\u00a0\u00bb, a indiqu\u00e9 un communiqu\u00e9 du\u00a0 minist\u00e8re des Technologies de la communication. \u00a0 Huit pr\u00e9tendants s’\u00e9taient retir\u00e9s de la course pour l’op\u00e9ration\u00a0 de privatisation la plus importante jamais effectu\u00e9e en Tunisie,\u00a0 dont le fran\u00e7ais Bouygues Telecom, l’espagnol Telefonica et Saudi\u00a0 Telecom. \u00a0 Le gouvernement tunisien esp\u00e8re tirer 1,4 milliard d’euros de\u00a0 cette op\u00e9ration qui devrait doper l’\u00e9conomie nationale affect\u00e9e par\u00a0 la hausse du prix du p\u00e9trole. \u00a0 Cr\u00e9\u00e9 en 1995, l’op\u00e9rateur public tunisien compte 1,2 million\u00a0 d’abonn\u00e9s au r\u00e9seau fixe et plus de 2,5 millions \u00e0 son r\u00e9seau\u00a0 mobile. \u00a0 Tunisie-Telecom partage le march\u00e9 tunisien avec un seul\u00a0 op\u00e9rateur GSM priv\u00e9 (Tunisiana, 2 millions d’abonn\u00e9s) et a affich\u00e9\u00a0 en 2004 un b\u00e9n\u00e9fice net de 161 millions d’euros pour un CA de 710\u00a0 millions d’euros. \u00a0 AFP \u00a0<\/div>\n
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Six offres pour l’achat de 35% du capital de Tunisie-Telecom<\/font><\/h2>\n
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Associated Press, le 08.03.2006 \u00e0 23h29 TUNIS (AP) — Six firmes internationales ont remis mercredi leurs offres pour l’acquisition de 35% du capital de Tunisie-Telecom (TT), l’unique op\u00e9rateur public de t\u00e9l\u00e9phonie mobile et fixe en Tunisie, a annonc\u00e9 dans la soir\u00e9e le minist\u00e8re des T\u00e9l\u00e9communications. \u00a0 Les six groupes en lice sont Vivendi International et France Telecom (France), Mobil Telephone Networks (MTN\/Afrique du Sud), Etisalet (Emirats Arabes Unis), Tecom, Telecom Italia et Saudi Oger qui ont pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 une offre commune. \u00a0 Trois autres pr\u00e9tendants s’\u00e9taient retir\u00e9s de la course, \u00e0 savoir le Fran\u00e7ais Bouygues Telecom, l’Espagnol Telefonica et Saudi Telecom. \u00a0 L’ouverture des plis a eu lieu le jour m\u00eame dans la matin\u00e9e \u00e0 Tunis, en pr\u00e9sence des repr\u00e9sentants des compagnies int\u00e9ress\u00e9es. La privatisation partielle de Tunisie-Telecom s’inscrit, dans le cadre de la lib\u00e9ralisation progressive du secteur des communication dans l’objectif de renforcer la comp\u00e9titivit\u00e9 des entreprises nationales et d’am\u00e9liorer les opportunit\u00e9s d’investissement dans ce domaine. \u00a0 La prochaine \u00e9tape sera consacr\u00e9e \u00e0 l’examen des dossiers administratifs et techniques relatifs \u00e0 ces offres avant de passer \u00e0 l’ouverture des offres financi\u00e8res qui devrait se d\u00e9rouler dans la deuxi\u00e8me quinzaine de mars, en pr\u00e9sence de tous les soumissionnaires de l’appel d’offres. \u00a0 Cependant, le r\u00e9sultat final ne devrait \u00eatre connu que dans trois mois, des surench\u00e8res \u00e9tant pr\u00e9vues au cas o\u00f9 les \u00e9carts seraient proches les uns des autres dans une fourchette de 10%. \u00a0 TT d\u00e9tient 70% de parts dans un march\u00e9 florissant dans un secteur qui enregistre un taux de croissance annuel de 20%. Il est le seul fournisseur de services de t\u00e9l\u00e9phonie fixe dans le pays mais partage la t\u00e9l\u00e9phone mobile avec un op\u00e9rateur priv\u00e9, \u00ab\u00a0Tunisiana\u00a0\u00bb appartenant \u00e0 parit\u00e9 \u00e9gale au groupe \u00e9gyptien ORASCOM et \u00e0 la compagnie koweitienne Al Watania. \u00a0 Consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme \u00ab\u00a0la transaction du si\u00e8cle\u00a0\u00bb, cette op\u00e9ration devrait rapporter \u00e0 l’Etat tunisien entre 1 et 2 milliards d’euros, selon les offres financi\u00e8res. \u00a0 Dans une seconde \u00e9tape, l’acqu\u00e9reur peut aspirer \u00e0 racheter les 16% suppl\u00e9mentaires du capital pour devenir majoritaire. \u00a0 Associated Press \u00a0<\/div>\n
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Premi\u00e8re r\u00e9union de l’Otan dans un pays arabe en avril au Maroc<\/font><\/h2>\n
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AFP, le\u00a0 08.03.2006 \u00e0 18h05 BRUXELLES, 8 mars 2006 (AFP) –\u00a0 L’Otan tiendra sa premi\u00e8re\u00a0 r\u00e9union dans un pays arabe en avril \u00e0 Rabat pour discuter de la\u00a0 relance du programme de coop\u00e9ration \u00ab\u00a0Dialogue m\u00e9diterran\u00e9en\u00a0\u00bb, a-t-on\u00a0 appris mercredi aupr\u00e8s de l’Alliance atlantique \u00e0 Bruxelles. \u00a0 Ce \u00ab\u00a0s\u00e9minaire de haut niveau\u00a0\u00bb se d\u00e9roulera les 6 et 7 avril dans\u00a0 la capitale marocaine et incluera les repr\u00e9sentants permanents des\u00a0 26 pays membres de l’Otan, ainsi que les directeurs politiques des\u00a0 minist\u00e8res des Affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res des 7 pays participant au\u00a0 Dialogue (Isra\u00ebl, Jordanie, Egypte, Tunisie, Alg\u00e9rie, Maroc et\u00a0 Mauritanie), selon des sources au sein de l’OTAN. \u00a0 La r\u00e9union sera pr\u00e9sid\u00e9e par le secr\u00e9taire g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de l’Alliance\u00a0 atlantique, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. C’est la premi\u00e8re fois que l’Otan organise une r\u00e9union \u00e0 un tel\u00a0 niveau dans un pays du Maghreb ou du Proche-Orient. \u00a0 Elle devra permettre de \u00ab\u00a0renforcer la dimension politique du\u00a0 dialogue m\u00e9diterran\u00e9en et d’examiner les perspectives futures\u00a0\u00bb de\u00a0 coop\u00e9ration, a indiqu\u00e9 un responsable de l’Otan sous couvert de\u00a0 l’anonymat. \u00a0 Le \u00ab\u00a0Dialogue m\u00e9diterran\u00e9en\u00a0\u00bb est un programme de coop\u00e9ration\u00a0 entre l’Otan et les sept pays qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 lanc\u00e9 en 1995 pour\u00a0 promouvoir la confiance dans la r\u00e9gion mais il n’avait jamais\u00a0 vraiment pris forme. Les dirigeants de l’Otan avaient d\u00e8s lors d\u00e9cid\u00e9, en juin 2005 \u00e0\u00a0 Istanbul, de le relancer. \u00a0 Depuis lors, l’Otan et les Sept se sont r\u00e9unis \u00e0 deux reprises\u00a0 au niveau minist\u00e9riel dont r\u00e9cemment en Sicile en f\u00e9vrier. \u00a0 Plusieurs de ces pays, notamment l’Alg\u00e9rie, doivent \u00e9galement\u00a0 participer \u00e0 l’op\u00e9ration maritime antiterroriste de l’Otan en mer\u00a0 M\u00e9diterran\u00e9e, lanc\u00e9e apr\u00e8s les attentats terroristes du 11 septembre\u00a0 2001. \u00a0 L’Otan cherche \u00e0 nouer des liens de coop\u00e9ration plus \u00e9troits\u00a0 avec le monde arabo-musulman mais se heurte bien souvent aux\u00a0 r\u00e9ticences d’opinions publiques historiquement m\u00e9fiantes \u00e0 l’\u00e9gard\u00a0 de l’alliance militaire occidentale domin\u00e9e par les Etats-Unis. \u00a0 L’Otan a aussi \u00e9tabli des canaux de communication avec les Etats\u00a0 du Golfe et approch\u00e9 l’Arabie saoudite. \u00a0 AFP\u00a0<\/div>\n
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Le HCR ouvre un bureau dans le centre de transit pour immigr\u00e9s de Lampedusa<\/font><\/h2>\n
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\u00a0AFP, le 09.03.2006 \u00e0 12h39 ROME, 9 mars 2006 (AFP) – Le Haut commissariat aux r\u00e9fugi\u00e9s\u00a0 (HCR) des Nations unies, qui a connu des difficult\u00e9s dans le pass\u00e9\u00a0 pour acc\u00e9der au centre de transit pour \u00e9trangers de Lampedusa (sud\u00a0 de l’Italie), a d\u00e9sormais un fonctionnaire pr\u00e9sent en permanence\u00a0 dans ce centre, a-t-il indiqu\u00e9 jeudi. \u00a0 L’\u00eele de Lampedusa, situ\u00e9e \u00e0 200 km au sud de la Sicile et \u00e0 300\u00a0 km au nord de la Libye, est le premier point d’arriv\u00e9e en Italie des\u00a0 immigrants clandestins, venus surtout d’Afrique et estim\u00e9s \u00e0 15.000\u00a0 par le minist\u00e8re italien de l’Int\u00e9rieur entre janvier et octobre\u00a0 2005. \u00a0 Un fonctionnaire du HCR est pr\u00e9sent depuis le 3 mars sur l’\u00eele,\u00a0 avec pour t\u00e2che d’aider \u00ab\u00a0\u00e0 une identification efficace des\u00a0 demandeurs d’asile et de leur garantir l’acc\u00e8s \u00e0 la proc\u00e9dure pour\u00a0 la reconnaissance du statut de r\u00e9fugi\u00e9\u00a0\u00bb, indique un communiqu\u00e9 du\u00a0 HCR. \u00a0 \u00ab\u00a0Ce fonctionnaire dispose d’un espace \u00e0 l’int\u00e9rieur du centre\u00a0\u00bb,\u00a0 a soulign\u00e9 \u00e0 l’AFP Laura Boldrini, porte-parole en Italie du HCR. \u00a0 \u00ab\u00a0C’est une avanc\u00e9e importante parce qu’avant, il n’y avait pas\u00a0 de pr\u00e9sence institutionnelle reconnue charg\u00e9e d’informer les\u00a0 \u00e9ventuels demandeurs d’asile de leur droit et des bonnes proc\u00e9dures\u00a0 \u00e0 suivre\u00a0\u00bb, a-t-elle ajout\u00e9e. \u00a0 \u00ab\u00a0L’information circulait de mani\u00e8re diff\u00e9rente, par exemple avec\u00a0 des brochures, et elle ne parvenait pas forc\u00e9ment \u00e0 tous\u00a0\u00bb, a-t-elle\u00a0 pr\u00e9cis\u00e9. \u00a0 L’Italie a re\u00e7u de fr\u00e9quentes critiques de la part des\u00a0 organisations internationales et des ONG sur sa politique d’accueil\u00a0 des ill\u00e9gaux arrivant par bateau. \u00a0 Des membres du HCR s’\u00e9taient vus refuser l’acc\u00e8s au centre de\u00a0 Lampedusa \u00e0 la mi-mars 2005, alors que 1.200 migrants avaient \u00e9t\u00e9\u00a0 intercept\u00e9s pr\u00e8s de l’\u00eele en quelques jours et emmen\u00e9s dans le\u00a0 centre, pr\u00e9vu pour accueillir 190 personnes. \u00a0 Selon la porte-parole du HCR, entre 12.000 et 15.000 personnes\u00a0 font chaque ann\u00e9e une demande d’asile en Italie et environ 50%\u00a0 d’entre elles obtiennent une forme de reconnaissance de ce statut,\u00a0 soit par l’octroi de l’asile politique (dans 10% des cas), soit par\u00a0 le biais d’un permis de s\u00e9jour humanitaire temporaire et\u00a0 renouvelable chaque ann\u00e9e (35-40% des cas). \u00a0 AFP <\/p>\n\n<\/div>\n
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Swedish police allowed to wear turbans, head scarves and skull caps as part of uniform<\/font><\/h2>\n
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Associated Press, le 9 mars 2006 \u00e0 <\/span> 13<\/span>h<\/span>59<\/span><\/p>\n
STOCKHOLM<\/span><\/st1:city>, <\/span> Sweden<\/span><\/st1:country-region><\/st1:place> (AP) _ Swedish police said Thursday they <\/span>have changed their uniform restrictions to allow officers <\/span>to wear turbans, head scarves or Jewish skull caps on the <\/span>job.<\/span><\/p>\n
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\u00a0The new policy is a way to attract more ethnic minorities to the police force, which has been criticized for not having enough diversity. Previous regulations said religious headgear could not be used as part of an official police uniform.<\/span><\/p>\n
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\u00a0\u00ab\u00a0To not allow police to wear turbans or head scarves would be to shut out large groups in <\/span> Sweden<\/span><\/st1:place><\/st1:country-region> from the police profession,\u00a0\u00bb said Katri Linna, the government ombudsman against ethnic discrimination. \u00ab\u00a0An officer in religious headgear would also serve an important symbolic function.\u00a0\u00bb<\/span><\/p>\n
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\u00a0However, the police will not issue its own turbans, head scarves or skull caps. An officer wishing to wear such headgear will have to pick one that has a \u00ab\u00a0suitable shape<\/span><\/p>\n
and color\u00a0\u00bb to fit the uniform, the National Police Board said in a statement. <\/span><\/p>\n
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Associated press<\/font><\/span><\/h3>\n<\/div>\n
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Tout le monde a bien entendu, sauf Ben Ali<\/font><\/h3>\n
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Par Abou Zaydane<\/font><\/strong> \u00a0 Tunis, le 2 f\u00e9vrier 2006 \u00a0 En d\u00e9pit des nombreuses visites inopin\u00e9es effectu\u00e9es par le dictateur Ben Ali et son \u00e9pouse, Le\u00efla Ben Ali aux \u00ab zones d\u2019ombres \u00bb – comme les appelle le r\u00e9gime fasciste et aux centres pour handicap\u00e9s que une administration dans la r\u00e9gion de l\u2019Ariana, inaugur\u00e9e par son \u00e9pouse, le r\u00e9gime se trouve en contradiction avec lui-m\u00eame. En effet, comment peut-il pr\u00e9tendre qu\u2019il accorde une importance pr\u00e9pond\u00e9rante aux handicap\u00e9s alors qu\u2019il a contribu\u00e9 \u00e0 estropier de nombreux jeunes Tunisiens, dont le nombre d\u00e9passe les 3000 \u00e0 la prison du 9 avril (ils sont \u00e2g\u00e9s de 17 \u00e0 29 ans). \u00a0 A la prison de Bizerte, cinq mille prisonniers rel\u00e8vent de cette tranche d\u2019\u00e2ge, idem pour les prisons de Gafsa, de Sfax, du Kef, d\u2019El Haouareb, de Mornag, de Zaghouan, de M\u00e9denine, Kebili ou Mornaguia. Et Dieu seul sait combien en renferme la prison de Borj El Amri dont les travaux touchent \u00e0 leur fin, travaux qui lui permettront d\u2019absorber une part encore plus importante de la jeunesse tunisienne perdue. \u00a0 Ce respectable Ben Ali n\u2019en a pas la moindre id\u00e9e, puisqu\u2019il ne s\u2019est pas autoris\u00e9 en tant que dictateur \u00e0 visiter les prisons et \u00e0 se faire expliquer la situation de cette partie de la jeunesse tunisienne. \u00a0 Pire encore, il a confi\u00e9 cette mission \u00e0 l\u2019avocat rat\u00e9, charg\u00e9 de l\u2019administration du minist\u00e8re de l\u2019oppression et de la r\u00e9pression des droits de l\u2019homme, pardon, au minist\u00e8re de la justice et des droits de l\u2019homme, ma\u00eetre B\u00e9chir Takkari. \u00a0 Le dictateur pourrait-il ne serait-ce qu\u2019une fois par an jeter un coup d\u2019\u0153il pour visiter les prisons et lib\u00e9rer les prisonniers ? \u00a0 (Traduction ni revue ni corrig\u00e9e par l\u2019auteur de la version en arabe, LT) \u00a0 (Source : www.reveiltunisien.org , le 8 mars 2006)<\/font><\/strong>\u00a0 <\/p>\n\n<\/div>\n
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Tunisie\u00a0: \u00ab\u00a0la mafia politique et les signes annonciateurs de la chute\u00a0\u00bb<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
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<\/span>par Hamime <\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
Premi\u00e8re partie Tunisie\u00a0: la mafia politique et les signes annonciateurs de la chute par Hamime mercredi 15 f\u00e9vrier 2006, par Hamine<\/font><\/span><\/a><\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
Seconde partie Tunisie\u00a0: la mafia politique et les signes annonciateurs de la chute par Hamime mercredi 22 f\u00e9vrier 2006<\/font><\/span><\/a><\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
Troisi\u00e8me partie Tunisie\u00a0: la mafia politique et les signes annonciateurs de la chute par Hamime mercredi 1er mars 2006<\/font><\/span><\/a><\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
Quatri\u00e8me partie<\/span><\/b><\/font><\/p>\n
Partant, nous aborderons les d\u00e9ficiences de la structure politique tunisienne en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, \u00e0 savoir le talent du despotisme de la dictature de parti unique imputable \u00e0 la mafia politique d\u2019une part, et l\u2019arri\u00e9ration de la pratique militante de ceux qui s\u2019autoproclament opposants d\u2019autre part. Car l\u2019opposition, de par son type de militantisme arri\u00e9r\u00e9, n\u2019a jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e0 m\u00eame d\u2019appr\u00e9hender la structure du r\u00e9gime politique tunisien actuel et n\u2019a m\u00eame pas ambitionn\u00e9 de chercher querelle \u00e0 ses faiblesses intrins\u00e8ques, toute occup\u00e9e qu\u2019elle \u00e9tait \u00e0 son discours \u00ab\u00a0Qui n\u2019engraisse ni n\u2019affranchit de la faim\u00a0\u00bb (1) un peuple qui n\u2019aspire, n\u2019attend et n\u2019esp\u00e8re que celui qui lui apportera un projet garant de vie et de paix. La fixation sur le discours et les insultes envers le r\u00e9gime et ses cadres internes et externes r\u00e9v\u00e8le la perte d\u2019orientation politique effective et des automatismes du traitement scientifique. Partant, nous appelons tous ceux qui ont \u00e0 c\u0153ur de lib\u00e9rer la Tunisie de son atonie d\u00fbe au virus de la mafia politique \u00e0 chercher \u00e0 comprendre la structuration du r\u00e9gime et sa dynamique, et de l\u00e0, ses faiblesses intrins\u00e8ques… Alors, si nous les examinons, si nous les connaissons, nous pourrons comprendre la ti\u00e9deur militante du peuple de fa\u00e7on g\u00e9n\u00e9rale et son aversion pour l\u2019affrontement, le conduisant \u00e0 se satisfaire des situations d\u2019abaissement, d\u2019abjection et d\u2019humiliation.<\/span><\/p>\n
La structure du r\u00e9gime politique mafieux tunisien<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
Que signifie structure du r\u00e9gime mafieux\u00a0? Il faut de prime abord comprendre que la structure apparente et connue du r\u00e9gime n\u2019a rien \u00e0 voir avec la structure du r\u00e9gime mafieux. Ces structures, comme nous l\u2019avons pr\u00e9c\u00e9demment expliqu\u00e9, sont des structures polici\u00e8res qui volent et pillent, s\u2019adonnent \u00e0 toutes les abominations et trafiquent tout bien de valeur. Elles passent actuellement par des crises et des luttes intestines qui en sont arriv\u00e9es au stade des liquidations physiques\u00a0: il y a des dossiers d\u2019assassinats non r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9s de nombreux cadres de la police repr\u00e9sentant un danger \u00e0 un moment donn\u00e9 pour la dynamique mafieuse.<\/span><\/p>\n
Comment travaillent ces structures secr\u00e8tes et comment pillent-elles les richesses du pays\u00a0? Le minist\u00e8re de l\u2019Int\u00e9rieur est l\u2019\u00e9picentre de la gestion des institutions tunisiennes\u00a0: depuis les institutions polici\u00e8res jusqu\u2019\u00e0 celles, culturelles dont la structuration se fait par le biais d\u2019un directeur g\u00e9n\u00e9ral d\u00e9volu \u00e0 toutes les affaires administratives, qu\u2019il distribue \u00e0 diff\u00e9rents cadres de l\u2019administration en fonction de leur client\u00e9lisme, en conservant l\u2019administration financi\u00e8re sous son autorit\u00e9 propre. Un \u00e9conome lui est alors associ\u00e9. Les mafieux ont fa\u00e7onn\u00e9 ces deux \u00e9l\u00e9ments (le directeur g\u00e9n\u00e9ral et l\u2019\u00e9conome) comme des pions auxquels il se coordonne pour mener \u00e0 bien une op\u00e9ration de liquidation des subventions et du budget. A ce propos, citons les secteurs de la culture et de l\u2019information. Ces deux secteurs qui re\u00e7oivent le plus de soutien et sont les canaux du vol et du pillage. La mafia b\u00e9n\u00e9ficie de vols internes par le biais des d\u00e9penses des centres culturels et d\u2019information, ainsi que de financements \u00e9trangers pour la centralisation et de subventions de ces institutions permettant \u00e0 d\u2019autres cultures de s\u2019introduire rapidement pour ouvrir le march\u00e9 \u00e0 des produits \u00e9cart\u00e9s par la r\u00e9cession dans leurs propres march\u00e9s, d\u2019autant qu\u2019elle compte sur les palais arri\u00e9r\u00e9s et affam\u00e9s dont l\u2019exp\u00e9rience a prouv\u00e9 que ceux-ci se pr\u00e9cipitent sur les exc\u00e9dents des autres soci\u00e9t\u00e9s.<\/span><\/p>\n
(1) Coran, Sourate 88, verset 7<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
Hamime<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
(traduction, LT)<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
(Source\u00a0: www.reveiltunisien.org<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/b>, le 8 mars 2006)<\/b>\u00a0 <\/span><\/p>\n
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<\/p>\nLettre Ouverte A \u00a0son excellence l\u2019ambassadeur \u00a0des Etats Unis d\u2019Am\u00e9rique en Tunisie.<\/font><\/h3>\n
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Monsieur, Je me permets de vous adresser cet \u00e9crit en ayant l\u2019ultime conviction que mes propos auront un impact de suivi positif formulant une assise de d\u00e9collage spectaculaire dans les relations Tuniso-Am\u00e9ricaines avec l\u2019espoir de voir, un jour, les obstacles des susceptibilit\u00e9s conceptionnelles\u00a0 se ramollir d\u2019abord pour dispara\u00eetre ensuite entre deux peuples de deux continents diff\u00e9rents o\u00f9 les pays se sont transform\u00e9s en mairies \u00a0Supra-nationales. Cependant, je ne suis en mesure d\u2019oublier notre rencontre tr\u00e8s amicale, au mois de Mai 2005 \u00e0 l\u2019H\u00f4tel Sheraton \u00e0 Tunis, \u00e0 l\u2019occasion d\u2019un s\u00e9minaire \u00e9tabli sur la libert\u00e9 d\u2019expression par une ONG \u00ab\u00a0 Inter News \u00bb. Monsieur l\u2019Ambassadeur, Vous \u00eates certainement au courant que le Pr\u00e9sident Mr. G-W Bush, son Vice-pr\u00e9sident Mr. Dick Cheeny, nombreuses ONG internationales et de multiples journaux de renomm\u00e9e mondiale \u00e9taient solidaires avec moi dans ma lourde peine socioprofessionnelle d\u2019opposant\u00a0 politique rebelle \u00e0 toute injustice et \u00e0 toutes les d\u00e9rives de l\u2019autorit\u00e9 au pouvoir en Tunisie. \u00a0Le soutien moral que m\u2019a attribu\u00e9 la vertu de la sensation humanitaire internationale\u00a0 m\u2019a permis de d\u00e9fier l\u2019asphyxie autoritaire. La justice Tunisienne vient de me r\u00e9parer les pr\u00e9judices encourus au point que je ne pourrais croire au r\u00eave r\u00e9el que je vis actuellement. A ce propos se sont adjoints , \u00e0 mon \u00e9gard , la g\u00e9n\u00e9rosit\u00e9 et la bienveillance du Pr\u00e9sident Zine El Abidine Ben Ali que j\u2019ai toujours critiqu\u00e9 , depuis 18 ans , au point de la diffamation publique t\u00e9l\u00e9vis\u00e9e et \u00e0 l\u2019Internet ,sans qu\u2019il m\u2019emp\u00eache de m\u2019exprimer librement \u00e0 son encontre et \u00e0 l\u2019encontre de ses collaborateurs . Autrement dit, les motifs de l\u2019affrontement politique, que je menais durant 18 ans de mis\u00e8re et de calvaire , se sont dissous actuellement\u00a0 par un simple geste de compr\u00e9hension et de responsabilit\u00e9 des parties intervenantes . Mais, paradoxalement \u00e0 ce revirement, la honte m\u2019accable face aux sp\u00e9culateurs des brebis galeuses de l\u2019Opposition Tunisienne qui se d\u00e9t\u00e9riore de jour en jour pour s\u2019\u00e9carter de plus en plus du peuple Tunisien. Nombreux personnages devenus m\u00e9diatiques dans le parcours du marketing politique des d\u00e9fenseurs des droits de l\u2019homme ont us\u00e9 des souffrances des victimes du malentendu politique pour confectionner une gloire synth\u00e9tique fragile o\u00f9 l\u2019int\u00e9r\u00eat personnel des commis des droits de l\u2019homme pr\u00e9domine sur la r\u00e9paration des pr\u00e9judices des victimes qui leur ont fait recours au nom des principes et des valeurs universelles qu\u2019ils manipulent audacieusement par les notions de la s\u00e9gr\u00e9gation et le profit de clans . Etre opposant politique n\u2019a jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 synonyme d\u2019avoir une grande gueule . \u00a0C\u2019est plut\u00f4t avoir une raison patriotique honn\u00eate et cr\u00e9dible, du courage \u00a0Et une pr\u00e9disposition au sacrifice. Mais, la forme et le lexique du militantisme politique encouru par une telle frange handicap\u00e9e d\u2019une Opposition Tunisienne disloqu\u00e9e de sa base et non repr\u00e9sentative du\u00a0 paysage politique poussent au blocage et \u00e0 la d\u00e9formation des r\u00e9formes fondamentales pour entretenir la chronicit\u00e9 du statu quo au profit des foyers manipulateurs du marketing politique qui si\u00e8gent \u00e0 la rive nord de la M\u00e9diterran\u00e9e. \u00a0Par les slogans de la d\u00e9fense des droits de l\u2019homme , le terrorisme s\u2019est toujours d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 dans le monde sous les aspects de la l\u00e9galit\u00e9 , de la l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 et de la loyaut\u00e9 mettant dans l\u2019embarras l\u2019autorit\u00e9 du r\u00e9gime Tunisien dans les tribunes internationales pour bloquer les efforts officiels au d\u00e9veloppement national. \u00a0Certes, l\u2019autorit\u00e9 supr\u00eame est consciente de l\u2019existence de nombreuses carences de conduites et d\u2019attitudes pour lesquelles elle a d\u00e9j\u00e0 mis en \u0153uvre tout\u00a0 un processus d\u2019am\u00e9nagement, de remaniements et de r\u00e9novation pour le r\u00e9tablissement\u00a0 des \u00e9quilibres sociopolitiques. Mais cette orientation r\u00e9formatrice ne devrait \u00eatre marginalis\u00e9e au profit des greffons des remonte-controls. Il est , cependant , temps de mettre \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9preuve la reconnaissance du peuple Tunisien au Pr\u00e9sident G-W Bush et ses collaborateurs pour le r\u00e9tablissement des ponts de confiance et de coop\u00e9ration afin de remodeler la conqu\u00eate de la bonne r\u00e9putation des Etats Unies d\u2019Am\u00e9rique au niveau es pays Arabes . \u00a0Cet obstacle psychologique ne serait vaincu que par la participation et la collaboration des juifs Tunisiens , Alg\u00e9riens , Libyens et Marocains au dialogue des civilisations dans le cadre du Fauteuil Ben Ali pour \u00e9tablir des nouvelles notions d\u2019osmose civilisationnelle entre les religions. Sachant que la Tunisie a , toujours,\u00a0 \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e0 travers l\u2019histoire humaine contemporaine le Grand Portail du Moyen Orient , le spectacle de l\u2019effervescence politico-militaire de cette r\u00e9gion a , \u00e0 son tour , omis de faire appel \u00e0 la clairvoyance de l\u2019\u00e9quipe dirigeante Tunisienne dans le rapprochement des diff\u00e9rents Isra\u00e9lo-Palestiniens. Par ailleurs, il serait n\u00e9cessaire sinon indispensable de consolider les relations Tuniso-Am\u00e9ricaines dans un contexte r\u00e9novateur et r\u00e9formateur\u00a0 qui toucherait le fond et l\u2019\u00e2me du simple citoyen des deux continents. L\u2019installation et l\u2019ouverture d\u2019une Ambassade Isra\u00e9lienne \u00e0 Tunis en \u00e9change similaire \u00e0 Tel Aviv devrait promouvoir la paix au Moyen Orient et \u00e9radiquer la notion du terrorisme international avec beaucoup de civisme dans le cadre d\u2019une action culturo-\u00e9conomique. Si la volont\u00e9 supr\u00eame Am\u00e9ricaine est sinc\u00e8re dans l\u2019\u00e9tablissement de pont diplomatique Tuniso-Isr\u00e8lien diurne, le peuple Tunisien ne cherche que le bon vieux temps des rapports et\u00a0 des affinit\u00e9s Islamo-juives. \u00a0Mais, en revanche toute man\u0153uvre Occidentale d\u2019orchestration et de manipulation d\u2019attitudes et de conduites pourraient remettre les relations Tuniso-Am\u00e9ricaines en question. Il faudrait, en cons\u00e9quent, se mettre \u00e0 l\u2019esprit que l\u2019hostilit\u00e9 principale qui pourrait surgir \u00e0 l\u2019encontre de ce projet civilisationnel n\u2019est autre que celle de l\u2019Opposition Tunisienne bien assist\u00e9e par des foyers financiers \u00e9trangers suspects et des personnalit\u00e9s politiques Fran\u00e7aises qui manipulent au remonte-controls des r\u00e9volt\u00e9s contre la Tunisie et les juifs dans un esprit d\u2019anti \u2013s\u00e9mitisme \u00e0 vocation criminelle Nazi qui aspire \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9radication du peuple juif entre l\u2019holocauste et la mer .\u00a0 \u00a0A cet effet , il est recommand\u00e9 au\u00a0 gouvernement Am\u00e9ricain de renforcer les efforts du Pr\u00e9sident Zine El Abidine Ben Ali afin de prendre le flambeau d\u2019une politique arabe de mod\u00e9ration et de raison dans une perspective de paix et de prosp\u00e9rit\u00e9 entre les musulmans et les juifs\u00a0 au bassin M\u00e9diterran\u00e9en. Par ailleurs, il vous est recommand\u00e9 Mr. L\u2019Ambassadeur des U.S.A en Tunisie ,\u00a0 de sortir du cercle sp\u00e9culateur vicieux d\u2019une Opposition Politique Tunisienne qui ne vit que dans les mar\u00e9cages car elle ne se nourrit que des mar\u00e9cages .\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Cependant, les revendications \u00e9litistes \u00e9troites de nos d\u00e9fenseurs des droits de l\u2019homme et de nos opposants politiques en Tunisie ne touchent r\u00e9ellement le v\u00e9cu\u00a0 quotidien du citoyen par m\u00e9pris, n\u00e9gligence et non consid\u00e9ration. \u00a0La pr\u00e9dominance convictionnelle de l\u2019imbibition m\u00e9ning\u00e9e de certaines id\u00e9ologies,\u00a0 abolies \u00e0 ses lieux de naissance,\u00a0 ne pourrait v\u00e9hiculer les crit\u00e8res de la mobilisation et de la discipline de masse dans une atmosph\u00e8re de diversit\u00e9 o\u00f9 l\u2019harmonie du spectre politique n\u2019\u00e9blouit ni l\u2019acteur ni le spectateur. \u00a0Nos brebis galeuses se sont toujours trouv\u00e9es confronter \u00e0 la repr\u00e9sentativit\u00e9 , \u00e0 la cr\u00e9dibilit\u00e9 , \u00e0 l\u2019honn\u00eatet\u00e9 et au\u00a0 d\u00e9terminisme des pr\u00e9sum\u00e9s interlocuteurs au nom du peuple Tunisien\u00a0 qui n\u2019ont cess\u00e9 de s\u00e9questrer , par la sp\u00e9culation id\u00e9o-politique s\u00e9gr\u00e9gative , les tribunes m\u00e9diatiques \u00e0 l\u2019ext\u00e9rieur de la Tunisie . \u00a0Nombreuses attitudes m\u00e9diatiques \u00ab d\u2019opposants politiques Tunisiens \u00bb ont\u00a0 bien aggrav\u00e9 leur nostalgie politique pour\u00a0 pousser toute crise sociopolitique locale \u00e0 l\u2019impasse. \u00a0Les exemples ne manquent pas \u00e0 ce propos. \u00a0Pourtant, nombreux diplomates et foyers diplomatiques \u00e9trangers, en Tunisie et ailleurs,\u00a0 se permettent l\u2019audace et l\u2019arrogance de la complicit\u00e9 discr\u00e8te aux complots contre le r\u00e9gime Tunisien au biais de\u00a0 la st\u00e9rilit\u00e9 politique d\u2019une frange d\u2019\u00e9lites isol\u00e9es de la base \u00e0 la recherche d\u2019une revanche personnelle qui inciterait \u00e0 la greffe d\u2019une d\u00e9mocratie synth\u00e9tique par l\u2019arme et le sang. \u00a0Le recours de certains r\u00e9volt\u00e9s aux man\u0153uvres scandaleuses publiques a toujours tent\u00e9 de ridiculiser vainement l\u2019autorit\u00e9 au pouvoir par les mensonges et les provocations de bassesses qui ne cessent de trouver de l\u2019\u00e9cho ailleurs. \u00a0Leurs appels aux manifestations et \u00e0 l\u2019insurrection populaire\u00a0 n\u2019ont jamais trouv\u00e9 de r\u00e9ponse, de soutien et de solidarit\u00e9 m\u00e9diatique locale populaire. \u00a0Pourtant, la presse et l\u2019information satellitaire Occidentale et Al-Jazira ont toujours exprim\u00e9 de la piti\u00e9 et de l\u2019affection \u00e9motionnelle par la sp\u00e9culation politique des rarissimes\u00a0 faux incidents occasionnels attribu\u00e9s \u00e0 l\u2019autorit\u00e9 au pouvoir. \u00a0Le mensonge du porte-parole du marasme de l\u2019opposition politique trouve toujours les justifications parano\u00efaques \u00e0 son commerce politique \u00e0 l\u2019ext\u00e9rieur de la Tunisie. Monsieur l\u2019Ambassadeur, \u00a0Il est temps de voir les choses en face pour sortir de la sp\u00e9culation et du marketing politique entretenu par le profit et le favoritisme au nom de la d\u00e9mocratie et de la d\u00e9fense des droits de l\u2019homme. \u00a0Un important effort international devrait s\u2019\u00e9tablir prochainement\u00a0 en Tunisie pour sortir de la voie de la marginalisation politique en vue de r\u00e9tablir les \u00e9quilibres de l\u2019\u00e9quation g\u00e9o-strat\u00e8gique\u00a0 internationale par l\u2019int\u00e9gration du hors-jeu qui a toujours amput\u00e9 les grandes man\u0153uvres de d\u00e9collage politique , \u00e9conomique et social . La lib\u00e9ration r\u00e9cente des prisonniers politiques et l\u2019accalmie des tensions politiques internes en Tunisie ne sont au fait qu\u2019un bon signe pour l\u2019expansion des bonnes intentions et initiatives \u00e0 l\u2019ext\u00e9rieur de nos fronti\u00e8res . Cependant , l\u2019orientation des projecteurs de la politique ext\u00e9rieure Am\u00e9ricaine sur l\u2019incidence de l\u2019Egypte et l\u2019Arabie Saoudite , depuis plus d\u2019un demi si\u00e8cle , pour la r\u00e9solution du conflit Isra\u00e9lo-arabe du Moyen Orient a transform\u00e9 une m\u00e8che en un incendie civilisationnel fatal qui se prolonge et s\u2019\u00e9tend ailleurs\u00a0 . De ce fait, la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 d\u2019Isra\u00ebl na\u00eet, s\u2019engage et prend son d \u00e9part \u00e0 partir de la Tunisie , v\u00e9ritable Portail du Moyen Orient. Car, \u00e0 titre de confirmation, je vous proposerai Mr. L\u2019Ambassadeur de monter au plus haut point culminant des hauteur du Nord de la Tunisie , vous visualiseriez avec une jumelle puissante , Tel Aviv et sa banlieue sans aucun obstacle ni fronti\u00e8res. Le peuple Tunisien n\u2019a jamais omis la reconnaissance Am\u00e9ricaine de son ind\u00e9pendance et l\u2019intervention \u00e9co-financi\u00e8re et humanitaire d\u2019une grande puissance qui respecte ses interlocuteurs de l\u2019autre cot\u00e9 de l\u2019Oc\u00e9an. Si les ponts du dialogue des civilisations du monde demeurent sensibles aux fluctuations des humeurs des grandes puissances face aux \u00e9checs diplomatiques, politiques et militaires de certains \u00e9tats influents sur le cours des \u00e9v\u00e8nements quotidiens mondiaux, ils\u00a0 n\u2019ont jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 synchrones avec les\u00a0 affinit\u00e9s des peuples entre les pays de la plan\u00e8te. Un double langage de schizophr\u00e8nes politiques \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9chelle internationale a toujours \u0153uvr\u00e9 pour la r\u00e9pulsion de l\u2019affection de masses pour cr\u00e9er des \u00e9corchures civilisationnelles au profit de la myopie des orientations politiques bas\u00e9es sur les susceptibilit\u00e9s, les complots et les conflits de tendances id\u00e9o-th\u00e9ologiques. \u00a0Nombreux dirigeants politiques du monde\u00a0 n\u2019ont jamais eu le courage d\u2019\u0153uvrer\u00a0 en dehors du chauvinisme nationaliste et de l\u2019int\u00e9grisme religieux\u00a0 pour vaincre le contexte de l\u2019\u00e9go\u00efsme \u00e9lectoral mobilisateur\u00a0 motiv\u00e9 par l\u2019implantation de l\u2019absolu humain sur le compte du sacr\u00e9 divin . Les d\u00e9s\u00e9quilibres constat\u00e9s dans l\u2019\u00e9dification de syst\u00e8mes et de r\u00e9gimes politiques se sont toujours\u00a0 r\u00e9f\u00e9r\u00e9s \u00e0 la mat\u00e9rialisation des rapports humains en l\u2019absence de rep\u00e8re moral et\u00a0 d\u00e9faut des normes convictionnelles capables de renforcer la mobilisation spontan\u00e9e des masses populaires autour de symbole patriotique. \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Le recours au culte de la personne n\u2019est jamais parvenu \u00e0 combler le d\u00e9ficit de la foi pour marginaliser la religion de toute nature. De ce fait, nombreuses conventions officielles entre hauts dirigeants de pays n\u2019engagent uniquement que leurs signataires sans que leurs peuples soient m\u00eal\u00e9s \u00e0 ses accords. \u00a0Ce type de relations entre \u00e9tats d\u00e9marque une st\u00e9rilit\u00e9 de proc\u00e9dures internationales\u00a0 qui n\u2019ont\u00a0 jamais\u00a0 fait\u00a0 l\u2019objet d\u2019\u00e9tudes strat\u00e9giques objectives modulant les fondements rationnels entre les rapports de\u00a0 pays et peuples face aux relations isol\u00e9es entre dirigeants et leurs bases. Si la statut du sociologue Arabo-musulman Ibn Khaldoun demeure debout entre la Cath\u00e9drale Chr\u00e9tienne et l\u2019Ambassade de France dans la plus importante art\u00e8re urbanistique \u00e0 Tunis , la Mosqu\u00e9e Zeitouna s\u2019est implant\u00e9e \u00e0 la M\u00e9dina dans un environnement architectural qui r\u00e9siste au temps sous une ambiance originelle et artisanale bien sp\u00e9cifique aux traditions et coutumes d\u2019un peuple qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 toujours fier de ses origines . \u00a0Cependant, au plus haut sommet de Carthage, se trouve l\u2019Eglise Chr\u00e9tienne de Saint Louis qui projette ses reflets sur la Mosqu\u00e9e \u00ab El Abidine \u00bb joignant sur les bords de leur axe m\u00e9dian les deux Synagogues de la Marsa et de La Goulette \u00e0 la banlieue nord de Tunis . Ce rayonnement pluri-culturo-religieux conf\u00e8re \u00e0 la Tunisie la diversit\u00e9 d\u2019un polymorphisme civilisationnel \u00e0 travers l\u2019histoire de ses anc\u00eatres avec une projection \u00e0 l\u2019avenir qui historise\u00a0 le pr\u00e9sent contemporain. \u00a0Tenant compte de ces donn\u00e9es rationnelles, cette diversit\u00e9 a, toujours, \u00e9t\u00e9 favorable \u00e0 un nouvel \u00e9tat d\u2019esprit permettant \u00e0 la Tunisie de prendre le relais du flambeau Arabo-Musulman de meneur de la politique internationale au bassin M\u00e9diterran\u00e9en. A la recherche d\u2019une d\u00e9marche d\u2019adh\u00e9sion \u00e0 la modernit\u00e9 contemporaine, l\u2019autorit\u00e9 supr\u00eame du Commandement du pays, devrait d\u00e9velopper son activisme politique vers la responsabilisation commune avec l\u2019Opposition Tunisienne qui a toujours synth\u00e9tis\u00e9 depuis cinquante ans d\u2019ind\u00e9pendance des \u00e9l\u00e9ments passifs incapables de renouveler leur discours contestataire se r\u00e9f\u00e9rant \u00e0 une mentalit\u00e9 archa\u00efque de r\u00e9volt\u00e9s : \u00ab Se d\u00e9marquer de la foule pour se faire distinguer \u00bb. Si le d\u00e9funt Za\u00efm Habib Bourguiba a \u0153uvr\u00e9 pour initier au peuple Tunisien les principes n\u00e9cessaires \u00e0 la modulation entre la civilisation Arabo-Musulmane et la civilisation Occidentale, il \u00e9tait clairement et franchement hostile aux maux de t\u00eate du Nationalisme et du Communisme. \u00a0Son itin\u00e9raire \u00e0 la magistrature supr\u00eame a \u00e9t\u00e9 marqu\u00e9 par des stations politiques historiques offrant \u00e0 la Tunisie une position privil\u00e9gi\u00e9e parmi toutes les nations du monde. \u00a0La mentalit\u00e9 de sa clairvoyance \u00e9tait anticip\u00e9e \u00e0 son \u00e9poque face \u00e0 sa th\u00e8se dans la r\u00e9solution du conflit du Isra\u00e9lo-palestinien au Moyen Orient. \u00a0Par ailleurs, l\u2019esprit r\u00e9trograde des dirigeants Arabes, de cette \u00e9poque,\u00a0 a bloqu\u00e9 son processus. \u00a0Le changement dans la continuit\u00e9 \u00e9tabli par son successeur, le Pr\u00e9sident Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, a, cependant, renforc\u00e9 la position ant\u00e9rieure de la Tunisie dans ce domaine en tendant les ponts de confiance, de coop\u00e9ration et de solidarit\u00e9 avec les pays Arabes.\u00a0 \u00a0Ceux-ci ont sous-estim\u00e9 l\u2019importance civilisationnelle de la Tunisie relativement \u00e0\u00a0 sa superficie, sa densit\u00e9 d\u00e9mographique et ses ressources. \u00a0Mais, le parcours de l\u2019impact\u00a0 de la Tunisie a, toujours, refus\u00e9 ces normes de r\u00e9f\u00e9rences dans ses relations ext\u00e9rieures. \u00a0Car, entre autres, l\u2019O.L.P n\u2019aurait jamais acc\u00e9d\u00e9 \u00e0 la Maison Blanche sans la motivation politique et diplomatique Tunisienne. \u00a0 Les circonstances actuelles de l\u2019\u00e9volution des \u00e9v\u00e9nements internationaux exigent l\u2019unification des efforts patriotiques de tout un chacun et m\u2019obligent particuli\u00e8rement\u00a0 \u00e0 m\u2019aligner au rang de la raison pour surpasser les surench\u00e8res politiques st\u00e9riles entretenues par les sp\u00e9cialistes de la sp\u00e9culation de la d\u00e9fense des droits de l\u2019homme et\u00a0 du marketing politique d\u2019une frange d\u2019opportunistes de l\u2019Opposition Tunisienne. \u00a0Mon conseil au\u00a0\u00a0 Pr\u00e9sident Zine El Abidine Ben Ali se r\u00e9sume \u00e0\u00a0 son incitation\u00a0 \u00e0 dominer la charge totale de la responsabilit\u00e9 politique de la Tunisie pour prendre le train de la politique internationale. La Tunisie est, cependant, en mesure d\u2019\u00eatre \u00e0 la hauteur de l\u2019avant-garde politique pour prendre le flambeau du monde Arabo-Musulman par la sagesse de la mod\u00e9ration et l\u2019objectivit\u00e9. \u00a0Il est temps qu\u2019elle se substitue \u00e0 l\u2019Egypte et \u00e0 l\u2019Arabie Saoudite pour un renouvellement positif de la mentalit\u00e9 moderne de l\u2019Islam en vue d\u2019un meilleur usage de l\u2019osmose fluide\u00a0 du dialogue des civilisations et ses alliances coordinatrices du rapprochement des peuples de la plan\u00e8te. \u00a0La concr\u00e9tisation des slogans de v\u00e9ritable coop\u00e9ration, de solidarit\u00e9 sur la base de la tol\u00e9rance fictive , du respect mutuel et l\u2019\u00e9tablissement des ponts de confiance avec les communaut\u00e9s Juive et Chr\u00e9tienne dans le monde ne sont qu\u2019un objectif de paix et de sereinit\u00e9 pouvant contrarier l\u2019extension du terrorisme. \u00a0La s\u00e9gr\u00e9gation raciale\u00a0 , ethnique et diplomatique\u00a0 Arabo-Musulmane a toujours opt\u00e9 pour l\u2019exclusion des repr\u00e9sentations officielles Juives en pays Arabo-Musulmans sous pr\u00e9texte du refus m\u00e9diatique populaire\u00a0 dont le comportement a tant \u00e9volu\u00e9 et\u00a0 a bien chang\u00e9 relativement \u00e0 son haut commandement politique . \u00a0Donc , la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de l\u2019\u00e9tablissement de points de contacts officiels d\u00e9clar\u00e9s , en plein jour ,\u00a0 des repr\u00e9sentations diplomatiques Juives en Tunisie contribuerait \u00e0 abolir les tabous et les barri\u00e8res psychologiques pour vivre une r\u00e9alit\u00e9 commune permettant le rapprochement des notions religieuses de la descendance d\u2019Abraham. Si le Caire a \u00e9t\u00e9 construit , depuis des si\u00e8cles, par un Tunisien, Jawhar Essekelli, sa confirmation prouve \u00e0 travers les prolongements de l\u2019histoire que la Tunisie a \u00e9t\u00e9 toujours le pr\u00e9curseur des innovations et des cr\u00e9ations dans la notion de la civilisation. \u00a0Un simple regard sur la cartographie g\u00e9opolitique\u00a0 montre que la Tunisie a \u00e9t\u00e9 toujours la Portail\u00a0 du Moyen Orient indispensable au passage de toute r\u00e9ussite politique. \u00a0 Il n\u2019est, cependant, pas concevable actuellement que la Tunisie, terre des rencontres et des civilisations, demeure au si\u00e8ge du spectateur passif face \u00e0 la m\u00e9tamorphose dystocique du monde contemporain. Les r\u00e9centes \u00e9lections Palestiniennes qui ont men\u00e9 le Hamas \u00e0 la victoire exigent de la Tunisie une responsabilit\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique pour l\u2019ouverture d\u2019un dialogue constructif officiel avec l\u2019\u00e9tat H\u00e9breux\u00a0 afin d\u2019\u00e9radiquer la qualification du terrorisme qui s\u2019est coll\u00e9e \u00e0 la religion Musulmane et aux Musulmans. La Tunisie est en mesure d\u2019\u00eatre un mod\u00e8le exclusif pour le monde Arabe et Musulman au moyen du d\u00e9veloppement \u00e9conomique, social, politique et culturel. La Ghriba , \u00e0 l\u2019Ile des r\u00eaves de Djerba , renforcerait les liens d\u2019amiti\u00e9 et de coop\u00e9ration avec la communaut\u00e9 internationale Juive\u00a0 en dehors de la clandestinit\u00e9 et des contraintes m\u00e9diatiques de la\u00a0 peur hallucinatoire des hostilit\u00e9s populaires Arabo-Musulmanes pr\u00e9sum\u00e9es. En cons\u00e9quent, je demande fermement , par le biais de votre ambassade des Etats-Unis d\u2019Am\u00e9rique \u00e0 Tunis ,\u00e0 titre incitateur et de consid\u00e9ration au Roi Abdall\u00e2h d\u2019Arabie Saoudite de contribuer avec les U.S.A\u00a0 afin de\u00a0 renforcer politiquement et financi\u00e8rement la position du\u00a0\u00a0 Pr\u00e9sident Tunisien\u00a0 Zine El Abidine Ben Ali pour l\u2019\u00e9change d\u2019ouverture d\u2019ambassades de Tunisie et d\u2019Isra\u00ebl dans les pays respectifs afin de rapprocher la notion bilat\u00e9rale des diff\u00e9rents de la civilisation Musulmane , Juda\u00efque et Chr\u00e9tienne , en terre des rencontres, dans le but d\u2019\u00e9radiquer l\u2019injustice de la qualification de terrorisme attribu\u00e9e gratuitement \u00e0\u00a0 l\u2019Islam et aux Musulmans . L\u2019Arabie Saoudite a tant contribu\u00e9 par sa n\u00e9gligence officielle s\u00e9curitaire et id\u00e9ologique\u00a0 \u00e0 la propagation de la culture religieuse fanatique int\u00e9griste du Wahhabisme, source des malheurs et des drames du monde arabo-musulmans . Elle devrait , \u00e0 son tour, s\u2019innocenter de l\u2019orientation des index internationaux de culpabilit\u00e9 terroriste et criminelle dirig\u00e9s de l\u2019Occident \u00e0 la Terre Sainte Musulmane. La position sacr\u00e9e de la Tunisie face \u00e0 la religion de la communaut\u00e9 Juive, par la Ghriba ,\u00a0 se trouve confront\u00e9e\u00a0 \u00e0 la position sacr\u00e9e de l\u2019Arabie Saoudite , par la Mecque , face aux Musulmans. A partir de ce contexte, le dialogue des civilisations s\u2019ouvrirait entre la descendance d\u2019Abraham. \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Dr.SAHBI AMRI<\/font><\/strong> \u00a0M\u00e9decin \u00a0 Tel.00.216.98.22.27.51<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Avis aux jeunes chercheurs!<\/font><\/h3>\n
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Le prix de la meilleure th\u00e8se en langue fran\u00e7aise est organis\u00e9 par l\u2019Institut d\u2019Etudes de l\u2019Islam et des Soci\u00e9t\u00e9s du Monde Musulman (IISMM), cr\u00e9e au sein de l\u2019Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS).<\/span><\/p>\n
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Ce prix vise \u00e0 distinguer les recherches en langue fran\u00e7aise qui ont pour objet d\u2019\u00e9tude le monde musulman, \u00e0 favoriser l\u2019innovation et la recherche scientifique, \u00e0 fournir aux jeunes chercheurs les moyens de publier ou de poursuivre leurs travaux dans les meilleures conditions.<\/span><\/p>\n
Ce prix sera attribu\u00e9 tous les deux ans par un jury international et remis solennellement au cours d\u2019une c\u00e9r\u00e9monie publique.<\/span><\/p>\n
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Domaines de recherche concern\u00e9s <\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
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Les th\u00e8ses concern\u00e9es par ce prix devront \u00eatre li\u00e9es aux r\u00e9gions d\u2019Afrique et d\u2019Asie o\u00f9 l\u2019islam est la religion majoritaire ou une des religions majeures, ou aux r\u00e9gions o\u00f9, du fait de migrations anciennes ou r\u00e9centes, une partie de la population est de tradition musulmane. <\/span><\/p>\n
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Les th\u00e8ses concern\u00e9es par ce prix seront li\u00e9es \u00e0 un des cinq groupes de disciplines suivants : <\/span><\/p>\n
\u2022Etudes linguistiques ( arabe, persan, turc) et litt\u00e9raires <\/span><\/p>\n
\u2022Droit, \u00e9conomie, sciences politiques <\/span><\/p>\n
\u2022Histoire, histoire de l\u2019art, islamologie <\/span><\/p>\n
\u2022D\u00e9mographie, et \u00e9tudes des migrations, \u00e9tudes urbaines et g\u00e9ographie <\/span><\/p>\n
\u2022Anthropologie, musicologie, sociologie <\/span><\/p>\n
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Appel \u00e0 candidature <\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
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Les candidats devront avoir soutenu leur th\u00e8se entre le 1er janvier 2002 et le 31 d\u00e9cembre 2005. La lettre de candidature sera accompagn\u00e9e d\u2019un exemplaire de la th\u00e8se, du rapport de th\u00e8se et d\u2019une lettre de recommandation du directeur de th\u00e8se. Les candidatures seront re\u00e7ues jusqu\u2019au 16 avril 2006 inclus. <\/span><\/p>\n
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En septembre 2006, la publication des r\u00e9sultats donnera lieu \u00e0 une c\u00e9r\u00e9monie publique au cours de laquelle les laur\u00e9ats seront appel\u00e9s \u00e0 pr\u00e9senter bri\u00e8vement leurs recherches. Les fondations et institutions qui auront contribu\u00e9 au financement de ces prix seront mentionn\u00e9es dans la publication des r\u00e9sultats.\u00a0 <\/span><\/p>\n
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Informations:<\/span><\/span><\/b><\/font><\/p>\n
Institut d\u2019Etudes de l\u2019Islam et des Soci\u00e9t\u00e9s du Monde Musulman <\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
96 boulevard Raspail <\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
75006 Paris <\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
Tel : (33) 1 53 63 56 00 <\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
Fax : (33) 1 53 63 56 10 <\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
http:\/\/iismm.ehess.fr<\/font><\/a> <\/span><\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
iismm@ehess.fr<\/font><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0\u00a0 <\/span><\/b><\/p>\n
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Home – Accueil – \u0627\u0644\u0631\u0626\u064a\u0633\u064a\u0629 TUNISNEWS 6\u00a0\u00e8me\u00a0ann\u00e9e, N\u00b0\u00a02117 du 09.03.2006 \u00a0archives : www.tunisnews.net Huit familles de prisonniers politiques: \u00ab\u00a0A\u00efd, comment nous reviens-tu, A\u00efd\u00a0?\u00a0\u00bb Les Verts en France : Tunisie\u00a0, la dictature de Ben Ali choisit ses Verts U. S. Department of state: Tunisia – Country Reports on Human Rights Practices\u00a0 – 2005 AFP: Tunisie \/ […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":22040,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"inline_featured_image":false,"site-sidebar-layout":"default","site-content-layout":"","ast-site-content-layout":"default","site-content-style":"default","site-sidebar-style":"default","ast-global-header-display":"","ast-banner-title-visibility":"","ast-main-header-display":"","ast-hfb-above-header-display":"","ast-hfb-below-header-display":"","ast-hfb-mobile-header-display":"","site-post-title":"","ast-breadcrumbs-content":"","ast-featured-img":"","footer-sml-layout":"","ast-disable-related-posts":"","theme-transparent-header-meta":"","adv-header-id-meta":"","stick-header-meta":"","header-above-stick-meta":"","header-main-stick-meta":"","header-below-stick-meta":"","astra-migrate-meta-layouts":"default","ast-page-background-enabled":"default","ast-page-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"ast-content-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"footnotes":""},"categories":[],"tags":[55,37,29],"class_list":["post-15601","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","tag-55","tag-37","tag-fr"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/tunisnews.net\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15601","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/tunisnews.net\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/tunisnews.net\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tunisnews.net\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tunisnews.net\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=15601"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/tunisnews.net\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15601\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tunisnews.net\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/22040"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/tunisnews.net\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=15601"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tunisnews.net\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=15601"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/tunisnews.net\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=15601"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}